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Abstract
Preferences relating to inequality aversion, the trade-off between equality and efficiency, and
self-interest, the degree to which the ‘self’ is weighted in relation to ‘others’, are incorporated
within structural models to explain prosocial behaviour, the act of giving to others. To observe
such behaviour, incentivised laboratory and lab-in-the-field experiments are run. Structural
preferences parameters are then estimated, at the individual, cluster and sample level, within
the utility functions proposed. Noise in decision making is formally modelled with the Beta
and Dirichlet distributions, which are formulated as random behavioural models. In the first
chapter, distributional decision problems amongst groups of three are presented to partici-
pants within a laboratory experiment. Using multiple experimental designs and alternative
perspectives, within-subject treatment effects are tested. The second chapter incorporates
oneness, the closeness of connection to others, within a structural model to better explain the
differential effects that social distance can have on distributional decision making. In a lab-in-
the-field experiment in Mbale, Uganda, modified three-person dictator games are presented
to participants to enable the observation of such behaviour, alongside an extensive survey.
Finally, the third chapter focuses on N-person giving. Five alternative utility functions are
formulated, which incorporate differing behavioural preference parameters; accounting for
the distinction of self-other and between-other inequality aversion, congestion and minimum
threshold levels. Both the goodness-of-fit and predictive accuracy of each model are compared,
to identify the ‘best’ model for each individual. Within each of the three chapters, results
show extensive heterogeneity in prosocial behaviour, which is accounted for through the esti-
mated preference parameters. On average, participants have a substantial regard for others
and a preference for reducing inequality, rather than increasing efficiency. The experimental
design, perspective, oneness levels and number of recipients are shown to have significant,
but differential, effects on prosocial behaviour.
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“ How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”
- Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (1790)
Introduction
A regard for others is something inherent in human nature. Acts of kindness, generosity
and compassion are frequently observed throughout society. Yet, much research in the field
of economics assumes that all individuals are purely selfish. The intricacies of the varying
degrees of altruism are often ignored, and through it a substantial understanding of human
nature is missed.
The constructs of inequality aversion, the trade-off between equality and efficiency, and
self-interest, the degree to which the ‘self’ is weighted in relation to the ‘other’, form the
foundations of this thesis. These preferences account for the regard for others that particular
individuals feel, allowing for heterogeneity in prosocial behaviour, the act of giving to others, to
be explained. Within each of the three chapters of this thesis incentivised experiments are run
to enable the observation of individual-level prosocial behaviour and subsequent estimation
of preference parameters, which strive to explain such behaviour.
This introduction will outline the general approach taken, before introducing the three
chapters. Following the introduction will be the three chapters. Each are written as self-
contained papers, with extensive appendices included. The conclusion will, then, briefly
summarise the whole thesis, describing its contributions to the literature and limitations,
before discussing possible extensions and proposed future research.
***
Throughout the thesis, the methodological approach taken falls under the umbrella of experi-
mental economics. Experimental methods allow for the collection of data not easily observed
in the real world. It allows for the abstraction and isolation of particular phenomena en-
abling the testing of economic theory, estimation of preferences and evaluation of treatment
effects. Through utilising experiments, and analysing the data produced, light can be shed
on particular aspects of human nature, thus increasing our knowledge and understanding.
To utilise such methods, incentivised experiments were run in the EXEC laboratory, at
the University of York, and as a lab-in-the-field experiment, in Mbale, Uganda. Within the
experiments participants were presented with incentivised decision problems. Participants
made individual choices, using interactive on-screen interfaces, which had real monetary con-
sequences for themselves and others in the experiment. It is through this that a revealed
preference approach can be taken, which is distinct from the stated preference approach. In
the latter, participants are asked to state what they would do in a particular scenario, while
1
Inequality Aversion and Self-Interest
the former incentivises each decision problem to reveal how participants actually behave.
Decisions in the laboratory experiments were made using computers, while a temporary labo-
ratory was set-up in the lab-in-the-field experiment, with touch-screen tablets. The controlled
environment within both approaches allows for complex experiments to be run, allowing for
extensive datasets to be constructed.
The samples within the laboratory experiments predominantly consist of university stu-
dents, while in the lab-in-the-field experiment participants are drawn from both general pop-
ulation and university student pools. Across both types of experiment rich demographic data
are obtained alongside the experiments, through running parallel questionnaire-based sur-
veys. Utmost care was taken when running each experiment, to ensure that the methods
used were transparent, replicable and void of deception, with participants decisions remaining
anonymous.1
To analyse the data obtained from the experiments descriptive, econometric and structural
modelling analytical techniques are used. The first is primarily used to illustrate the observed
behaviour, while the second is used to identify significant treatment effects, test hypothesis
and examine demographic trends. Within the third, utility functions are proposed to explain
behaviour through incorporating structural preference parameters. The preference parameters
both have an intuitive meaning behind them and strive to account for differences in behaviour.
Before going into detail on the preference parameters, a divergence into the notion of utility
will be taken. This discussion will clarify the philosophical standpoint of the research.
Utility is a construct which is often thought of as synonymous with happiness, felicity
or pleasure. To explain behaviour, economists formulate utility functions; where agents are
assumed to behave in a manner which maximises their utility, given their constraints. As
individuals prefer one alternative over another, and therefore receive higher utility from it,
that alternative is chosen by that individual. Here, utility is considered in the ‘modern’
context (see Binmore (n.d.) for discussion). Individuals are not assumed to behave in the way
they do because they are actually maximising the particular utility function proposed. Rather
we imagine individuals behave as if they are maximising utility, according to the particular
functional form proposed and preferences estimated. The utility function is not the reason
why individuals exhibit such behaviour, but merely allows for a description of their behaviour.
A utility function, ultimately, is only a model. A model simplifies something which is
complex; in doing so it allows for interesting observations to be drawn, but still falls short
of encompassing the truth. A paper plane models how aerodynamic forces act on the paper
plane while in flight, while a model aircraft shows a to-scale replica of a real aircraft. We
begin with the knowledge that the models are false (aeroplanes are neither made of paper,
nor are they miniature) but use them to simplify matters allowing for a greater understanding
to emerge. Our objective is to find the model, and preference parameters within the model,
which best explain the behaviour observed and provide intuitive insights into the reasoning
behind such behaviour.
1Indeed, this research focuses upon altruism, rather than reciprocity. While in the latter generosity is often
considered as a calculated self-interested act for future return, the former concerns the ‘pleasure’ derived purely
from an increase in the welfare of others. By ensuring anonymity the concerns of reciprocity are removed.
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Preference parameters are at the core of the models. Different parameter values within the
utility functions allow for alternative preference orderings, which determine which behaviour
is optimal (i.e. that which gives the most utility). The flexibility of these parameters allows
for heterogeneity in behaviour to be accounted for, and this is the crux of the utility functions
proposed. By explicitly modelling heterogeneity the differences in behaviour can be accounted
for. In our setting, the interest is in prosocial behaviour, and through it other-regarding pref-
erences. Rather than assuming all individuals are purely self-interested an array of preferences
can be accounted for, which allows for the variation in behaviour.
In this emerges an interesting paradox. The assumption that all individuals are purely
self-interested is questioned, yet at the same time the assumption that individuals (selfishly)
seek to maximise their own utility is relied upon. This apparent paradox points to some of the
main critiques of mainstream economics, however, if a clear distinction is made this paradox
is removed. Egoism, or self-love, refers to those who are purely self-interested in terms of
monetary payoffs (income, wealth, etc.). Self-interest, can instead be used to refer to agents
maximising their own utility. By distinguishing between the two, and relaxing the assumption
of egoism to that of self-interest then the other-regarding preferences (heterogeneous though
they are) can be explicitly accounted for in mainstream economic thought.
A further point of discussion relates to assumptions of deterministic choices, that agents
always act optimally. If a deterministic approach is taken, then individuals are assumed
to behave optimally and make no error in their decisions, but if behaviour is assumed to
be stochastic then decisions are assumed to be noisy, meaning that error models need to
be proposed to rationalise observed behaviour. If the former is assumed then elicitation
methods can be used to establish parameters, while preferences need to be estimated within
the latter. Both elicitation and estimation techniques are used within the first chapter, with
the focus shifting to estimation techniques in the latter two chapters. The type of error model
predominantly used is a random behavioural model; where the error is made when calculating
(or choosing) the optimal decision. The Beta distribution and Dirichlet distribution are
formulated as random behavioural models, offering a novel flexible approach to accounting
for noise in allocation problems.
Once the utility functions and error models are formulated, and preference parameters
estimated, the goodness-of-fit of the model can be evaluated. If the models fit well, they
achieve their aims, if not, perhaps better models are needed. However, it is not just fit, but
prediction which is important in economics models; as the following illustrates. The quadrant
may well be a useful tool, enabling a sailor to pinpoint where in the seas they are at that
precise moment, and indeed allowing them to map where they have been, but as Captain
Ahab laments: “Thou canst not tell where one drop of water or one grain of sand will be
to-morrow noon” (Melville, 1851). Unlike a quadrant, an economic model should be able to
predict behaviour, as well as fit previously observed behaviour. Often experimental papers
estimate preference parameters which well fit the data, but neglect an assessment of their
predictive accuracy. The focus of the third chapter is shifted to address this, enabling the
analysis of both the fit and predictive accuracy of the models proposed.
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In general, the thesis relies upon experimental methods to gather data on prosocial be-
haviour. To analyse such data, descriptive, econometric and structural modelling analytical
techniques are used. A revealed preference approach is taken, where utility functions are pro-
posed and preference parameters estimated (or elicited) to account for the heterogeneity in
the behaviour observed. The extent to which the models explain the data, is then be analysed
for both goodness-of-fit and predictive accuracy. The following delves into the specifics of
each chapter.
***
In the first chapter multiple experimental designs and alternative perspectives were presented
in an incentivised laboratory experiment (n=30). Within the experiment participants made
distributional decisions amongst groups of three. In order to explain the behaviour observed,
preferences relating to inequality aversion and self-interest are estimated at the individual,
cluster and sample level, within the utility functions proposed. Within-subject treatment
effects are tested between the multiple designs - Pairwise Choice, Discrete Slider and Con-
tinuous Allocation - and alternative perspectives - Place-in-Society, Veil of Ignorance and
Impartial Spectator. Furthermore, methods relating to both deterministic and stochastic be-
haviour are explored; with the Beta distribution proposed as a random behavioural model,
to account for noise in decision making. The goodness-of-fit of different utility functions and
error models is further analysed. Within the chapter is an extended literature review and an
extensive discussion, encompassing: differences in design and perspective, individual level pre-
diction and risk under the veil of ignorance, in addition to comparisons with the heath-related
social welfare function and distributional preferences literatures. Results reveal extensive het-
erogeneity exists between-subjects, but also significant within-subject treatment differences.
The majority of the sample exhibit behaviour which is inconsistent with a purely individual-
istic model; with substantial regard for others and a preference for reducing inequality over
reducing inefficiencies.
The second chapter incorporates oneness, the closeness of connection to others, within a
structural model to better explain the differential effects that social distance has on distri-
butional decision making. A CES utility function is formulated which builds upon previous
models that incorporate inequality aversion and self-interest. Preferences parameters are
introduced which reflect behavioural responses to changes in oneness. These parameters dis-
tinguish between how elastic self-other and between-other trade-offs are, to better explain
the distributional effects that differential oneness can have. Further to this, in order to ratio-
nalise noise in decision making, the Dirichlet distribution is proposed as a random behavioural
model. To observe behaviour an incentivised lab-in-the-field experiment was run in Mbale,
Uganda (n=156). The experiment was in the form of a modified three-person dictator game,
where two within-subject treatments varied if the identity of the recipients of giving was
anonymous or known. Decision problems were repeated (54 rounds) to ensure individual-level
preferences could be estimated. The experiment was run on touch-screen tablets, and re-
cruited both general population and student samples. Alongside the experiment an in-depth
survey was conducted to establish an extensive list of demographic characteristics, including
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indices of multidimensional poverty and asset wealth which are particularly important in the
context of development. Results show that entwining both distributional preferences and so-
cial distance are crucial in understanding giving behaviour, when the identity of the recipient
is known. On average, oneness is shown to have large and significant effects on giving; with a
greater willingness to trade-off between the self and others, than between-others, as relative
oneness levels change. The defining feature of the results is the extensive heterogeneity in
both preferences and prosocial behaviour.
Within the third chapter a modified N -person dictator game was run, in an incentivised
laboratory experiment (n=83), to observe how giving behaviour changes in response to a
varying number of ‘recipients’. Using a within-subject design two treatments are presented
to participants across 45 rounds; the multiple slider treatment, allowing precise allocations to
each player, and the single slider treatment, only allowing for the proportion of allocations to
the self to be chosen. Individual-level preference parameters are estimated within five alter-
native utility functions; each incorporating inequality aversion and self-interest. Additional
preference parameters are formulated within extended models, to account for alternative be-
havioural responses to changes in N . The first models the distinction between self-other and
between-other inequality aversion. The second incorporations congestion, the trade-off be-
tween average and total payoffs to others. While the third accounts for minimum threshold
levels. The relative goodness-of-fit and predictive power of each model is tested, allowing
for the identification of ‘types’ of individuals. This approach allows the flexibility to explain
heterogeneity in individual behaviour not only through preference parameters within a par-
ticular model, but between different behavioural assumptions made in alternative models.
Additional error parameters are further incorporating in the random behavioural formulation
of the Dirichlet distribution, allowing for differential error as the complexity in decision mak-
ing increases. Results show that increasing the number of recipients changes the behaviour of
individuals in different ways. On average, participants are willing to give more total payoffs to
others as the number of players increase, but not to maintain average payoffs to others. How-
ever, extensive heterogeneity is found in individual preferences, with no model ‘best’ fitting
all individuals.
There are, of course, differences between the chapters. The experiments of the first and
third chapters are run in a laboratory, with student samples from the University of York,
while in the second chapter both student and general population samples are recruited in a
lab-in-the-field experiment in Mbale, Uganda. The first chapter varies both perspective and
design, while the latter two keep both constant. Within the second chapter the anonymity
of the others is removed, while throughout the other chapters anonymity is maintained. The
Beta distribution is formulated as a random behaviour model in the first chapter, while the
Dirichlet distribution is used in the second and third. Only one model is formulated in the
second chapter, while several utility functions and error models are analysed in the first and
third. However, it is this due to the variation in the three chapters which allows for a more
complete analysis to emerge.
The three chapters of the thesis strive to account for a host of different factors which
surround inequality aversion and self-interest. Each the experimental design, perspective of
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the participant, closeness to others and the number of recipients, alongside the prices of giving
and size of the budget, are incorporated in the thesis, and their effects on prosocial behaviour
and other-regarding preferences are tested. This broad inquiry into a specific component of
human nature will hopefully be of interest to the reader, shed light on the subject matter and
provoke further thoughts, questions and debate.
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Chapter 1
Multiple Designs and Alternative
Perspectives
Preferences relating to inequality aversion and self-interest are estimated, at an indi-
vidual, cluster and sample level, using an incentivised laboratory experiment (n=30).
The experiment presents participants with decision problems concerning distributional
decisions amongst groups of three. Using multiple experimental designs and alterna-
tive perspectives within-subject treatment effects are tested. To model behaviour
utility functions are proposed which question the integrity of a purely individualistic
models, by incorporating preference parameters relating to self-interest and inequality
aversion. Results reveal that while preferences are heterogeneous between-subjects,
within-subject differences caused by treatment effects are significantly larger. Fur-
thermore, the majority of the sample exhibit other-regarding behaviour which is in-
consistent with a purely individualistic model.
***
Chapter 1. Multiple Designs and Alternative Perspectives
1 Introduction
References to inequality aversion and other-regarding preferences are becoming ever more
present in the field of economics. Stemming from experimental, behavioural and welfare eco-
nomics, these notions question the integrity of purely individualistic utility functions. Models
which offer greater explanation of individual behaviour are being formulated, by accounting
for heterogeneous preferences over distributional decisions. Yet, different experimental designs
are used to observe individual behaviour and participants are asked to consider alternative
perspectives when making distributional decisions. Do such design decisions have a significant
effect on the behaviour observed and preferences estimated?
In this paper, distributional decision problems over groups of three are presented to par-
ticipants within an incentivised laboratory experiment. Individual, cluster and sample level
preference parameters are estimated within utility functions which incorporate concerns of
inequality aversion and self-interest. By using multiple experimental designs and alternative
perspectives within-subject treatment effects are analysed. Methods relating to both deter-
ministic and stochastic behaviour will be explored; where the Beta distribution is proposed
to rationalise noise in individual decision making. The goodness-of-fit of different utility
functions and error models is compared, and the importance of distinguishing between risk
aversion and inequality aversion under the ‘veil of ignorance’ is discussed.
The following section will review the relevant literature. The experiment will then be
described, with details of the three experimental designs - Pairwise Choice, Discrete Slider
and Continuous Allocation - and the three alternative perspectives - Place-in-Society, Veil of
Ignorance and Impartial Spectator. The theoretical framework will follow, where the func-
tional form of the utility functions will be explained alongside the random behavioural error
model. The results will then be presented, followed by the discussion and conclusion.
1.1 Literature
1.1.1 Distributional Preferences and Social Welfare Functions
In mainstream economics one fundamental assumption is that individuals are innately selfish.
They aim to maximise an objective function where their only concern is their own monetary
payoffs, not the payoffs of others. Yet a body of literature has emerged, primarily in the field
of experimental economics, which reveals that utility functions often better explain individual
behaviour by incorporating other-regarding preferences. Two main streams of thought, within
the distributional preferences literature, have been proposed; those which incorporate social
preferences and those which incorporate reciprocity (E. Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). It is the
former which will be concentrated upon here. Models of social preferences not only assume an
individual’s utility is based upon their own income, but also upon the distribution of resources
amongst others. The degree of self-interest can, however, vary between individuals. Three
major models are those concerning altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), relative income and
envy (Bolton, 1991), and inequity aversion (E. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ocken-
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fels, 2000). Various hybrid models have also been established (Charness and Rabin, 2002;
Erlei, 2008; Cox, D. Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007). These models primarily seek to model
individual behaviour, which is observed in economic experiments.
Another strand of literature, focusing upon Social Welfare Functions (SWF), is concerned
with establishing a single numerical welfare index from “aggregating all information about
an income distribution” (Amiel and F. Cowell, 1999). Implicit within a SWF is a value
judgement concerning the trade-off society is willing to make between equality and efficiency.
It can be used to rank different societal distributions. There are a wide range of forms
a SWFs; the Atkinson Index (Atkinson, 1970), Kolm Index (Kolm, 1976), Health-Related
Social Welfare Function (Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2009) and the Parabolic Health-Related Social
Welfare Function (Abasolo and Tsuchiya, 2004), for example. This strand of literature, rather
than focusing upon explaining individual behaviour seeks to establish societal moral value
judgements, which enable a ranking of different distributions amongst the population. The
parameter of interest in such models is the inequality aversion parameter. Predominantly
through questionnaire-based surveys techniques, in the realm of health, several studies have
sought to elicit a societal inequality aversion parameter (Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2011; Aba´solo
and Tsuchiya, 2013; Robson et al., 2017).
Deeply rooted in both strands of literature is the concept of inequality, and the degree
of aversion to it. Yet, the two strands seem to vary somewhat on the exact meaning of this
aversion. The concept of inequality aversion in the distributional preferences setting is deter-
mined from a self-regarding perspective, while within the SWF context it is a philosophical
concern (or lack of concern) for unequal distributions amongst the entire society. What would,
therefore, seem to be a plausible assumption is that it is both of these elements which are
important; in both individual behaviour and moral value judgements. It is the combination
of these two elements, the degree of inequality aversion for distributions amongst all present
and a level of self-interest, which shapes the decisions of individuals, which will be the focus
of this research.
1.1.2 Experiments or Questionnaire-Based Surveys
While these two separate strands of literature often intertwine their methodological stand-
points frequently conflict. Those concerned with distributional preferences mostly use incen-
tivised laboratory experiments, while questionnaire-based surveys are predominantly used in
the SWF literature. Experimental economists often argue that questionnaire type data is sec-
ond best; that not only do they not truly reveal what the populace actually would do, as there
are no monetary consequences, but they are prone to various biases and errors. The power to
explain individual behaviour is, therefore, argued to be significantly decreased. On the other
hand, those who utilise questionnaire-based surveys argue that when eliciting values about
social norms “the subjects should be genuinely interested in the underlying issues which the
experimenter wishes to study, and not primarily in the sums of money they can bring home
after the experiment” (Gaertner and Schokkaert, 2012). Indeed, strongly-defined views may
not translate directly into concrete actions (Amiel and F. Cowell, 1999). What is clear is
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that, although these arguments could point to issues with the other method, the main issue
is a lack of cohesion between the aims of the two; while the experimental economists strive to
ascertain individual behaviour, those conducting questionnaire-based surveys are more often
concerned with social values. Yet, when considering individual behaviour which is influenced
by social norms an area between the two strands emerges. While having to remain wary of
the two arguments, a synergy can be established by combining necessary elements.
1.1.3 Philosophical Standpoints
Often there is a lack of integration between economics and philosophy. However, the concept
of inequality aversion as proposed in Atkinson (1970) carefully intertwines the two. Inequality
aversion is defined as the trade-off between equality and efficiency. The concept is encapsulated
as a parameter in an economic model, but the standpoints the parameters represents are
grounded in philosophy. The Atkinson Index in Equation (1.1) is a social welfare function,
which incorporates ε as the inequality aversion parameter, where ε ∈ [−1,∞]. The income
to each agent i is denoted by xi, µ is the mean level of income and f(xi) is the proportion of
agents with the same level of income as i:
I = 1−
[∑(xi
µ
)−ε
f(xi)
] 1
−ε
(1.1)
To visualise what different values of ε represent, iso-welfare curves denoting the indifference
between distributions between individual i and j are shown in Figure 1.1. By following the
line of each curve the different distributions of income between which an individual with that
level of inequality aversion is indifferent can be observed. When ε = −1 the curve is linear,
representing the philosophical standpoint of ‘Utilitarianism’ where total income, regardless of
its distribution, is all important. As ε increases more weight is attached to income transfers
lower in the distribution; representing a ‘Weighted Prioritarian’ standpoint, where a higher
weight is given to the worse off. The standpoint of ‘Maximin’ means that welfare is solely
dependent upon the income of the worst-off in society, and is represented by ε = ∞. To
extend the Atkinson inequality aversion parameter; if ε was unbounded below -1 then it
could incorporate those who actually preferred inequality, those who are ‘Inequality Seeking’.
Another extension, is to consider the standpoint of an ‘Egalitarian’. ‘Egalitarians’ are so
averse to inequality that they are willing to sacrifice the income to the worst-off in order to
reduce it. To account for this preference an alternative functional from, which allows for such
violations of monotonicity, needs to be proposed as in Abasolo and Tsuchiya (2004).
1.1.4 Perspective
When answering the question of how averse to inequality is an individual? The perspective
from which the individual considers the question needs to be accounted for. Several studies
have been conducted assessing the extent to which there are significant differences in value
judgements, given an alternative perspective. Core to the literature are four different perspec-
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Figure 1.1: Iso-Welfare Curves for Alternate Inequality Aversion Parameters
tives where the individual: knows their Place-in-Society, is under a ‘thin’ Veil of Ignorance
(Harsanyi, 1953), is under a ‘thick’ Veil of Ignorance (Rawls, 1999) or is an Impartial Specta-
tor (Smith, 1790). To be specific, when considering the Place-in-Society the individual knows
exactly who they are in society. A ‘thin’ Veil of Ignorance is where they know that, with
a certain probability, they will be one of the members of society, but do not know which.
While a ‘thick’ Veil of Ignorance is where individuals are completely shrouded by the veil,
they know not who they are, nor the probability of being anyone in the distribution. An
Impartial Spectator, is someone who decides upon the distribution of a society when they are
not involved; often referred to as a social planner.
Traub et al. (2005) focus upon two of these perspectives: the Impartial Spectator and
the Veil of Ignorance. They also have two levels of information, where the probabilities are
known, ‘ignorance’, and when they are not, ‘risk’; which conform to the ‘thick’ and ‘thin’
veil’s, respectively. They found that in the ‘risk’ treatment the Impartial Spectator is more
inequality averse than when under the veil, yet in the ‘ignorance’ treatment the reverse was
true. Further papers have also conducted research on the difference of perspective (Bosmans
and Schokkaert, 2004; Herne and Suojanen, 2004; Amiel, F. A. Cowell, and Gaertner, 2009).
The choice of this perspective is therefore important when establishing parameter values of
inequality aversion.
1.1.5 Is Behaviour Deterministic or Stochastic?
When establishing individual-level preferences there are two alternative streams of thought;
that behaviour is either deterministic or stochastic. Behaviour is deterministic when individ-
uals make no error in their decision making. If this is the case then experimenters can present
individuals with decision problems, and through observing their choices reveal ‘true’ prefer-
ence parameters through direct elicitation. The alternative is to assume that behaviour is
stochastic. Rather than individuals always behaving ‘optimally’ their decisions are noisy and
13
Chapter 1. Multiple Designs and Alternative Perspectives
prone to error.1 Here, rather than direct elicitation, a particular stochastic error structure
has to be assumed and preferences estimated from observed behaviour in multiple decision
problems.
Three families of models have been proposed to account for stochastic error: Random Util-
ity, Random Behavioural and Random Preference (Conte and Moffatt, 2014). Random Utility
(RU) models, or Fechner models (Fechner, 1965 [1860]), assume the utility valuation of each
alternative choice is subject to random error. When the participant then ranks alternatives
according to the level of utility there may be errors, due to this miscalculation prior to rank-
ing. The stochastic term is applied additively to the utility function. Random Behavioural
(RB) models assume participants aim to calculate the optimal decision y∗ directly, but then
make an error when calculating or choosing y∗. The actual behaviour is then assumed to be
distributed according to some stochastic error distribution. Random Preference (RP) models
assume that it is the preferences of the individual which are stochastic, meaning that different
rankings of alternatives will be made and a different optimal decision chosen, from that new
ranking.
The stylised graph, in Figure 1.2, highlights the three forms of error. The solid curve
represents the level of utility for each alternative choice y, where the optimal choice is y∗.
The vertical arrows represent the errors which are encompassed in the RU model, while the
horizontal arrows the RB model. The grey dotted curve represents the alternative utility
rankings, from the RP model, which has yP as the ‘optimal’ decision. The model used
throughout the main analysis is the RB model, intuitively for the continuous nature of the
decision problem used it is more suitable than RU and, unlike RP, can ‘rationalise’ all possible
decisions made.
Figure 1.2: Stochastic Error
1Of course, it is not necessarily the case that individuals are making error, but that the predictions of
the proposed model are wrong. Indeed this is the viewpoint taken here. That models by their very nature
are wrong; they cannot possibly capture every element of human decision making. But by simplifying such
complex decision making into a mathematical model, we can better understand behaviour. This enables us to
predict differential choices by accounting for preferences. The aim is then to find the most simple model which
is least wrong.
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While deterministic models may be seen as na¨ıve, and stochastic models the more sophisti-
cated of the two, there is a trade-off between the two methods. In practical terms, participants
have to be paid to be in the laboratory, which implies a time constraint. A greater range of
hypotheses can be questioned and parameters elicited if deterministic preferences are assumed.
Indeed, if too many repeat questions are asked it may be argued that, in trying to reduce the
issues associated with error, one ensures error in the response; as participants become tired
and bored of a repetitive task. A trade-off between the two has to therefore be established.
Not enough questions leave conclusions prone to potential error in responses, while too many
may prove inefficient and actually create error.
***
This paper contributes to the literature with an experimental design which allows for an
inclusive analysis of the concerns of the above literature. The three-person design of the ex-
periment enables both self-other and between-other distributional decisions to be observed.
Through this, preferences parameters can be estimated (and elicited), across multiple ex-
perimental designs, when individuals consider both partial and impartial perspectives. The
preference parameters established both strive to explain individual behaviour and establish
moral value judgements over distributional decisions.
2 Experimental Design
The experiment is broken up into designs, games and rounds. There are a total of 3 designs,
10 games and 68 rounds. Throughout the experiment participants made incentivised decisions
about the distribution of monetary payoffs between group of three players. The three designs
are different methods of establishing the parameter values of interest, they are: Pairwise
Choice (PC), Discrete Slider (DS) and Continuous Allocation (CA). Within each of these
designs there are three different perspectives which the participants were asked to assume,
there were: Place-in-Society (PS), Veil of Ignorance (VOI) and Impartial Spectator (IS).
There were multiple rounds within each of these individual perspectives. More specific details
about the experiment design and the sample can be found in Appendix A.1, alongside the
paper instructions in Appendix A.2.
2.1 Three Designs
In the PC design participants were offered the choice between two different distributions of
payoffs; Choice A and Choice B. The payoffs were iteratively reduced, for Choice B, each
round, creating equality-efficiency and self-other trade-offs. The DS design is in the form of
a modified dictator game; participants were given a budget (£30) to allocate amongst three
players. For each player the allocations given were multiplied by a multiplication factor to
give the final payoff. The choices allowed were discrete distributions and they were made
by selecting a notch along a slider. The CA design was, again, a modified dictator game,
however, the decisions allowed were (almost) continuous, to distribute to the nearest pence.
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While there are three different designs in place there are several aspects which remain
common throughout. Firstly, each round is supplemented by instructions. There are the paper
instructions to begin with, which participants keep beside them, then on-screen tutorials to
explain the layout of each design. Before each game there was a prompt screen explaining
the particulars of that game, and each round there are shortened instructions to the side.
Within each round there were the possible payoffs for each player in the group, shown by the
height of the orange bars, with numbers showing the precise payoffs. There were accompanying
individual payoffs, alongside the ‘total sum of payoffs’ (the sum of the payoffs in the group) and
the ‘gap between payoffs’ (the difference between the best-off and worst-off player). Common
to each round was a timer, the timer counted down to a minimum time (before which they
could not advance to the next round) and then to a red maximum time (after which they
were forced to the next round). Participants had to interact in some way, particular to the
design, to indicate their preferred distribution of payoffs amongst the group. The specifics of
each design are shown below.
2.1.1 Pairwise Choice
The first design presents respondents with a set of pairwise choices, which offer the choice
between two different distributions of payoffs: Choice A and Choice B. Participants made
their choice by clicking either distribution. Within each of the 4 games (2 PS, 1 VOI and 1
IS) there were 8 rounds. Throughout each of the rounds Choice A remained the same, while
Choice B started at some initial point and was incrementally reduced. Figure 1.3 shows the
screen of one such round.
Figure 1.3: Pairwise Choice: Z-Tree
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To elicit individual parameter values the properties of their indifference curves need to be
established. For inequality aversion, r, it is the curvature which is required, while it is the
gradient which is needed for self-interest, α. Figure 1.4 shows a simplified two person case,
where each curve represents a different degree of inequality aversion. At each point along a
given curve the individual is indifferent between the distributions of payoffs. To establish the
curvature, and the corresponding r, two distributions of payoffs between which the participant
is indifferent needs to be found. As previously mentioned Choice A remains the same, but
Choice B changes each round, as shown by the horizontal dotted line in Figure 1.4. By finding
the point at which the participant ‘switches’ from B to A, using the midpoint between the
two, the point of indifference can be found. This ‘switch’ is expected as there is a trade-off
between equality and efficiency. Choice B is the more equitable choice of the two, but in each
round the total payoffs are reduced. A similar method is used for α, considering the gradient
of the curve.
Figure 1.4: Indifference Curves for Varying Level of Inequality Aversion
For both the VOI and IS treatments only the r parameter needed to be established, as
α is assumed to be 1/3. This meant that only one set of 8 rounds needed to be presented
to elicit an r parameter. Choice A remained constant at [15, 13, 8], for Player 1, 2 and 3
respectively. Choice B on the other hand kept the payoff to each player equal; these were [12.4,
11.6, 10.8, 10, 9.2, 8.4, 7.6, 6.8] for the corresponding eight rounds. To illustrate this Table
1.1 shows the categorised choices, with a clear ‘switching’ point, alongside their r parameter
and category for the VOI and IS treatments. Take the ‘Utilitarian’ category as an example.
In order to elicit an r value of -1, the participant must have chosen BAAAAAAA, that is B in
Round 1, then A for the seven rounds after. As they ‘switched’ between Round 1 and 2 the
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indifference point is assumed to be 12, halfway between 12.4 and 11.6. From this we infer that
the participant is indifferent between the points [15, 13, 8] and [12, 12, 12]. By numerically
solving equivalent utility functions an r parameter of -1 is then elicited.
Table 1.1: Pairwise Choices: VOI and IS
Choice Indifference Point r Category
AAAAAAAA 12.8 -3.5445 Inequality Seeking
BAAAAAAA 12 -1 Utilitarian
BBAAAAAA 11.2 0.9293 Weighted Prioritarian 1
BBBAAAAA 10.4 2.8702 Weighted Prioritarian 2
BBBBAAAA 9.6 5.4989 Weighted Prioritarian 3
BBBBBAAA 8.8 11.4793 Weighted Prioritarian 4
BBBBBBAA 8 ∞ Maximin
BBBBBBBA 7.2 N/A Egalitarian 1
BBBBBBBB 6.4 N/A Egalitarian 2
For the PS perspective, both r and α needed to be elicited. This was done by ensuring
the choice set could elicit r irrespective of α first and then, contingent on this r, elicit α.
This was achieved by keeping the payoff to P1 identical in both choices, while changing the
distribution of payoffs between P2 and P3 throughout the rounds. Choice A remained as [15,
13, 8]. Choice B kept the payoff to P1 at 15 in each round but had P2 and P3’s payoff equal
at [10.75, 10.25, 9.75, 9.25, 8.75, 8.25, 7.75, 7.25] for the corresponding round. Once r had
been established α could then be elicited. A set of choices was established for each possible
r, they adhered to the following equation, where xa,xb and xc are the income for P1, P2 and
P3 in Choice A, respectively, and x1,x2 and x3 is income for P1, P2 and P3 in Choice B,
respectively:
α =
x−rb + x
−r
c − x−r2 − x−r3
2x−r1 − 2x−ra + x−rb + x−rc − x−r2 − x−r3
(1.2)
2.1.2 Discrete Slider
The discrete slider is a discretised modified dictator game. Participants are given a budget,
which they must allocate amongst the three players. They are, however, constrained to a
discrete set of distributions from which they must choose. These choices will be represented
with a slider, which at each notch provides different levels of payoffs for each of the three
players. Participants must move the slider to each possible notch, to see each available option,
then move the slider to the notch of their preferred distribution. The distributions used are
the optimal allocations for given levels of r and α (see x∗i in Section 3). A screenshot of the
design is shown in Figure 1.5.
In order to elicit parameter values of r and α two stages are necessary. In the first stage,
the game is simplified to the specialised case where and pi = [1, 1, 1]. Due to this specification,
for any given value of x∗1 it must be that x∗2 = x∗3 =
m−x∗1
2 in order to ensure that such
allocations are optimal values for a set of r and α values. Eight notches of discrete choices
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Figure 1.5: Discrete Slider: Z-Tree
are provided, whereby x∗1 ∈ [10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3.33]. Given these discrete choices, and the
specialised case of the game, there exist a set of corresponding α and r parameters for which
that allocation is optimal; i.e. there is no unique solution. After the first stage the second
slider was presented, the choice set given was dependent upon the response to the first slider.
Importantly, the productivity factor was changed to pi = [1, 0.6, 1.4], in order to find a unique
solution. It is dependent upon this second choice that a unique categorised α and r parameter
can be elicited for a participant.
2.1.3 Continuous Allocation
The final design allows participants to precisely distribute allocations amongst the three play-
ers. Participants were given a budget, £30, and had to distribute the entire budget. The
allocation for each player was multiplied by their respective payoff multiplier ; the resulting
amounts were denoted by the payoff. Within the design there were the three perspectives,
each of these had multiple rounds; VOI and IS had 5 rounds each, while PS had 20. Within
these rounds the payoff multipliers were varied, to provide different decision problems to the
participants. A screenshot of the design is shown in Figure 1.6.
To make their allocations participants had multiple options. Firstly, they could move
the sliders. These sliders are accurate to £0.01, are between an allocation of £0 and an
allocation of the Total Budget, £30. The second option was to click the arrows, either side
of the sliders, these made the small changes of £0.01 easier, so that participants could more
accurately adjust their allocations, once near with the slider. The final option was to use
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Figure 1.6: Continuous Allocation: Z-Tree
the written input boxes; by inputting numerical values and clicking update the participants
could enter exact allocations for each player. The slider, arrows and written input boxes are
available for each of the three players. When the allocation was input, the payoffs to each
player updated immediately.
2.2 Three Perspectives
One question that may be asked is to what extent does the perspective of the individual
affect their preferences and behaviour? The three perspectives which are included within each
design are the: Place-in-Society, ‘thin’ Veil of Ignorance and Impartial Spectator. For the first
perspective, Place-in-Society, the participant knows which of the three players they are in the
distribution; making distributional decisions concerning themselves and two others. The Veil
of Ignorance stems from work by Rawls (1999) and Harsanyi (1953), where participants are
placed under a ‘veil’; they know they are distributing between themselves and two others, but
do not know which player is which (see Section 6.5 for further discussion). Our approach is
perhaps closer to Harsanyi’s, in that participants know the probabilities of being either player
is equal. Finally, the last perspective is where participants are outside of the distribution, and
are making distributional decisions about three other players. This stems from the concept of
the impartial spectator (Smith, 1790), an outside figure looking down upon a society in which
they are not involved; often referred to as a social planner.
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2.3 Questionnaire
Following the experiment was a questionnaire; asking questions on demographics, opinions
and testing cognitive abilities. The demographic questions are on: gender, age, nationality,
ethnicity, religion, highest level of education and household income. The opinions questions
concern: political persuasion, opinions on reducing inequality, the importance of equality vs
incentives from income differences and the trade-off between total income vs income equality.
While the cognitive questions ask three cognitively difficult questions to reveal if participants
are willing to exert the effort, and are capable of answering such questions.
3 Utility Function
In order to intertwine the distributional preferences and SWF literature, a utility function
must be proposed which incorporates the essential elements of individual behaviour and moral
value judgements. The functional form is derived from the Atkinson Index (Atkinson, 1970); a
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function with additive separability and convexity to
the origin. Importantly, the ‘utility’ value corresponds to the Equally Distributed Equivalent
(EDE), which is defined as the mean level of payoffs “which if equally distributed would give
the same level of social welfare as the present distribution” (Atkinson, 1970). The index has
been reformulated to incorporate the α parameter, which relaxes anonymity and allows for
varying degrees of self-interest, by Andreoni and Miller (2002), and is similar in form to that
used by Dolan and Tsuchiya (2009) and Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007). Specific to
our case are the Multiplication Factors, pii; the inclusion of which means participants are
concerned with the outcome, or payoff, rather than the allocations, xi. This approach allows
a SWF to be translated into an individual utility function, where the individual has some
other-regarding preference and aversion to inequality. The outcome model is as follows:
Ui =
(
N∑
i=1
αi(piixi)
−r
)− 1
r
(1.3)
The parameters of interest are inequality aversion, r, where −1 ≤ r ≤ ∞ and r 6= 0,
and the degree of self-interest, α, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and α1 = α. The regard for others
αj = (1 − α)/n, denotes the weight given to each other, where j > 1 and n is the number
of others. The level of inequality aversion corresponds to the convexity of the indifference
curves. When r = −1 the curve becomes linear, representing the ‘Utilitarian’ standpoint.
As r increases the curves become more convex, implying a higher weight to those who are
worse off, which represents a ‘Weighted Prioritarian’. When r =∞ ‘Maximin’ preferences are
represented. The gradient of the indifference curve is determined by the degree of self-interest.
When α → 1 individuals become more self-interested, as αj → 0, while when α → 0 they
become less self-interested, as αj → 1/n. The other parameters are xi, pii and N where: xi
is the allocation given to Player i, pii is the multiplication factor for player i and N is the
number of players in the group.
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Given the above utility function and a budget constraint m =
∑N
i=1 xi, where m is the
budget, the following optimal allocations, which maximise utility, can be obtained:
x∗i =
m
1 +
N∑
j 6=i
(
pii
pij
(
αjpij
αipii
) 1
1+r
) (1.4)
In the specific case of three individuals, we have α2 = α3 = (1−α)/2. Further to this, given
that the allocations are optimal we can obtain r and the self-interest parameter α contingent
on that r, where j, k 6= 1 and j 6= k:
r =
−ln
(
pij
pik
)
ln(pikxk)− ln(pijxj) − 1, α =
 n(
pijxi
pi1x1
)−(1+r) pij
pi1
+ 1

−1
(1.5)
Through observing any allocation the participant chooses, then r and α can be established;
assuming that individuals are behaving optimally, so to maximise the objective function.
3.0.1 Graphical Intuition
To provide some intuition behind the interaction of the parameters in the proposed utility
function Figure 1.7 shows the optimal allocation to Player 1, x∗1, for given inequality aversion,
r, and self-interest, α, parameters. The scenario is normalised to where m = 1 and each of the
multiplication factors are unity. When individuals are entirely self-interested, where α = 1,
r becomes irrelevant and the allocation goes solely to Player 1. Similarly, when α = 0 and
the individual is entirely selfless, x∗1 goes to zero. When r →∞, meaning that individuals are
‘Maximin’, given that α 6= 0, 1 the level of ‘self-interest’ have little effect and the payoffs are
split equally. When an individual is a ‘Utilitarian’, when r = −1, they allocate all the Player
1, if α > 13 , when α <
1
3 they allocate zero to Player 1, and if α =
1
3 then they are indifferent
between any allocation. When r → 0 ‘Cobb-Douglas’ preferences are represented, where x∗i
is proportionate to α.
3.1 Allocation Model
The above outcome model proposes that individuals are concerned with the distribution of
payoffs, meaning that decisions are made by accounting for the multiplication factors. An
alternative functional form, the allocation model, assumes that individuals ignore the mul-
tiplication factors; and instead focus only upon the allocations they are giving. This is a
simplified version, where the optimal allocations would be somewhat easier to calculate. It
is hypothesised that for certain individuals different models will best explain their behaviour.
Therefore, the parameter values for each model and the goodness-of-fit will be estimated for
each model; showing the specification and suitability of each. The allocation model is as
follows:
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Figure 1.7: Optimal Allocation, x∗1: Varying r and α
U2i =
(
N∑
i=1
αi(xi)
−r
)− 1
r
(1.6)
The corresponding optimal allocations are:
x∗i =
m
1 +
N∑
j 6=i
((
αj
αi
) 1
1+r
) (1.7)
4 Error Modelling
The two alternative methods which can be used to establish preferences of individuals are:
elicitation and estimation. The former assumes that individuals make deterministic choices,
while the latter assumes they are stochastic. Deterministic behaviour means that participants
make no error in their decisions, therefore any observed response can be used to elicit param-
eter values within a utility function. Stochastic behaviour, on the other hand, assume that
individuals make some error in the decisions they are making. As a result, multiple decision
problems need to be presented and a particular error model needs to be assumed in order to
estimate an individual’s preferences. The error model assumed here is a random behavioural
model; where participants have some ‘true’ preferences which lead to an ‘optimal’ decision
(which maximises utility). This ‘optimal’ decision, however, may be difficult to calculate and
therefore error is made in its calculation. Estimation is used to establish the ‘most likely’
parameter values, given the observed behaviour of the participant.
Both Pairwise Choice and Discrete Slider designs assume participants make determinis-
tic choices, but the Continuous Allocation design has been expanded to consider stochastic
choices. To model decisions within the CA treatment we assume individual’s actual alloca-
tions xi are drawn from a Beta distribution, a flexible distribution constrained between 0 and
1, and specified by two parameters; (a1, β1). Individuals are assumed to have some optimal
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allocation, x∗1, x∗2 and x∗3, which correspond to the expected value of the Beta distribution. In
this way parameters for the utility function and a precision term, denoting the extent of the
error, can be estimated at both individual and sample level. This work is an extension of work
done by Hey and Panaccione (2011) and Hey and Pace (2014) where the Beta distribution is
used for similarly bounded decision problems, for ambiguous and risky decisions.
4.1 Continuous Allocation Stochastic Error
In order to model the decisions made for the Continuous Allocation design three assumptions
are made, (1) x1 ∼ B(a1, β1). Due to the nature of the continuous allocation game this is
an appropriate distribution to assume. Like the experiment where allocations are constrained
between two points (£0 and £30) the beta distribution is constrained between 0 and 1,
therefore by normalising the allocations to between 0 and 1, the decisions made are likened to
the beta distribution. The second assumption is that (2) E(x1) = x
∗
1, the expected value of
x1 is some optimal allocation x
∗
1 which corresponds to the optimal values established above.
Furthermore, we assume (3) var(x1) =
x∗1(1−x∗1)
s1
where more variance is observed further from
the bounds, as there are more possibilities for error, and s1 is a precision parameter; the
higher the precision the lower the variance, and vice versa. Given these assumptions, and the
form of the beta distribution:
E(x1) =
a1
a1 + β1
= x∗1 (1.8)
V ar(x1) =
a1β1
(a1 + β1)2(a1 + β1 + 1)
=
x∗1(1− x∗1)
s1
(1.9)
Solving these equations, it follows that:
a1 = x
∗
1(s1 − 1), β1 = (1− x∗1)(s1 − 1) (1.10)
The above has established the model for x∗1, however, the participants are making alloca-
tion decisions over three players. As a result we also need to model x∗2. Rather than assuming
that x2 is distributed according to the Beta distribution we must, however, assume that it is
x2/(1− x1) which is distributed according to the Beta distribution B(a2, β2). What this rep-
resents is the remainder that x2 is, in comparison to x3, from m−x1. The allocation to Player
3, x∗3, does not need to be modelled explicitly as it is simply the residual; x3 = m− x1 − x2.
This ensures the allocations are constrained to the budget, and therefore
∑N
i=1 xi = m.
For x2 we therefore have:
E
(
x2
1− x1
)
=
a2
a2 + β2
=
x∗2
1− x∗1
(1.11)
V ar
(
x2
1− x1
)
=
a2β2
(a2 + β2)2(a2 + β2 + 1)
=
x∗2(1− x∗1 − x∗2)
(1− x∗1)2s2
(1.12)
24
4. Error Modelling
It follows that:
a2 =
x∗2(s2 − 1)
1− x∗1
, β2 =
(
1− x
∗
2
1− x∗1
)
(s2 − 1) (1.13)
Now that we have established the form for x1 and x2, the form of the log-likelihood
function that needs to be maximised, with respect to the parameters α, r, s1 and s2, needs to
be derived. As the decisions made by the participants are not truly continuous we need to
evaluate the likelihood that the optimal value is between the possible options the participant
had. The slider the participants could use was accurate to £0.01, as a result there is £0.005
either side of the allocations where their true decision could lie. As we have normalised the
parameters to between 0 and 1, we also need to divide by m to ensure that it is consistent.
Therefore, for x1 the following needs to be established:
prob
(
x1 − 0.005
m
≤ x∗1 ≤ x1 +
0.005
m
)
(1.14)
The log-likelihood function to be maximised for x1, over each t ∈ T rounds, with respect
to the parameters is, therefore:
T∑
t=1
log
∫ x1t+ 0.005mt
x1t− 0.005mt
(
Γ(a1t + β1t)
Γ(a1t)Γ(β1t)
(
za1t−1(1− z)β1t−1
))
dz (1.15)
For x2:
prob
(
x2 − 0.005m
1− x1 ≤
x∗2
1− x∗1
≤ x2 +
0.005
m
1− x1
)
(1.16)
So our log-likelihood function becomes:
T∑
t=1
log
∫ x2t+0.005mt
1−x2t
x2t− 0.005mt
1−x2t
(
Γ(a2t + β2t)
Γ(a2t)Γ(β2t)
(
za2t−1(1− z)β2t−1
))
dz (1.17)
‘True’ parameter values are estimated by searching for those parameter values which max-
imise the sum of the log-likelihood functions. This analysis will be conducted with MatLab,
using fmincon (constrained non-linear minimisation). The parameter values estimated will
be the ‘most likely’ parameter values that individual has, from the data gathered, given they
made error according to the assumed distribution.
Intuitively, the log-likelihood function evaluates the probability that, with given parame-
ter values, the optimal allocation lies between the feasible options the participant had each
round of the game. By finding those parameter values which give optimal allocations which
maximise the probability of the actual allocations being observed the model provides a ‘best’
fit. Goodness-of-fit measures can then be calculated to identify how well the model fits actual
behaviour.
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Figure 1.8 shows an example of the actual and optimal allocations, alongside estimated
and optimal preference parameters for one individual over 18 rounds. We can observe from
the bottom three panels the actual x allocations for each round. From this, optimal parameter
values can be found for r and α through the maximum likelihood-estimation. Using these
estimated parameter values the optimal allocations, found in the lower three panels, can be
established. As a goodness-of-fit measure, by calculating the absolute difference between the
optimal and actual allocations, it is possible to see how close the estimated parameter values
are to the actual allocations. For x1 allocations, for example, the average absolute difference
between estimated and actual allocations is 0.0332, this corresponds to an average error in
estimation 99.6p per round. Alongside the estimated r and α, the optimal r and α (see
Equation 1.5) are shown in the top two panels. This highlights the importance of estimating
parameters, rather than eliciting them; there is extreme volatility in the optimal parameters,
if deterministic choices are assumed.
Figure 1.8: Goodness-of-Fit Example
4.1.1 Two-Beta
In the extreme case where α = 1, then x∗1 = 1, the above models will not suffice. As a result
a more specific form of the above is necessary, whereby β1 = 1. Due to the nature of the
problem, the usual assumptions relating to the expected value and the variance are no longer
correct. What is, therefore, done is to estimate a1, this not only provides the shape of the
pdf, but also a degree of precision for these estimates. For the sake of continuity a1 = s3. The
higher a1 the higher the probability that x1 will be close to 1. Likewise we know the opposite
is true as x∗2 = 0, for which we assume a1 = 1. As before the aim is now to find the optimal
β2, or s4, the measure of precision in actual allocations.
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These extreme case models will be run parallel to the standard model, then for each
individual the most suitable model will be used. The maximum likelihood estimates will be
used to determine which model, normal or extreme the individual is most likely to conform
to.
4.1.2 Beta-with-Bias
The second family of error models proposed are the Beta-with-Bias models. These models
revert back to the standard error story, but a bias is introduced. For the first model, Beta-
with-Equality-Bias we define: x′i =
bm
3 +(1−b)x∗i where b is the bias parameter. This variable
x′i replaces x
∗
i in the standard error model above. There is no bias if b = 0, but if b > 0 then
bias exists and the optimal allocation is biased towards an equal distribution of allocations.
For second model, Beta-with-Effort-Bias, we define: x′i = bx¨∗i + (1 − b)x∗i , where again b is
the bias parameter, however we now have x¨∗i which corresponds to the optimal x allocation
in the allocation model, specified above. Again there is no bias if b = 0, however if b > 0
then individuals make some decisions based on the simpler Allocation model, they do not
consider the final payoffs but the allocations themselves. Intuitively the Beta-with-Equality-
Bias model combines the complex optimal allocation decision the individual could make, with
respect to their ‘true’ parameter values, with a basic heuristic to share their allocation equally
between the three players. For the Beta-with-Effort-Bias the higher the bias the less ‘effort’
participants are inputting to calculate their desired distribution of payoffs, relying on the
distribution of allocations instead. Both models will be used to estimate parameter values.
The results will be compared and the connotations of the assumptions behind each discussed.
4.1.3 Local Maximums
One issue with the estimation procedures necessary for the error modelling described above
is that starting values need to be specified in order to find optimal values within MatLab. As
a result depending on the starting value used a local maximum may be found, rather than a
global maximum. To overcome this issue multiple starting values will be used, each individual
maximisation problem ran, then the result with the highest fval will be used as the global
optimal result.
5 Results
The results shown below will be in the following order. First, the sampling and data will be
explained. Then, the aggregated distributions of individual-level behaviour and preferences
will be shown. Sample level treatment effects will then be analysed, alongside an in-depth
analysis of the treatment effects on the Equally Distributed Equivalent (EDE). Cluster anal-
ysis will be presented, with preferences estimated for representative agents of each cluster.
Throughout this analysis preferences are estimated within the outcome utility function, using
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the two-beta error story. The final section, tests between the outcome and allocation utility
functions and the alternative error models; assessing the goodness-of-fit of each model.
For further analysis see the appendices for: disaggregated within-design comparisons (A.3),
the pilot study, simulated comparisons of experimental designs and precision of estimated
parameters (A.4) and the use of the beta-with-effort-bias model to detect effort (A.5). Alter-
native analytical techniques can be found to the EDE random-effects model (A.6) and finite
mixture model (A.7). Sensitivity analysis is also conducted in A.8, on the assumption that
α = 1/3 and in A.9 on the distribution of payoffs assumed for the calculation of the EDE.
5.1 Data
The experiment took place in the EXEC laboratory, at the University of York. Using hroot
(Hamburg Registration and Organisation Online Tool), randomised invites were sent out
amongst a pool of 1866 users to acquire a sample of 30 participants. Three sessions were run
and 15 users were invited to each session. In order to ensure correct group sizes, only samples
which were multiples of 3 could be used. For the first session there were 10 users who showed
up, so the experiment was run with 9 participants. For the second session 11 showed up and 9
participated, while there were 13 who showed up and 12 who participated in the third session.
This resulted in a total sample size of 30. Details on the demographic characteristics of the
sample are found in A.1.
5.2 Aggregated Individual Distributions
The distribution of the Proportional Payoff to Player 1 (PPP1), inequality aversion (r), self-
interest (α) and Equally Distributed Equivalent (EDE) values, derived from individual par-
ticipants decisions, are shown in Figure 1.9. While the r parameters and EDE distributions
are from all treatment groups, PPP1 and α are restricted to particular sets. The PPP1 distri-
bution contains only DS and CA data, from every round, as PC decisions are not comparable.
The α distribtution is only from the PS perspective, as for VOI and IS α is assumed to be
1/3.
Perhaps the most intuitive of the results, the PPP1 shows the share of the total payoffs
the participant distributed to themselves. When rounding to 0.01, the majority of decisions
show participants are willing to share some of the budget, 81.97%, yet a substantial minority
of responses, 18.03%, do exhibit purely individualistic behaviour. Those decisions which give
Player 1 a third are 9.55%, with 32.42% taking less than 40% and 53.94% with taking less
than 50%. With a mean and mode of 0.5562 and 0.4737, respectively, the decisions the
participants have taken show two clear findings: participants are heterogeneous and the vast
majority violate assumptions of pure self-interest.
For preferences in relation to inequality aversion this heterogeneity of behaviour is re-
flected. A median parameter of 2.5552 reveals an ‘average’ population preference reflecting
‘Weighted Prioritarianism’. In terms of ‘defined’ preferences there are 6.67% of parameters
established which reflect ‘Utilitarianism’, 4.81% ‘Cobb-Douglas’, 50.37% ‘Weighted Priori-
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tarian’ and 30.74% who are extremely inequality averse, or ‘Maximin’.2 When considering
self-interest, for the PS perspective, a mean of 0.7526 and median of 0.85, show an aggregate
preference which weights the self higher than others. Disaggregating this 9.3% weight them-
selves equally and 23.26% have a weight of less than 0.5, however,58.14% weight themselves
higher than 0.75, while 26.74% have an α close to 1.
Figure 1.9: Aggregate Distribution of PPP1, r, α and EDE
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The distribution of EDE is shown in the bottom right graph. The EDE is useful as it is
comparable across all treatments and avoids the issues that emerge from viewing parameter
estimates individually, 3 This variable is equivalent to the utility values that each individual
gets from the distribution of payoffs in a certain society. The society in question is arbitrary,
so we have used an unequal society where the distributions are [10, 1, 1] to P1, P2 and
P3 respectively (see A.9 for sensitivity). The EDE is a continuous variable from 1, where
individuals are ‘Maximin’, to 10, where individuals are entirely self-interested. 22.96% of
participants have an EDE valuation of 1, 63.04% have a value lower than 2, with 7% at 4 and
7.39% at 10. This distribution needs to be view with caution, however, as a large proportion
of lower EDE’s are due to the inclusion of the VOI and IS data, which has an assumed α,
which skews the data. A more in-depth analysis, and resulting cumulative frequency plots,
will be shown later.
2Those with an r greater than 15 were grouped.
3Estimations which show maximin preference often have misleading α parameters, as do α values of 1 for
the inequality aversion parameters.
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5.2.1 Self-Interest and Inequality Aversion Scatter
Within the Place-in-Society perspective a cross design comparison can also be mapped for the
two parameters, r and α, together. Figure 1.10 plots both parameters, for different designs.
For visual ease, if r ≥ 15, it is simply plotted at 15. Similar patterns from the graphs above
emerge, however, the pattern of responses and clustering become more apparent. For DS there
appears to be clustering around lower self-interest and lower inequality aversion, while PC
appears slightly more self-interested and more inequality averse. CA seems to be distributed
more evenly, but has more points within the extremely inequality averse region. For the
pattern of responses, it is clear that PC and DS were elicited values, while CA has been
estimated, due to the rigid grid pattern of the former and non regularity of the latter.
Figure 1.10: Parameter Value Comparison Between Designs, PS
To summarise the elicited and estimated preference parameters, the median responses are
as follows. Between alternative designs and perspectives the range of median estimates for
inequality aversion, r, is from 0.5 to 3.590. This range is encompassed by the standpoint
of a ‘Weighted Prioritarian’, where a higher weight is given to the worst-off. The range of
median self-interest, α, is from 0.792 to 0.9. Showing that participants have other-regarding
preferences; weighing their own welfare more, but willing to sacrifice some of their own payoffs
to benefit others.
5.3 Treatment Effects
To delve deeper into the results, Table 1.2 shows multiple models which assess the treatment
effects on the PPP1, α, r and EDE. The dependent variables are as before, with the exception
of PPP1, which (to ensure comparability between designs) consists only of the first decisions
taken, when pi = [1, 1, 1]. With the exception of (3) each model is a Random Effects model
(with robust standard errors). Model (3), with r as the dependent variable, is a Random
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Effects Ordered Probit, as r had to be categorised due to issues of large and infinite values
representing Maximin preferences.
The first model seeks to establish differences in pure responses, due to either perspective or
design. The constant shows that, given the treatment is CA-PS, the average PPP1 is 0.5536.
Both perspectives, VOI and IS, show a large and significant reduction of 0.2392 and 0.2112,
respectively. There is no significant difference between the VOI and IS perspectives, however.
Behaviour is significantly different when the participant knows who they are, but when they
decide upon distributions when they are either in the society, but do not know who they
are, or are not in the society, decisions made are similar. When changing from continuous to
discrete, there is a significant positive effect (p < 0.05). A 5.07ppt increase, shows that when
presented with discrete options participants appear less generous than the continuous case.
Moving to model (2) it appears that the self-interest is relatively robust with regard to
experimental design. Self-interest is not significantly different between PC and CA, and only
significant at the 10% level between PC and DS. Inequality aversion does, on the other hand,
have significant treatment effects. Moving from PC to either DS or CA have significant
positive effects at the 5% and 1% level receptively, meaning that participants are more averse
to inequality. There are, however, no significant effects between DS and CA. In terms of the
perspective, in the VOI participants show significantly more aversion to inequality, however, IS
is only significant to the 10% level. There are also no significant differences between VOI and
IS. In line with the higher magnitude for PPP1, this perhaps shows that when participants
are within the society and know who they are they become less averse to inequality and
more willing to trade-off equality for efficiency. The magnitudes shown here are not directly
interpretable, however, as the model is an Ordered Probit, though it does give an idea of the
significance and direction of effect.
Table 1.2: Random Effects Model: PP to P1, α, r and EDE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PP to P1 Self-Interest Ineq. Aversion EDE
Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err. Coef./Std. err.
Perspective
Veil of Ignorance -0.2392∗∗∗ 0.3897∗∗∗ -3.0730∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.151) (0.512)
Impartial Spectator -0.2112∗∗∗ 0.2935∗ -3.0072∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.162) (0.479)
Design
Discrete Slider 0.0507∗∗ -0.0995∗ 0.4296∗∗ -0.7717∗∗
(0.022) (0.054) (0.200) (0.333)
Continuous Allocation -0.0694 0.5508∗∗∗ -1.2203∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.174) (0.292)
Constant 0.5536∗∗∗ 0.8106∗∗∗ 5.4361∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.041) (0.594)
N 30 30 30 30
Observations 180 86 246 257
R-Squared 0.2981 0.0284 0.3171
Model RE RE RE-OP RE
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Finally, to consider the EDE brings a more complete, and comparable, analysis to the
decisions made. A lower EDE represents a lower level of self-interest and/or a higher aversion
to inequality, and vice versa. The results from model (4) show the significant negative effects
for perspective, with a slightly higher effect for VOI rather than IS. While this effect is
apparent in this model, there are no significant differences between VOI and IS. Both DS and
CA are significantly different from PC, 5% and 1% respectively, with CA having a greater
negative effect (-1.2203) than DS (-0.7717).
These results show that both design and perspective are crucial considerations when con-
ducting similar experiments. Place-in-Society treatments reveal much lower giving and lower
levels of inequality aversion. So when estimating parameters for SWF’s, or Atkinson Indices,
this difference needs to be considered. While the results from the perspective were expected,
the differences between design are somewhat more worrying. Although we assume partic-
ipants enter an experiment with specific preferences, it appears that the design influences
the parameters elicited/estimated. The PC design elicits lower aversion to inequality than
dictator games. Even within the category of dictator game, whether the decisions made are
continuous or discrete affects the decisions made and preferences established.
5.3.1 Equally Distributed Equivalent
To further demonstrate the treatment effects Figure 1.11 shows cumulative frequency plots of
the EDE values for the sample. The three left-hand panels show differences in perspective,
within each design, while the three right-hand panels show differences in design, within each
perspective. There is a clear difference between the perspectives; while VOI and IS appear very
close, within each design, Place-in-Society is consistently to the right. This is not surprising,
and is partially driven by the assumption that α = 1/3 within VOI and IS. What is of interest
is that VOI and IS are very close together. Even though participants are within the former
society, and not within the latter, participants appear to have similar preferences. When
considering the differences between designs, given a perspective, there are apparent differences.
While bias could be down to either design, the PC design appears to bias preferences towards
selfishness, while CA appears to bias preferences towards ‘Maximin’. In the PS perspective,
for instance, those who are ‘Maximin’ in CA are slightly over 30% and just under 15% for
PC. At the opposite end of the scale, less than 20% are totally self-interest in CA, but this
reaches almost 40% in PC. This pattern also holds true, though perhaps to a lesser extent,
for both VOI and IS.
One observation of note, is that within the VOI and IS treatments, the difference appears
to be mainly driven by the coarseness of the PC design; indeed simulations in Appendix A.4
show that the PC treatment underestimates r (in the PS perspective), which would lead to a
higher EDE. Had a more fine set of choices been made available perhaps the differences may
not have been as large.
The observations in this subsection, and that above, are further confirmed by the Skillings-
Mack results, in Appendix A.6. The results more closely dissect the EDE results, without
needing to make the assumptions of normality the random effects model requires. As a com-
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plete model, for design effects within each perspective and for perspective effects within each
design the Skillings-Mack results generally show that the PC design and the PS perspective
elicits/estimates higher EDE values. With results significant in all but the between designs
in the IS perspective.
Figure 1.11: EDE Differences in Perspective and Design
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Difference in Perspective, Discrete Slider
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Difference in Design, Veil of Ignorance
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Difference in Perspective, Continuous Allocation
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5.3.2 Questionnaire Responses
Further analysis was conducted to establish an individual effects from the Demographic char-
acteristics, Opinions and Cognition, from the questionnaire. For both PPP1 and EDE there
were no significant effects for any characteristic. For α and r there were no significant ef-
fects at the 5% level, however two variables were significant at the 10% level. For α if the
participant was female they were, on average, more self-interested (0.1860). For r females
and those who valued reducing income inequality rather than increasing national income were
more averse to inequality. Age, nationality, education, parental income, political preference,
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views on reducing inequality and cognitive error were all insignificant at the 10% level. These
results are, however, presented with caution, as the sample size is relatively small.
5.4 Cluster Analysis and Finite Mixture Model
While data can be analysed on a sample level, taking account of averages, in this context a
cluster based approach may be appropriate. When considering that individuals have hetero-
geneous preferences in relation to inequality aversion and self-interest, one may also propose
that there are certain clusters, or types, of individuals who hold more similar preferences to
those within their cluster in comparison with those outside their cluster. If this were to be
the case, then exactly who belongs to which cluster, and how many clusters are in the sample
needs to be established.
Proportional payoffs to players 1, 2 and 3 will be used from the CA, PS, treatment in
order to identify any clustering of payoff allocations between subjects. Three methods have
been utilised, Hierarchical Clustering, K-means and Finite Mixture Model Clustering; the
latter is presented here, the former two in Appendix A.7. These methods ascertain how these
clusters may be composed and propose an optimal number of clusters within the sample.4
The analysis will be run using r, where the commands used are predefined (and relatively
straightforward) commands to use.
A Finite Mixture Model (FMM) proposes a ‘mixture’ of individual density functions which
accurately fit the data. Here the standard form will be used; where a set of normal densities,
with varying variance and mean, will be chosen to most accurately fit the data. The form of
the finite mixture model, assuming we have a mixture of Gaussian densities is:
f(x) =
G∑
g=1
pigf(x|θg) (1.18)
The mixing proportions of each of the normal densities is denoted by pig, it shows that
a particular proportion of the population fits within that corresponding density, or cluster.
Each of these individual clusters are defined by the function representing that density. In
order to establish the parameters of the model a maximum likelihood estimation is run, using
the Expectation-Maximisation Algorithm . The r code ‘mclust’ was used to establish the
parameters of the model; enabling a clustering of observations which was the ‘most likely’.
The results find that a two cluster solution is optimal, that the split was a 22:8 split
between the two clusters. For those separated into either cluster the probability that they
should belong to their cluster was 1.000 for every individual, with the exception of individual 9
for whom the probability was 0.985. Such high individual probabilities show that the clusters
are very well defined and that individuals ‘belong’ to that cluster. The mixing proportions,
that show the probability that the individual belongs to either cluster, are 0.7329 and 0.2671
respectively. The mean proportional payoff that each cluster can be shown to be [0.4256,
4I am very grateful to Nema Dean who gave a workshop on Cluster Analysis Using R, for the Applied
Quantitative Methods Network at the University of Sheffield. The methods used are closely intertwined with
what she taught.
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0.2871, 0.2873] for P1, P2 and P3, respectively, within the first cluster and [0.8905, 0.0557,
0.0538] for P1, P2 and P3, respectively, within the second. The split populations could be
seen as a more altruistic group, 73.29% of the population who gave on average 57.44% to
others, and a more self-interested group, 26.71% of the population who only gave on average
10.95% to others.
Table 1.3: Finite Mixture Model Clustering Results
Mean Proportional Payoff
Mixing
Proportions
Payoff to
P1
Payoff to
P2
Payoff to
P3
Cluster 1 0.7329 0.4256 0.2871 0.2873
Cluster 2 0.2671 0.8905 0.0557 0.0538
In order to visualise the clusters which have been established Figure 1.12 is a scatter plot
and accompanying kernel density plots which show the Proportional Payoffs between P1 and
P2 for each individual. Those observations highlighted in blue represent Cluster 1, while those
in red represent Cluster 2. A clear separation between the observations appears within the
scatter plot. Note that the Proportional Payoff to P3 is simply the residual of the two from
one. There is a very distinct trend which emerges from this data, that while individuals may
differ on how much they allocate to themselves, invariably they aim (on average) to share
the remaining payoffs equally between the other two, which is in line with the theoretical
prediction of the utility model.
Figure 1.12: Clustered Proportional Payoff: Scatter and Kernel Density Plots
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If this clear separation into two clusters is to be observed then, given this analysis has
been done, ‘social preferences’ can be established for each of the clusters. Optimal inequality
aversion and self-interest parameters can be established for the ‘representative agent’ of each
cluster, then instead of using median preferences of the entire sample (which may be sub-
optimal for the majority of the population) these two clustered social preferences could be
used, with the mixing proportions to advocate policy implementations.
Table 1.4: Cluster Estimates of Parameter Values and Goodness of Fit
Average Goodness of Fit
r α P1 P2 P3
Cluster 1 1.5445 0.5818 2.5427 1.6736 1.7453
Cluster 2 -0.1262 0.8753 4.2576 2.1474 2.1918
Sample 0.613 0.8327 7.7383 3.9391 3.9555
Table 1.4 shows the parameter estimated and average absolute goodness of fit statistics for
each cluster separately, and the entire sample. The analysis is run by using each decision, for
each individual, (i.e. 18 rounds for all individuals within a cluster), and the resulting r and α
parameters are those estimated to be the most likely. The goodness of fit measures show the
absolute difference between the actual allocations and the optimal allocations (according to
the estimated parameter values) averaged for each observation. When considering the entire
sample there is an inequality aversion parameter of 0.6130 and a self-interest parameter of
0.8327, meaning there is some weighting on the income of the worst-off, but significant levels
of self-interest. When moving to Cluster 1 there is an increase in the r and a decrease in α,
which is somewhat intuitive; those who are allocating on average 0.4256 to themselves care
more about inequality and less about their own payoffs. Cluster 2 shows the opposite pattern,
less aversion to inequality (hence more emphasis on efficiency) and higher self-interest. The
estimation procedure is most accurate for Cluster 1, where the average GOF for Player 1 is
2.5427; meaning that on average the difference between the actual and optimal x allocations is
£2.54 out of the budget of £30. This figure falls for both P2 and P3, and is relatively similar
for both. The GOF worsens when considering Cluster 2 across each of the allocations. This is
perhaps due to the switching behaviour of the two individuals who have a certain proportion
of their allocations to P1 at 1, and the rest around 0.33. As expected when looking at the full
sample, the GOF worsens again.
When these estimated parameters are used to establish the ‘optimal’ allocations (when
pi = [1, 1, 1]) these allocations can be compared with the actual average allocations from each
cluster. For Cluster 1 the ‘optimal’ allocations are [0.4278, 0.2861, 0.2861] to Players 1, 2 and
3, respectively, while for Cluster 2 they are [0.9113, 0.0443, 0.0443]. When this is compared to
the mean response we find that for Cluster 1 the allocations are very close, while for Cluster
2 the ‘optimal’ allocations are slightly lower.
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5.5 Individual Level – Continuous Allocation
While the previous section compares specific treatment effects on a sample wide level, this
section seeks to determine to what extent the stochastic error models specified explain the
behaviour of individuals throughout the experiment. The CA design was created specifically
to be able to test between different utility and error models. Due to the repeated nature of the
questions, estimation procedures, rather than elicitation methods can be used. To simplify
this comparative task only the PS perspective will be used; this was one major aim of the
study and has the most rounds making the estimation procedure more accurate. Firstly,
comparisons can be made between the two utility models, outcome utility and allocation
utility. Secondly, comparisons can be made between the two error stories, the Two-Beta
model and the Beta-with-Bias models.
Figure 1.13 shows a comparison of the parameter values between the different models.
The allocation model shows the most divergence from the other models. For the three models
which incorporate the outcome, many have identical values (usually those with zero bias in
their responses) while a trend appears that those not identical have less aversion to inequality.
This latter trend can perhaps be explained, as a bias towards equality would be consistent
with a higher inequality aversion.
Figure 1.13: Comparison of Estimated Parameters; Utility Models and Error Stories
5.5.1 Goodness of Fit
In order to establish which of the models best fits the responses made the goodness of fit
measures from each individual can be compared. Several measure will be shown here: the
Euclidean Distance (ED), Maximum Log-Likelihood (MLL) and the corrected Akaike infor-
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mation criterion (AICc).5 The ED established how close the optimal allocations, x∗i , are to
the observed allocations, xi, while the MLL establishes how likely the observed behaviour is,
given the estimated preference parameters and error model proposed. The AICc is a statistic
used for model selection; using the MLL but penalising models which use more parameters.
Each measure is calculated for each individual, for each utility function and error model.
Comparing the measures allows an analysis of how well the models fit the data, relative to
one another.
Figure 1.14 shows the distribution of GOF measures for the entire sample (excluding MLL
as visually it is very similar to AICc). The left panel show the mean ED, for each individual,
where a lower value shows a better fit. The distribution shows that each the Two-Beta, Beta-
with-Effort-Bias and Beta-with-Equality-Bias, are very close. The allocation model does
worse for the majority of the sample, meaning that most participants, appear to consider the
problem in its entirety, they consider the total payoff to each of the individuals, and distribute
accordingly. The Two-Beta egoist model, however, fits much worse, for the majority of the
sample, with the exception of the few individuals who are distributing payoffs primarily to
themselves. The right panel shows the distribution of the AICc, which shows a similar trend.
Notice here, however, that the Two-Beta egoist model dominates for individuals at very low
levels of AICc, these two individuals are those who allocated everything to themselves each
round. Note also, that the Two-Beta model appears to be doing slightly better than the
Beta-with-Bias models, this is due to the additional parameter the Beta-with-Bias models
include.
Figure 1.14: Comparison of Utility Functions and Error Models; Goodness of Fit
Table 1.5 summarises the three GOF measures, showing the sample mean values for each
model and the number of ‘types’ within each model, where the GOF measure of that model
5The Euclidean Distance is calculated as: ED =
√∑N
i (x
∗
i − xi)2. The Maximum Log-Likelihood is
the sum of the maximised log-likelihood values in Section 4.1. The corrected Akaike information criterion is
calculated as: AICc = 2k − 2(MLL) + 2k(k + 1)/(n− k − 1) (Sugiura, 1978).
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is dominant. The sample mean ED is similar for the Two-Beta and Beta-with-Bias models,
with larger values for the allocation model and even larger for the Two-Beta egoist model.
Similar patterns emerge for the MLL (with a higher value denoting a better fit), but results
from the AICc show that the Two-Beta model seems to do better than the Beta-with-Bias
models. Indeed, when considering ‘types’ for both ED and MLL there are a mix of individuals
classified into each model. With the Beta-with-Bias models performing similarly to the Two-
Beta models. However, when the AICc is considered the small additional benefit that the
Beta-with-Bias models offer is not large enough to offset the additional parameter needed.
The majority of the sample are ‘best’ characterised by the preference estimates within the
Two-Beta model, with only one participant classified as a Beta-with-Equality-Bias type.
Table 1.5: GOF Summary of Alternative Utility Functions and Error Models
Two-Beta Beta-with-Bias
Allocation
Standard Egoist Effort Equality
Mean ED 0.0788 0.5570 0.0800 0.0798 0.1328
MLL -180.94 -243.69 -180.90 -180.74 -204.71
AICc 372.95 492.18 376.81 376.48 420.95
Type ED 9 6 9 4 2
MLL 8 2 8 12 0
AICc 27 2 0 1 0
N 30 30 30 30 30
6 Discussion
6.1 Difference in Design
An important question to ask when conducting laboratory experiments is: to what extent
does the specific design of the experiment affect behaviour? The majority of experiments
focus upon one design, and therefore risk not knowing if that design has any inherent biases.
By posing this question and presenting respondents with three different designs - Pairwise
Choice (PC), Discrete Slider (DS) and Continuous Allocation (CA) - this paper aims to
identify potential biases, strengths and weaknesses of each design.
From our results differences between designs are apparent. Preference parameters and
EDE values can be compared between all treatments, while raw decisions (PP to P1) can
only be compared between DS and CA (see Table 1.2). On average participants allocate more
to themselves in the DS, than in the CA. Self-interest, α does not vary much between designs;
only parameters in DS are significantly lower than in PC, and this only at the 10% level.
When considering inequality aversion, r, and EDE significant differences emerge. Inequality
aversion is significantly higher, and EDE significantly lower, in both DS and CA in comparison
to PC. This reveals that participants are choosing distributions which favour the worst-off to
a greater extent in the DS and CA treatments. The Skillings-Mack results show similar
patterns, for the EDE. Showing that the rank of EDE is lower in the DS and CA, compared
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to PC, for each perspective. Though differences are not significant in the impartial spectator
perspective.
Further to experimental results, simulations were conducted, assessing if the biases be-
tween the designs were due to factors inherent in the design. This was conducted for the
Place-in-Society perspective, as it was the most susceptible to differences in design and allows
for differences in self-interest to be compared. First, precision was analysed, where CA was
shown to allow a much finer parameter estimation, while PC and DS were more coarse elicita-
tion methods. Indeed this distinction proved to be important when considering ‘deterministic’
choices simulated individuals would take. When no error was made by the individuals, their
‘true’ parameter values were more precisely captured, in CA, compared to the other designs.
However, when a ‘random preference’ error was added to the individual’s preference param-
eters, CA gave more biased results. The discrete nature of the choices in the PC and DS
designs mitigate the effects of such an error.
A further difference between the designs is that of elicitation (PC and DS) vs estimation
(CA). The choice between the two primarily depends on the trade-offs which the experi-
menter needs to make between time, precision and concerns of noise. Elicitation techniques
assume that participants make no error, and therefore only need one set of decision problems,
while estimation assumes decisions are noisy and usually require a large battery of decision
problems.
Assume all designs were elicitation designs. In terms of time, PC requires multiple pairwise
choices to be presented (eight or sixteen in our case), while DS and CA need only one or two.
As discussed above the discrete nature of PC and DS leads to less precision in parameter
estimates, in comparison to CA. Yet, noise can manifest itself in several ways. If noise exists
and is (as in Appendix A.4) due to ‘random preference’, then the PC and DS are preferred
to CA. However, participants could also make ‘random behavioural’ error, which in the case
of PC could lead to incoherent ‘switching’, meaning that no parameters can be elicited (as
was the case for 8 of 30 for r in PS). So the issues for PS are time, precision and ‘random
behavioural’ error, for DS precision and CA ‘random preference’ error. If, alternatively,
estimation techniques were used then all models would require a longer time, due to large
batteries of problems being needed, but they would reduce issues of precision and allow noise
to be effectively modelled, and its bias reduced.
It appears, therefore, that the appropriateness of the design depends on the context.
Alternative designs can be used depending upon the relative importance the experimenter
places on time, precision and noise. Both elicitation and estimation methods can also be
used for each design shown here, allowing for additional flexibility. While experimenters have
to be wary that differences in design could have significant effects on behaviour and estimation
(or elicitation) of preferences, simulations can be ran for alternative designs to identify such
issues without using valuable experimental funding.
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6.2 Alternative Perspectives
By incorporating alternative perspectives: Place-in-Society (PS), Veil of Ignorance (VOI) and
Impartial Spectator (IS); the following questions were sought to be answered. To what extent
does the perspective of the individual affect their value judgements? Are preference param-
eters significantly different when the participant is asked to consider different perspectives?
This question is intertwined with the more normative judgement of which perspective should
be used for such distributional decision making. While this analysis is a positive one, the
results from this chapter could inform such a normative discussion.
Unlike when comparing experimental designs, the raw responses can be used to identify
differences between perspectives, within designs. When considering PC, individual’s decisions
directly map onto inequality aversion groups, see Figure 1.18. While differences between the
median groups are not very apparent, the median response is either ‘Weighted Prioritarian 1’
or ‘2’, the distribution of responses changes somewhat between perspectives. While neither
perspective have any individuals willing to violate monotonicity, and a similar proportion of
individuals are ‘Maximin’, differences appear at lower levels of inequality aversion. While only
4.5% are ‘Utilitarian’ in PS, there are 20.8% and 28.6% ‘Utilitarian’s’ and even 8.3% and 3.6%
‘Inequality Seeking’ individuals in IS and VOI, respectively. Interestingly, some individuals
appear to prioritise efficiency, rather than equality, when the perspective is more impartial.
When moving into the DS comparisons are somewhat different, here there is a stark
contrast between PS and the other perspective, see Figure 1.19. More equal allocations emerge
from IS and VOI, with 40% of subjects distributing payoffs equally in both perspectives, in
comparison to the 0% in PS. In CA the trend is similar, distributions in VOI and IS are far
more equal (see Figure 1.20); with a median response of 0.46 in PS, and median responses of
0.33 in both VOI and IS.
The results of the random effects model in Table 1.2 results show that inequality aversion
is significantly higher in both the VOI and IS (10% level), while EDE is significantly lower
for both VOI and IS. The Skillings-Mack results (see Table 1.12) confirm this for EDE, for
both aggregate and within design. While the difference in EDE is not surprising, due to the
assumption that α = 0.33 in VOI and IS, the difference is partially driven by those significant
differences in r. The hypothesis that α = 0.33 is not rejected for VOI and IS (see Appendix
A.8), and indeed is significantly different from the estimated α within the PS, with a mean of
0.74.
Perspective is therefore important, it has large effects on the distributional decisions that
individuals make. Individuals allocate far more equally when under the veil or as an impartial
spectator. Across all designs participants appear to be less averse to inequality when they
know who they are. Furthermore, the estimates of self-interest are not significantly different
from 1/3 for the VOI and IS perspectives, but are significantly higher in the PS perspective.
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6.3 Individual Level Prediction
Within the structural approach to experimental economics, assessing how well the proposed
model, or models, fit to the data is important. Here there are two proposed utility functions,
outcome utility and allocation utility, and two families of error model, two-beta and beta-with-
bias. The CA PS treatment was chosen to test between utility functions and error models.
Results show that the outcome utility model strictly dominated the allocation utility model,
for AICc statistics. Individuals appeared to fully consider the final payoffs, rather than simply
distributing the allocations. In terms of error models the two-beta model appeared somewhat
better; however, the beta-with-bias models perform similarly, but are penalised by having an
additional preference parameter. Between the utility functions the outcome model dominates,
however, with regard to the error models the choice is debatable.
Due to analysis in Section 5.5.1 the Two-Beta model was chosen for the main analysis.
Primarily this was due to higher AICc values, which selected the model as best for all but
one participant. Although the Beta-with-Bias models are more general, they were not able to
explain behaviour better than the Two-Beta model. An additional concern is that the bias
parameter may alter the other estimated value judgements. While the Two-Beta model does
little to affect the actual parameter values, r and α, by design the Beta-with-Bias models
affects the parameters. Individuals with true α values of 1, will be shown to have an α of less
than 1 for instance. As these values are meaningful in terms of the philosophical standpoint
which they represent the Beta-with-Bias models are, perhaps, less desirable. For the Beta-
with-Equality-Bias model specifically, the assumption is that individuals are biased towards
an equal allocation, the issue is this equal allocation may correspond to a set of parameter
values; which, with the inclusion of the bias parameter, will not be estimated.
There are, however, several benefits of using the Beta-with-Bias models. The first of which
is related to the Beta-with-Effort bias model. Behaviourally it is appealing, in the sense that
it can be proposed that by linking the outcome and allocation utility models a proxy of effort
is received. Individuals who put in more effort consider the payoff outcomes each round, even
though it is more demanding in terms of cognition and effort, while those who only consider
the allocations put in less effort. The higher the bias towards this allocation utility function,
the less effort is put in. Indeed, with the regression in Appendix A.5 there is shown to be a
significant relationship. The models also smooth the effects of those individuals who switch
between entirely selfish allocations and sharing allocations. While the Two-Beta model may
be able to estimate error for them, it does have to assume they are entirely self-interested to
begin with, while the Beta-with-Bias models can begin the estimations without imposing that
assumption.
6.4 Comparisons
6.4.1 Social Welfare Functions in Health
There are a number of studies within the health economics literature which utilise a Social
Welfare Function, from which an inequality aversion parameter is elicited. A. Williams,
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Tsuchiya, and Dolan (2004), Tsuchiya and Dolan (2007), Dolan and Tsuchiya (2009), Dolan
and Tsuchiya (2011) and Robson et al. (2017) conducted questionairre-based surveys, using a
similar Pairwise Choice design, in England, while Abasolo and Tsuchiya (2004), Abasolo and
Tsuchiya (2008) and Aba´solo and Tsuchiya (2013), conducted such surveys in Spain. Each
of these studies revealed that the majority of the population were averse to inequality. In
most studies a comparable median inequality aversion parameter was not found, either as it
was not reported, or was not comparable. Median values of 27.9 and 9.95 were reported in
Dolan and Tsuchiya (2011) and Robson et al. (2017), respectively. From two of the studies in
Spain, Abasolo and Tsuchiya (2004) and Aba´solo and Tsuchiya (2013), the median response
was found to violate monotonicity, meaning that an r parameter would not be identifiable as
they were more inequality averse than Maximin preferences. The most comparable median
response estimated here, from the Pairwise Choice design and Impartial Spectator perspective,
was 1.9. This parameter value is significantly less than the elicited value from the other studies,
meaning that our sample was significantly less averse to inequality.
A more in-depth comparison, concerning the entire distribution of responses can be con-
ducted using data from Robson et al. (2017). The format of the survey is comparable to that
used here, however, there are key differences. As mentioned above, the dimension is health,
rather than income. Participants were not given monetary incentives for each question, but
paid a set turn-up fee. While there were similarly 8 rounds of Pairwise Choices, those in
the questionnaire had the option of ‘Programme A and Programme B are Equally Good’ in
addition to the choice of Programme A or Programme B.
For the purpose of comparison the health questionnaire results have been split into various
samples. The first is the ‘paper’ based questionnaire, where members of the public attended a
day-long session at the University of York and invigilators were present to explain, and form
discussion groups, in relation to the questionnaire. The bottom two bars were both done in
the form of an online survey, hosted by Smart Survey. They have been split into a set of
student only responses and the larger general population responses.
When comparing the results there are several differences. The median responses show
higher inequality aversion in each of the health questionnaire results (r = 9.95) compared
to the experimental results (2.5552 <= r <= 2.8702). The distribution of responses at the
extremes is also significantly different. While not one individual was classed as an ‘Egalitarian’
(and hence violated monotonicity) within the experiment between 14.3% and 34.2% of the
health questionnaire responses did. At the opposite extreme 20.8% and 28.6% of participants
were ‘Utilitarian’s’ in the Impartial Spectator and Veil of Ignorance perspectives, respectively,
compared to 3% of in the general population, and 0% in the other samples. Arguments may
emerge that the population sample may be that which effected the differing distributions.
However, as Figure 1.15 highlights when considering only students within the health sample
the difference is even more stark.
There are two potential reasons for this; domain and method. The first, domain, refers
to the difference between health and income. Individuals could be more averse to inequality
within the dimension of health. It could be seen as a necessity in life, and something which
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Figure 1.15: Distribution of Inequality Aversion for Alternative α Values
should not be unequally distributed. The second factor refers to the difference between in-
centivised laboratory experiments and questionnaire-based surveys. As discussed in Section
1.1, the two strands of literature, Distributional Preferences and Social Welfare Functions,
use these different methods and each debate the other’s method. Without straying into the
debate, it is clear that these differences could also be responsible for the disparity in estimates.
However, one aim of this experiment was to mitigate the arguments against the experimental
method. By utilising the Impartial Spectator perspective the concern that individuals are
primarily concerned with ‘sums of money they can bring home after the experiment’ is miti-
gated. The underlying issues of inequality aversion are hopefully assessed, while the incentive
compatible experiment hopefully mitigated the biases and errors that questionnaire responses
may contain. If this is the case then the differences emerge from either the potential biases
within the questionnaire method or the differing aversions regarding the domain. Indeed,
when formulating the Atkinson index (in the context of income) Atkinson (1970) took values
of between -1 and 1.5 when proposing the index. Whilst not based on experimental evidence,
this intuitive range is not too dissimilar to the elicited value of 1.9
6.4.2 Dictator Games
Engel (2011) performs a meta-analysis of dictator games, which allows for a comparison of
giving in other experiments. From 616 treatments, the ‘grand mean’ showed that dictators
were willing to give 28.35% of their share on average. From our accumulated responses the
mean PP to P1 was 0.56, giving a share of 44.02%, which is a significantly higher share than
in absolute terms. Yet this share is 22.01% to each of the other players. Indeed, Engel finds
that giving is significantly higher in multiple recipient dictator games, however, his results
suggest that giving per person actually increases.
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Consistent with our results is a large degree of heterogeneity. From the 328 treatments
that gave full distributions, 36.1% were entirely self-interested, 16.74% shared equally, 34.09%
gave less than equal but more than none, and 13.07% gave more than half their share. From
our results, in relative terms to the three players, 17.67% of the responses were entirely self-
interested, 9% shared exactly equally, 65.32% gave less than equal but more than none, and
8.02% gave more than half their share. There are roughly half the number of self-interested
responses in our sample, less equal sharers and fewer more than equal sharers.
Cappelen et al. (2007) propose that individual’s fairness ideals are heterogeneous, propos-
ing three such ideals: Strict Egalitarianism, Libertarianism, and Liberal Egalitarianism.
Where strict egalitarians dislike unequal outcomes, libertarians believe individuals should
give exactly what they produce and liberal egalitarians should be held responsible only for
their choices. A structural model is estimated and they find that the proportions of the above
three fairness ideals are 0.435, 0.381 and 0.184, respectively. Their experiment was a one-shot
dictator game, with factors that were both within and outside the individual’s control. The
mean share the dictator offered to the other player was 27.1%, and the median share 29.2%.
Andreoni and Miller (2002) have an approach somewhat similar to ours. They consider
a CES utility function and vary prices, while ensuring individuals are subject to a budget
constraint. Again, they conclude that individuals are heterogenous and, as in Cappelen et
al. (2007), group individuals into specific groups. While no aggregate parameter values are
found for their CES function for the sample as a whole, the distribution of respondents who fit
into each specific group is comparable. They find that 43% of their subjects adhere strongly
to either, Purely Selfish, 22.7%, Maximin, 14.2%, or Utilitarian, 6.25%, preferences. The
remaining subjects weakly adhere to these utility functions, and they utilise the CES function
to predict similar self-interest and inequality aversion parameters. Converting our results into
comparable groups we find approximately between 12% and 26.67% of respondents adhere
to Maximin, 13.33% to Purely Selfish and 0% Utilitarians. As with other comparisons the
number of Purely Selfish individuals seem somewhat lower, while our Maximin responses vary
depending upon the r cut-off the range does span that of Andreoni and Miller’s value. There
are, however, zero Utilitarians within our sample.
While there are a whole host of experiments which consider similar dictator games, there
are several conclusions which appear throughout the literature. Firstly, that the self-interest
hypothesis, that all individuals are solely motivated by their own payoffs, is consistently re-
futed E. Fehr and Schmidt (2006). Indeed, many individuals are motivated by other-regarding
preferences, of some form. Second, preferences are heterogeneous, far from conforming to a
specific social norm, or distinct preference. The implications of this affect the majority of eco-
nomics, not only do these models better explain behaviour but point to alternative methods
of incentivising individuals in the real world.
6.4.3 Ugandan General Population and British University Students
One contentious issue with traditional laboratory experiments is the demographic from which
the sample is taken. The samples are usually made up mostly, or entirely, of students who
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themselves are a specific sub-population and are not representative of society as a whole.
The reason for this sample is more often than not due to cost and convenience; students
are readily available and are perhaps more willing to be rewarded with less money than
non-students may be. When considering preferences over elements which may have policy
implications a representative sample is often desirable. One way in which to do so, which will
be explained below, is to use samples from developing countries. These samples can consist
of representative samples and the compensation needed is far less in relative terms.
A pilot study (which was a precursor to Chapter 2) was ran in the Mbale region of Uganda
with 24 respondents. The design was similar to that of the Continuous Allocation, for Place-
in-Society. The numbers were made slightly simpler, to deal with poor numeracy skills, but
the principle remained similar. Rather than a computerised laboratory it was run with paper
and pen. Participants moved physical tokens into boxes to denotes their allocations to P1, P2
and P3 respectively. Each box had different multiplication factors each round. Facilitators
were present to record responses, and to move to the next round of the game. Apart from
these aspects the experiment was kept relatively close to the experiment in the UK, to allow
for comparison.
Figure 1.16 shows the cumulative frequency plot of EDE for both samples. It is clear
that, while for three quarters of the population the EDE values are very similar, there is a
substantial difference for the higher EDE values. The University of York sample appears to
have a greater proportion of more self-interested individuals that the Ugandan sample.
Figure 1.16: Distribution of Inequality Aversion for Alternative α Values
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
EDE Welfare
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Uganda Pilot
York Laboratory
To further test this difference a mixture model was ran to identify clustering within the
sample. Within both samples the optimal number of clusters was two and these clusters, as
in our previous analysis for the whole sample, was split between a more egalitarian cluster
and a more self-interested cluster. The difference, however, is the proportion of those within
each sample. As Table 1.6 shows 92% of the Uganda sample fall within the first cluster, while
the proportion is only 73% of the York sample. While these results are just illustrative, they
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pave the way for a full comparison between student and representative sample which will take
place in Chapter 2.
Table 1.6: Mixture Model Cluster Comparison: Uganda and York Samples
Uganda York
Cluster Mixing
Proportions
Mean EDE Mixing
Proportions
Mean EDE
1 0.92 2.64 0.73 2.06
2 0.08 7.63 0.27 8.72
6.5 Risk Under the Veil of Ignorance
The Veil of Ignorance perspective, within the experimental context, creates two normative
dilemmas. The first concerns the distinction between aversion to inequality and aversion to
risk, the second the assumptions behind self-interest; both are intertwined. Two alternate
models will be proposed which reflect these two concerns.
In the VOI treatment participants are presented with a decision problem where they do
not know which of the three players they are, but know that the decisions they make could
determine the payoffs for themselves and two others. Participants could view the situation
purely as a risky choice, or as a distributive decision which will end in a degree of inequality.
If an individual had risk averse preferences they may act as if they had inequality aversion,
and vice versa. The CES utility functions used are common to both literatures: the Constant
Relative Risk Aversion and Atkinson Index (when reformulated as is here) are all but identical.
Indeed, as Rawls notes “of course the two principles are not the same [...] but there is this
similarity”, both views weight “more heavily the advantages of those whose situation is less
fortunate” (Rawls, 1999). So the interpretation of the γ parameter, specified below, is left to
the reader.
The matter is further complicated by assumptions concerning self-interest. If an individual
is assumed to be purely self-interested, adhering to egoism, then the problem becomes a risky
decision. Rawls, although not ruling it out, does not specify that individuals behind the veil
follow egoism, but that they must be “mutually disinterested”. Meaning they are “conceived
as not taking an interest in one another’s interests”; they are “not willing to have their interests
sacrificed to others” (Rawls, 1999). In our context, this is still open to interpretation. If an
individual’s interests are only the payoff to themselves then “surely his conception of the good
is egoistic”. If an individual does have other-regarding preferences their interests could be
considered to be ‘utility’, leading them to share the payoffs (to some extent). By maximising
their own ‘utility’ they are still ‘mutually disinterested’ and not sacrificing their own interests.
To delve into these issues two models are presented. The first, which has been assumed
throughout, has taken the EDE utility function as previously defined, but by setting α =
1/3 we can assume that participants are purely self-interested individuals, with their own
payoffs as a proxy for individual utility and establish a degree of risk aversion. This method
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assumes individuals are making decisions about their possible payoffs in each of the three
states. An alternate assumption could be that individuals are considering how to distribute
resources amongst the ‘society’ which they will be in, meaning inequality aversion would be
the preference of interest. The model is shown below:
UV OI1 =
(
N∑
i=1
(
1
3
(piixi)
−γ
))− 1γ
(1.19)
The second model assumes that individuals do have some other-regarding preferences, as
a result the decision becomes more complex. Now participants must consider a decision where
they have a probability of 1/3 of being in the position of Player 1, 2 or 3, and must consider
the utility they would receive from allocations to all players in each state. Participants have
a degree of self-interest, α, so must consider each possible state when their self is Player i.
More formally:
UV OI2 =
(
N∑
i=1
(
1
3
(zi)
−γ
))− 1γ
(1.20)
Where:
zi =
α(piixi)−r + N∑
j 6=i
1− α
2
(pijxj)
−r
− 1r (1.21)
Note the difference between r and γ, while r denotes inequality aversion in the case where
an individual knows they are Player i, γ is denoted to highlight the parallels between risk and
inequality aversion, when the participant does not know which Player they are. To establish
γ, for Equation 1.20, the parameter values estimated in the Place-in-Society treatment are
used in Equation 1.21, then given those parameters γ is estimated.6
The distribution of estimated parameter values, from these alternate models, are shown in
Figure 1.17. A divergence appears between the two models. For γ 43.33% of the population
are classed as Maximin/Extremely Risk Averse, in Model 1, with 28.57% for Model 2. Further
more, while there are 21.43% Utilitarian/Risk Neutral in Model 2, there are 0% in Model 1.
While both models shows that Maximin/Extreme Risk Aversion are the model group, Model
2 shows a significant proportion of Utilitarian preferences.
6.5.1 Rawls and Harsanyi
Integral to the concept of the Veil of Ignorance is the debate between Rawls and Harsanyi.
Both adopt a definition of the Veil and propose ‘rules’ that individuals would adhere to
6Results shown below are estimated from the Continuous Allocation treatment. Unlike previous analysis
a analytical solution for x∗i could not be obtained, so results are estimated using numerical solvers to ensure
the set of corresponding first order conditions equal zero. Similar analysis can be conducted in the Pairwise
Choice treatment, using PS data to elicit α and r, and VOI data to elicit γ, given α and r.
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Figure 1.17: Comparison Between Inequality Aversion and Risk Aversion
once under the Veil. These ‘rules’ are, however, contradictory; with Rawls pointing towards
Maximin and Harsanyi to Expected-Utility Maximisation.
Harsanyi points to a necessary impartiality when making a “value judgement on the dis-
tribution of income.” Individuals making such a choice must be “ignorant of what his own
relative position [. . . ] would be within the system.” That this would be the case if they had
“exactly the same chance” of being in either position in society (Harsanyi, 1953). This being
the case then, for an individual, expected-utility theory would be used as their decision rule,
moreover they would choose the society with the highest average utility level (Harsanyi, 1975).
Rawls postulates that the Veil of Ignorance is where “no one knows his place in society, his
class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets
and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like” (Rawls, 1999). That when under the
veil ‘rational’ and ‘mutually disinterested’ individuals should adhere to the Maximin Rule.
To conform to the Maximin Rule one must “identify the worst outcome of each available
alternative and then adopt the alternative whose worst outcome is better than the worst
outcomes of all the other alternatives” (Rawls, 2001).
However, Rawls does specify that it is only under certain “conditions in which it is ra-
tional to be guided by the Maximin rule”. Perhaps the condition most appropriate refers to
probabilities; the “maximin rule takes no account of probabilities” and that parties involved
have no “reliable basis for estimating the probabilities” (Rawls, 2001). Harsanyi argues for
Laplace’s principle of indifference, that if we are in a situation of complete ignorance “then
it is reasonable to assign equal probabilities to all the possibilities”. Moreover, for moral
reasoning, the same “a priori weight should be given to all members of society” leading to
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these equal probabilities (Harsanyi, 1975). Out of a situation of ambiguity a situation emerges
where an equal weighting is reasonable; the ambiguous problem emerges as an uncertain one.
Indeed, this is the crux of the argument; while Harsanyi proposes a feasible assumption to
enable a rule to shape decisions, Rawls argues that Maximin would only be adhered to if such
probabilities did not exist at all. Perhaps this is the reason the proposed rules are opposed.
Both rules are justified from a normative standpoint, yet they lead to opposite conclusions.
One maximises total income, while the other increases the income of the worst-off. Rawls
states “in working out the conception of justice as fairness one main task clearly is to determine
which principle of justice would be chosen in the original position” (Rawls, 1999). So, rather
than adopting a normative standpoint, the work done here attempts to answer this question
from a positive standpoint.
Results shows that if participants are assumed to be ‘egoistic’ then the modal group adhere
to Maximin (43.33%) with no participants adhering to Utilitarianism. Suggesting that under
those assumptions more individuals adhere to Rawls’ ‘rule’. If we assume individuals have
some other-regarding preferences, then Maximin still remains as the modal group (28.57%),
however a significant minority (21.43%) adhere to Utilitarianism. Although the Maximin rule
consistently has a majority of ‘votes’ it is clear that, even under the Veil, preferences are still
heterogeneous, and although the same behaviour is observed a more simple model (the first)
may over estimate the proportion of Maximin preferences.
By using these models to estimate heterogeneous preferences, the ‘just’ principles esti-
mated can be extended to policy decision making. When policy makers are faced with deci-
sions (relating to redistribution of income) Social Welfare Functions, incorporating estimated
preferences, could be used to analyse the welfare effects and rank the decisions; allowing de-
cision makers to choose that with the highest welfare gain. While a single ‘rule’ could be
chosen, perhaps from a modal response, or an aggregate preference could be established, the
median or ‘most likely’ societal preference, individual level preference data could actually be
used, and then aggregated. In this approach more in-depth analysis could be conducted, and
if larger experiments were conducted, relating to the welfare gains and loses for particular
groups. Indeed, it would point to an ideal distribution in society, according to potentially
‘just’, evidence based, principles. While only meagre steps towards this aim have been made
within this experiment, it hopefully provides a way in which to push this agenda forward.
7 Conclusion
To conclude, an incentivised laboratory experiment (n = 30) was run, where participants were
required to make distributional decisions amongst groups of three. Multiple experimental de-
signs and alternative perspectives were presented to allow the identification of within-subject
treatment effects. Utility functions have been proposed which incorporate parameters re-
lating to self-interest and inequality aversion; combining behavioural modelling with moral
value judgements. Preferences are then estimated on an individual, cluster and sample level
to explain the behaviour observed in the experiment. The goodness-of-fit of alternative utility
50
7. Conclusion
functions and stochastic error models is further analysed, alongside the disentanglement of
risk and inequality aversion while under a veil of ignorance.
Economic models which assume all individuals are purely self-interested have been shown
to be lacking in explanatory power, as extensive heterogeneity in behaviour is found between-
subjects. Through formulating models which incorporate other-regarding preferences, how-
ever, the differences in individual-level behaviour can be explained. The majority of the
sample is shown to possess some regard for others and an aversion to inequality. Yet, altering
the design of the experiment, or perspective which the individual considers, has been found
to have significant effects on the behaviour of the individual. This leads to the need to es-
timate different preference parameters. Furthermore, results have shown the importance of
accounting for noise in behaviour. These factors are important, and in future research the
effect that the design and perspective can have on the behaviour observed and preferences
estimated should be accounted for.
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A Appendices
A.1 Running the Experiment
A.1.1 Sample Characteristics
Table 1.7 shows the demographic composition of the sample, which was established through
the questionnaire. The sample contains significantly more female participants (70%), with
93.3% between the ages of 18 and 30. In general participants are highly educated, 33.3% at
undergraduate level and 46.7% at postgraduate level, with 28 out of 30 participants being
students. Income is low, as to be expected with students, with 66.6% earning below £12,600,
while parental income is slightly more representative there is still a high proportion, 36.7%,
in the lowest income bracket. In terms of nationality and ethnicity the sample is relatively
international with 10 different nationalities being present; the majority groups are British,
46.7%, and white, 53.3%, with a sizeable proportion of Chinese nationals, 26.7%. Social
scientists make up the largest majority group of students, 40%, (half of which are in the
general area of economics) but arts and humanities and sciences are also well represented. In
terms of religion, there is an eclectic mix, and in terms of political preference the distribution
seems bimodal, with peaks to the left and centre. Participants were given the option of not
responding to any of the questions they felt uncomfortable with answering, so there are many
N/A responses in questions of ethnicity, religion and income which should be considered while
looking at the demographics.
Table 1.7: Demographic Composition of Sample; N=30
Demographic Category Number Percentage
Gender Male 9 30.0%
Female 21 70.0%
Age 18-21 10 33.3%
22-25 11 36.7%
26-30 7 23.3%
31+ 1 3.3%
N/A 1 3.3%
Nationality British 14 46.7%
Chinese 8 26.7%
Canadian 1 3.3%
Greek 1 3.3%
Hungarian 1 3.3%
Indian 1 3.3%
Japanese 1 3.3%
Latvian 1 3.3%
Lithuanian 1 3.3%
Turkish 1 3.3%
Ethnicity White 16 53.3%
British Asian 1 3.3%
Greek 1 3.3%
Japanese 1 3.3%
Mixed Race 1 3.3%
Turk 1 3.3%
Chinese 2 6.7%
N/A 7 23.3%
Religion Agnostic 1 3.3%
Atheist 5 16.7%
Buddist 3 10.0%
Christian 4 13.3%
Hindu 1 3.3%
Orthadox 1 3.3%
Other 1 3.3%
None 6 20.0%
N/A 8 26.7%
Demographic Category Number Percentage
Highest A Levels 5 16.7%
Education Other 1 3.3%
Postgraduate 14 46.7%
Undergraduate 10 33.3%
Subject/ Arts and Humanities 4 13.3%
Occupation Science 6 20.0%
Social Science 12 40.0%
Misc. Student 6 20.0%
Administrator 1 3.3%
N/A 1 3.3%
Income £0 10 33.3%
£1 - £12,600 10 33.3%
£12,601-£20,600 1 3.3%
£20,601-£32,100 1 3.3%
£32,101-£49,900 0 0.0%
£49,901 or more 0 0.0%
N/A 8 26.7%
Parent’s Less than £12,600 11 36.7%
Income £12,601-£20,600 4 13.3%
£20,601-£32,100 4 13.3%
£32,101-£49,900 4 13.3%
£49,901 or more 6 20.0%
N/A 1 3.3%
Political Left: 1 1 3.3%
Preference 2 0 0.0%
3 8 26.7%
4 4 13.3%
5 6 20.0%
6 8 26.7%
7 1 3.3%
8 1 3.3%
9 0 0.0%
Right :10 0 0.0%
N/A 1 3.3%
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A.1.2 Instructions
In order to increase the understanding of the experiment, participants were given instructions
throughout the experiment. The instructions came in four forms: paper instructions, on-
screen tutorials, reminders and passive on-screen instructions. The paper instructions were
given at the beginning of the session, before the on-screen experiment started. This consisted
of general instructions, which explained the experiment as a whole, and design specific in-
structions, which explained the specifics of each design (see AppendixA.2). Participants were
requested to read only the general and pairwise choice instructions before they began, to re-
duce information overload and to ensure they were focused on one design at a time. Following
the first paper instructions there was an on-screen tutorial which showed the participants
the specifics of the next design. The layout, and meaning of each section, of the screen was
explained, showing exactly how participants were to interact with the screen and make their
decisions. The tutorial itself was interactive, allowing the participant to click forward and
backward to understand the each design. They were made to correctly fulfil each requirement
of each design in order to proceed, and were given a minimum time to ensure they did not rush
through. Once the tutorial was completed the reminder screen would show, as it would before
each different game, to show the specifics of each game, including the perspective they would
take, the number and nature of rounds and other specific information. Finally, within each
round there were very brief passive on-screen instructions, giving just enough information in-
case participants forgot some information. When the first design was complete participants
were asked to refer to the next section of the written instructions, and then would repeat
each form of instructions for that design, and the next. The aim of providing information in
small sections repeated in different, and hopefully interesting ways, was to ensure participants
remained focused and absorbed the necessary information to really understand each element
of the experiment.
A.1.3 Randomisation
Randomisation is a vital element in the experimental design. Firstly, as each participant
entered the room they were asked to take a number, which corresponded to certain computer,
from a bag to randomise who was allocated to each seat. Secondly, subjects were randomly
allocated into groups of three for each round of the experiment. While participants made
decisions each round, ‘as if’ they were the dictator, in each round one dictator was randomly
(and anonymously) chosen to determine the payoffs to the group. For the Place-in-Society
and Veil of Ignorance perspectives the groupings were straight forward, the ‘dictator’ was
P1, and their decisions for P2 and P3 are played out for the participants in particular seats.
For the Impartial Spectator perspective the dictator in Group 1 makes decisions for Group
2, Group 2’s dictators decides for Group 3, and so forth, until the final dictator in the final
group decides for Group 1. These random group orderings remained anonymous, but ensured
that the design was incentive compatible.
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A.1.4 Ordering
Due to the small sample size randomisation of the treatment order was not possible. If the
ordering was randomised in each session there would have only been 9 to 12 participants to
observe any effects, these effects could, therefore, be because of random sampling rather than
due to the order effect. As a result focus was made on an ordering which aided understanding
of each design. Firstly, the designs were ordered in terms of how cognitively demanding
they were. Pairwise Choice, was deemed the least demanding as participants were required
to make a decision between only two choices, clicking on the distribution they preferred.
Discrete Slider, was second, as they had to move a single slider to state a preference amongst
multiple distributions. Last was Continuous Allocation, as not only did participants have to
calculate an exact preference in terms of allocation, but had three, rather than one, mediums to
interact with; the multiple sliders, arrows and input boxes. Secondly, the order of perspective
was Impartial Spectator, Place-in-Society and then Veil of Ignorance, as the complexity of
the perspective was deemed to be in that order. Decisions for the Impartial Spectator are
about decisions purely about others. When considering the Place-in-Society the matter is
more complex as the participants payoffs are within this, alongside others. But the Veil of
Ignorance is more complex as decisions about both individual and others need to be made,
when who each player is, is not certain.
A.1.5 Incentives
In order to incentivise participants the reward mechanisms used need to be ‘incentive compat-
ible’. What this, in essence, means is that the respondent provides “truthful responses to the
specific questions that the experimenter wants to observe responses to” (Bardsley et al., 2010).
One such mechanism, which will be used here, is the random-lottery incentive scheme. This
mechanism entails giving participants specific tasks which each has a well-defined reward
structure. Once all of the tasks have been finished one of the tasks will be selected at random,
and it is from this the participant will receive their payoff (Bardsley et al., 2010). Theoreti-
cally the random-lottery incentive scheme is unbiased, if one were to assume expected utility
preferences; the participant should give the exactly the same response to each task as they
would have done if they were only faced with that single task.
An important element of the design is the group dimension. As a result the payments
to those within the group and themselves are a vital when considering incentives. As three
players will be in each game, each receiving payoffs, it is necessary to ensure these payoffs are
considered to be real. As a result each participant made their decisions ‘as if’ they were the
dictator. One dictator was randomly (and anonymously) chosen for each round, and their
decisions played out for the participants within that group. In this way each participant
received one ‘set’ of payoffs, either that which they gave to themselves (when they were
chosen as the dictator) or that with another participant in their group gave them (when that
other participant was the dictator). This payoff mechanism, should, ensure that all players
behaviour optimally, as each of their allocation decisions had an equal weight of playing out.
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A.1.6 Software
The experiment was run in a computerised laboratory, with participants interacting with
an on-screen programme. This was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), a toolbox
designed for experimental economists which has the additional benefit that it saves data
routinely; which reduces the issues associated with server crashes.
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A.2 Instructions
Instructions
Please Read These Carefully.
Everyone Will Receive the Same Instructions.
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General Instructions
In this experiment you will be making decisions about the distribution of pay-
offs between yourself and other participants in this room. These payoffs are in
addition to your turn-up fee of £2.50.
There will be three different experiments, each made up of multiple games, which
in turn consist of multiple rounds. Your actual payoff will be determined from one
randomly selected round. It is from this one round that all participants will
receive their payoff. This means that every round has an equal chance of deter-
mining your final payoff, so consider each choice you make carefully. Everyone
will finish at the same time, as you need to wait for every participant to finish
each round before you can move onto the next.
The choices you make will determine the payoff for three players. You will make
choices which concern the distribution of payoffs between each player. For each
round, you will be randomly linked with other players. The three of you will make
your choices independently of one another, but only one of the player’s choices
will be selected, randomly, to provide the payoffs for all three players. You will
not know whose decision has been chosen and will receive you payoff, individually, at
the end.
A simplified version of the experiment is shown on the opposite page. It shows a
possible distribution of payoffs. The height of the orange bars shows the payoff
to each individual; with the payoff level shown on the vertical axis and the corre-
sponding player on the horizontal axis. Payoffs are always shown in pounds, in
this example, at the top of the orange bars and to right hand side next to the corre-
sponding player. The ‘Total Sum of Payoffs’ shows the payoffs of all the players
added together, while the ‘Gap Between Payoffs’ shows the difference between the
best-off and worst-off player. The Finish button in the bottom right corner allows you
to move to the next round. You must make a decision in every round and then
click Finish to confirm your decision.
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A minimum time will be displayed in the top right corner in every round, in black;
this time must have elapsed before you progress to the next round. There will also
be a maximum time, in red, which will be double the minimum time, if you do
not make a decision in this time and click Finish you will receive a payoff of zero
for that round, and your decision will not count for the other two players.
Throughout the three experiments you will face three different perspectives; they
are Outside Observer, Place-in-Society and Under the Veil. For the Outside
Observer your decisions will concern three other players. You will not be making
a decision about your payoff; that will be done by some other player. In Place-in-
Society the three players in the group are yourself and two other players. You
will know which player you are when you make your decision. Under the Veil will
be the same; however, you do not know who you are in the distribution, this will be
randomly decided.
After the experiment you will be required to fill out a questionnaire. Your responses
from the questionnaire, and from the entire experiment, will be treated anony-
mously. You will be given instructions before each of the three experiments,
explaining the precise situation. You should read these carefully, as each experi-
ment will be different. After the paper instructions you will be given a tutorial,
so that you can understand each experiment fully. If you require help at any time,
please raise your hand.
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Pairwise Choice Instructions
The first experiment will be a set of Pairwise Choice Questions; where you have
to choose between two different distributions of payoffs between three players.
The decision you make will be between Choice A and Choice B, which each contain
a different distributions of Payoffs. You will be shown two graphs side-by-side, which
represent these choices.
You are required to make a choice between the two. You can make your choice by
simply clicking anywhere on either graph. You can change back and forth, to see
in greater detail the payoffs. Once selected, your choice will be highlighted with
a box. Once you have made your choice you may click the Finish Button, in the
bottom right, to proceed. A screenshot of the experiment is shown below.
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You will firstly be shown an onscreen tutorial which, with blue information
boxes, will explain the interface and show you how to make your decisions. Then you
will do 4 games, each made up of 8 rounds. In the first game you will be an Outside
Observer, in the second and third games you will know your Place-In-Society
and in the fourth you will be Under the Veil.
Throughout each game there will be trade-offs between the Total Sum of Payoffs
and the Gap Between Payoffs. When making your decisions be sure to check the
differences between the two in Choice A and Choice B, as well as the distribution
of Payoffs.
In every game Choice A will remain the same throughout the 8 rounds, while
payoffs in Choice B will be gradually reduced in some way.
End of Pairwise Choice Paper Instructions
Please Proceed to the On Screen Tutorial
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Single Slider Instructions
The second type of experiment will be in the form of a single slider; there are a
set range of options which you can choose from, using the slider. Unlike the
first experiment you will only see one graph, shown below. It will have different
distributions of payoffs between three players. These distributions are all chosen
from a total budget of £30. What you must do is to move the slider along the
axis to find the distribution that you prefer. There are multiple distributions to
choose from, so be sure to check each of them.
There will be 3 games for this experiment, each made of two rounds. In the first
game you will be an Outside Observer, in the second you will know your Place-In-
Society and in the third you will be Under the Veil. For the second game, the
options you see in the second round will depend on your choice in the first round.
For the first and third games each round will be independent.
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Within each round there will be Payoff Multipliers implicit in the choices available.
In the first round of every game they will be [1, 1, 1] for Player 1, Player 2 and
Player 3, respectively. In the second round of every game, however, they will be
[1, 0.6, 1.4] for Player 1, Player 2 and Player 3, respectively. What this means is that
the allocations from the budget of £30 will be multiplied by the Payoff Multiplier
when given to each Player. You will see the effect of this in the second round,
where the Total Sum of Payoffs will change depending on which choice is made.
An example of how this works is shown below:
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
Allocation 10 10 10
Payoff Multiplier 1 0.6 1.4
Payoff 10 6 14
The addition of these different Payoff Multipliers, in the second round of each
game, means that there emerges a trade-off between the Total Sum of Payoffs
and the Gap Between Payoffs. As the Total Sum of Payoffs increases, so does
the Gap Between Payoffs.
Whichever choice you make will be the distribution from which you may receive
your payoff. You will firstly be shown an onscreen tutorial, which, with blue infor-
mation boxes, will explain the interface and show you how to make your decisions.
Then you will do the experiment for real.
End of Single Slider Paper Instructions
Please Proceed to the On Screen Tutorial
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Multiple Slider Instructions
The final type of experiment is the most complex. An extension of the single slider, the
multiple slider choice allows you to make very precise allocations between all
three players. There are no predefined distributions to choose from, you must
therefore choose allocations to each player on a continuous level. The allocations
you make will determine the potential payoff of the three players in that round.
In order to do this there are three options. Firstly, by moving the slider, for either
Player, you can give them the allocation you desire. Secondly, to enable you to
more precisely change the allocations the arrow buttons either side can increase
or decrease the allocations by a small amount. Thirdly, by using the Written
Input boxes you can precisely type the Allocations you want. A screenshot of the
experiment is shown below.
The Allocations you give to each Player are shown beside the slider, with the
Payoff Multipliers shown in the top right. The Payoffs are represented by the
orange bars, the value next to them and the number to the right hand-side,
the ‘Total Sum of Payoffs’ and ‘Gap Between Payoffs’ is also shown.
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One thing which will alter between rounds of this experiment is the Payoff Mul-
tipliers. For each round each player will be given a different Payoff Multiplier.
The payoff that player gets will be the Allocation, you give, multiplied by the
Payoff Multiplier. An example of how this works is shown below:
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
Allocation 10 10 10
Payoff Multiplier 1 0.8 1.2
Payoff 10 8 12
These Payoff Multipliers are important, if you choose to allocate to the Player
with a higher Payoff Multiplier, then the Payoffs they get are greater than if you
choose to allocate to someone who has a lower Payoff Multiplier. You will be able to
see the effect of this in the Total Sum of Payoffs. There is, however, a trade-off
as by allocating more to the Player with the higher Payoff Multiplier you are likely to
increase the Gap Between Payoffs.
First, you will be shown an onscreen tutorial, which doesn’t count for your payoff.
Then you will do the experiment for real. It will be made of 3 games; the first
game has 5 rounds, while the second has 20 and the third has 5 rounds. In
the first game you will be an Outside Observer, in the second you will know your
Place-In-Society and in the third you will be Under the Veil. In each round, you
must ensure that the entire Total Budget is allocated amongst the three players
before you continue.
End of Multiple Slider Paper Instructions
Please Proceed to the On Screen Tutorial
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A.3 Within-Design Comparisons
The results here identify the differences in responses due to changes in perspective, within each
experimental design. Figure 1.18 shows the distribution of responses between perspectives in
the Pairwise choice design. The nine categories denote different ‘switching’ points (see Table
1.1), which correspond to varying degrees of inequality aversion. The median response is either
Weighted Prioritarian 1 or 2, for each of the three perspectives. There are no ‘Egalitarian’
responses within any of the designs, implying that no subject is willing to violate monotonicity.
While the distribution within the IS and VOI treatments are very similar, there are less
‘Utilitarians’ and no ‘Inequality Seeking’ individuals within the PS perspective.
Figure 1.18: Pairwise Choice, Distribution of Responses
Figure 1.19 shows the comparison of decisions made by participants in the discrete slider
design. The numbers denote the notches that participants could choose; where Notch 1
denotes the choice which gave everything to Player 1 in the PS perspective, and to the player
with the highest multiplication factor in VOI and IS. Notch 8 represents the choice which
allocates most equally amongst the group of three. Results show very similar behaviour in
the IS and VOI perspectives, with a large proportion of the sample (40%) choosing the most
equal distribution. The PS perspective is somewhat different, with no participants choosing
Notch 8, and over half choosing Notch 1.
Figure 1.20 shows that a similar pattern emerges for the continuous allocation design.
The VOI and IS perspectives are very similar, while the PS perspective reveals individuals
allocating more to P1. Here each individual response, from each of the available rounds, is
shown. The median responses are 0.46, 0.33 and 0.33 for PS, VOI and IS, respectively, with
clear modal spikes at 0.33 for VOI and IS, and 0.33 and 1 for PS. There is a clear shift to
allocations to P1 when participants know who they are in society.
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Figure 1.19: Discrete Slider Comparison between Perspectives
Figure 1.20: Continuous Allocation; Proportional Payoffs to P1, between Perspectives
A.3.1 Pure Gains vs Efficiency
One design element of the experiment was a set of control questions, within the discrete
slider design, to answer the question: does behaviour change when faced with decisions of
pure gains, compared to decisions which are subject to some efficiency trade-offs? The pure
gains problems posed had a multiplication factor of one for each P1, P2 and P3, therefore
there are no competing objectives of equity and efficiency as no trade-off is required. The
efficiency questions had different multiplication factors, meaning participants needed to trade-
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off between the competing aims of maximising total income and distributing equally. The
results are shown below in Figure 1.21. The results are shown in terms of the notch which
the participant chose as optimal. Where ‘Eight’ denotes an equal distribution and ‘One’
denotes an allocation entirely to P1, in the PS perspective, and to the player with the highest
multiplication factor in VOI and IS. The lower of the bars denotes Pure Gains, while the
higher denotes Efficiency.
From these descriptive results there is a clear shift towards a more equal distribution when
moving into the pure gains questions. This is most stark in the VOI and IS treatments, where
responses within the most equal notch change from 40%, in both cases, to 80% and 73.33%,
respectively. Within PS the change is less, but there is still a clear shift; the median response,
for instance, shifts from One to Six. While these results are perhaps not shocking, they do show
that individuals are thinking about the decision task. There appears to be an understanding
of the multiplication factors, and as a whole do trade-off these competing objectives when
necessary. It appears that in a perfect world, where no trade-offs are necessary, preferences
shift towards a more equal society. Even when individuals know who they, there is a shift
away from more selfish allocations.
Figure 1.21: Pure Gains vs Efficiency Comparison; Discrete Slider
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A.4 Simulations and Pilot Study
In order to ensure the experimental design was optimal two preliminary stages were be carried
out; simulations and a pilot study. In order to assess if the experiment can tease out the pa-
rameters required preliminary simulations were ran. Randomly generated ‘participants’ with
given parameters ‘played through’ the experiment. Through utilising the generated choices
they make the test is to assess if the parameter values of each ‘participant’ can be estimated
correctly. If this is the case the experimental design achieves its aims, if not reworking of the
parameters needs to occur. Once an ‘optimal’ experimental design has been ensured a pilot
study can be ran. The aims of the pilot study are to ensure that every part of the experiment
works smoothly in the laboratory, and to provide a more probable distribution of responses.
Once this distribution has been established further simulations can be conducted, to see if
the experiment holds up to more realistic participant interactions.
A.4.1 Pilot Study
Before the main experiment was ran a Pilot Study was conducted to test the design. Four
participants, each of them postgraduate students at the University of York, participated in
the experiment. The experiment was run in full, but incentives were divided by ten to reduce
costs. While the experiment ran smoothly several design features were altered to ensure the
design was optimal for the real experiment. The interaction between subject and interface
was observed and questions were asked at the end, in order to gain an understanding of what
needed to be changed and what worked well.
In order to increase understanding of the Pairwise Choice design an additional page was
added to the Tutorial section. This section showed exactly how each round would progress,
with Choice A remaining static, with Choice B reducing each round. Through doing this it
was made clearer that a single switch at some point was a logical and consistent decision to
make. Alterations were made to the Continuous Allocation in two forms; firstly, the Input
Boxes were added to enable quicker and more precise allocations to be made and secondly, the
wording was changed from Productivity Factor to Multiplication Factor to avoid implications
that Productivity may have. The ordering of perceptions was changed from PS – VOI – IS to
IS – PS – VOI, as respondents felt that was the easiest and most logical ordering. Alterations
were made to the questionnaire, allowing participants to refrain from answering any question
they preferred not to. Timings were altered slightly to allow more time when it was needed,
and less when participants were waiting for long periods of time. Further changes were made
to make both paper and on-screen instructions more easily understandable; by clarifying
wording and ensuring repetition of vital instructions were made. With the changes in place,
the main experiment could be conducted, fully incentivised with a full and random sample.
A.4.2 Simulating Comparisons of Experimental Designs
In order to establish any potential effect that the experimental design may have on the es-
timated parameter values simulations need to be ran to discover exactly which parameter
68
A. Appendices
values can be estimated, if there is any potential bias in either design and how robust they are
to error. Below a comparison is made between the three experimental designs, the method is
drawn from (Crosetto and Filippin, 2015). What is shown, in Figure 1.22, is the corresponding
parameter values an individual could be observed to have for each possible choice within each
experimental design. The upper-right and lower-left graphs show individual ticks for each
possible self-interest and inequality parameter respectively. The top-left graph represents the
possible choices for both parameter values for each design. It is clear that, the Continuous
Allocation (CA) design offers a much greater range of parameters, while PC and DS offer
significantly less. Although more spread out, DS and PC are evenly spread when considering
the self-interest parameter. However, when considering the distribution of possible inequality
aversion parameters DS is significantly right skewed and PC is slightly right skewed. When
considering the top-left graph it is clear that any individual with true parameter values that
are inequality averse and relatively selfless would find few options in the DS which would
capture this. While PC has more options than DS it is clear that large jumps to the nearest
parameter value would need to be made. It is clear that the CA method captures a far greater
range of possible values. Moreover, while the CA generates this range from just one decision
problem (in this case where pi = [1, 0.8, 1.2]) there are twice as many needed for DS and fifteen
as many in PC.
Figure 1.22: Comparisons of Possible Parameter Values for each Design
The density plots below, in Figure 1.23, reveal more information about the distribution
of possible parameter values. While we know from the previous graph that CA does have
a far greater number of choices, what is not clear is how they are distributed. We can see
that, although relatively low on numbers PC has a very even distribution across the potential
parameter values. DS is, as before, equally spread for α but skewed towards parameters
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which reflect less inequality aversion. CA is now revealed to have a very unequal distribution
amongst the parameters; with a greater density at 0, 0.33 and 1 for α, and towards -1 for r.
Figure 1.23: Density Plots of Options for each Parameter Value
In order to test what the effect these elements of each design could have upon the elici-
tation and estimation of parameter values a simulation was ran. Parameter values were was
simulated for 10,000 hypothetical individuals, characterised by the Outcome Utility function.
The parameter values were drawn from distributions which reflected those observed within
the experiment, perhaps not perfect but with similar characteristics. To ensure a similar dis-
tribution r ∼ B′(5, 1.8), while usually characterised as being bounded between 0 and ∞, this
was readjusted to accommodate our -1 parameter values. The median value is similar to that
established from the results of the experiment, at 2.1262. For the Self-Interest parameter,
again a similar distribution was mapped to that found from the results of the experiment.
This time α ∼ B(4, 1.1), with a median value of 0.8216. The distributions of parameter values
are shown in Figure 1.24.
Figure 1.24: Distribution of Randomly Generated Parameter Values
Once a distribution of ‘true’ parameter values was established then a comparison of those
parameter values which could be elicited/estimated from each design could be compared with
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those ‘true’ values. There were several proposed simulations to compare, but each consisted
of matching the closest possible parameter value from the design for that simulation. The
first was Deterministic, where there was no error in responses, and individuals were able to
choose the option which was closest to their ‘true’ parameter. The second two simulations
incorporate stochastic preferences, where error is directly added to the ‘true’ preferences.7 A
simple normal error is added, with zero mean with varying variance. The low error variance
parameter is 0.3 and 2 for the self-interest and inequality aversion simulations, respectively.
While for the high error the values are 0.6 and 4, respectively. The final simulation aims to
highlight a proportion of individuals within the experiment who exhibit confused behaviour.
Rather than adhering to the utility function these individuals choose any parameter value
with equal probability. A significant proportion, 10% of these responses are mixed with other
deterministic individuals, to provide our final simulation.
Figure 1.25 shows cumulative frequency plots which show the distribution of each of these
simulations for each design; for self-interest, the left column, and inequality aversion, the right.
Each of the simulations, are plotted against the ‘true’ parameter values. The graphs highlight
two key aspects for each design; the precision of the simulations and their susceptibility to
error. First if deterministic preferences are considered CA is by far the more accurate, with
the deterministic curve almost exactly mapping the ‘true’ curve. For both PC and DS, whole
closely following the curvature of the line, both stair-step, due to the nature of the discrete
intervals. While both perform equally for Self-Interest, DS is more precise in inequality
aversion, especially at lower levels.
When considering the individuals could make error when thinking of their true preferences,
the accuracy of the estimates diminished in all cases. However, the effects that error has on
each design vary. While both PC and DS have predefined notches, which correspond to
theoretically appealing values, the effect seems to be less extreme than in the case of CA.
For Self-Interest, in DS for example, due to a minimum cap on α that error which has led
to a parameter value below 0.33 (which has a very low probability of happening) does not
have much effect, and the estimates are somewhat closer. Compare this to CA where, as
any parameter value is attainable, the effects of the specific error make a large difference to
the curves. Indeed, if the error proposed had been different, the effects of that error on the
simulations would have been as acute. For the random error, an interesting pattern which
reflects the histograms in Figure 1.23 emerges. While the effects on PC and DS for self-
interest are minimal, for CA there is a clear bias towards the 0.33 parameter value. While
for inequality aversion, CA appears to be slightly biased towards -1, while PC has very little
change.
To provide a more concise summary of these figures Table 1.8 and Table 1.9, show mean,
median and standard deviation statistics for Self-Interest and Inequality Aversion, respec-
tively. Those numbers shown in bold, for each simulation, shows the closest value to the
‘true’ values. In both tables, CA is incredibly precise within the deterministic simulation. PC
and DS are relatively accurate for α, but much less so for r. When error is added a different
7This approach draws from the Random Preference approach; used to enable analysis across all three
designs.
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Figure 1.25: Cumulative Frequency Plots; Comparing ‘True’ Parameter values to Established
Parameter Values
picture emerges. CA becomes less accurate the more error is added in. For α, DS becomes
the most accurate for the mean and standard deviation statistics, and jointly dominant with
PC for the median, in each of the two error and random simulations. For r, however, CA has
the closest mean, while PC has the closest median and standard deviation in the first error
simulation. But in the second simulation DS becomes dominant in the mean and standard
deviation. For the random simulation CA remains superior for the mean, while DS is dom-
inant in the other two statistics. Throughout each of the simulations, for both parameters,
the median response for PC remains constant, always slightly imprecise but robust to error,
the opposite of CA.
Table 1.8: Summary Table for Self-Interest: Comparing Simulations
Deterministic Error = 0.3 Error = 0.6 Random
Mean Mdn SD Mean Mdn SD Mean Mdn SD Mean Mdn SD
True 0.782 0.822 0.168 0.782 0.822 0.168 0.782 0.822 0.168 0.782 0.822 0.168
PC 0.784 0.8 0.172 0.738 0.8 0.253 0.691 0.8 0.317 0.765 0.8 0.189
DS 0.784 0.8 0.17 0.746 0.8 0.237 0.714 0.8 0.283 0.772 0.8 0.179
CA 0.782 0.822 0.168 0.732 0.79 0.266 0.66 0.788 0.365 0.736 0.798 0.222
From these simulations we can pose several hypotheses. First, that assuming individuals
make no error, the CA method is superior in terms of how accurately we can establish individ-
ual parameter values. As there are very few possible parameter values that cannot be arrived
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Table 1.9: Summary Table for Inequality Aversion: Comparing Simulations
Deterministic Error = 2 Error = 4 Random
Mean Mdn SD Mean Mdn SD Mean Mdn SD Mean Mdn SD
True 4.593 2.126 8.028 4.593 2.126 8.028 4.593 2.126 8.028 4.593 2.126 8.028
PC 3.862 2.555 7.848 3.898 2.555 8.053 4.016 2.555 8.331 5.286 2.555 14.13
DS 3.779 2.000 7.697 3.906 2.820 7.805 4.181 3.170 8.043 3.621 2.000 8.067
CA 4.592 2.128 8.024 4.750 2.709 8.160 5.155 3.135 8.490 4.166 1.846 7.723
at through the CA method, in comparison to PC and DS there is less potential for bias in the
design of the design. However, if we pose that individuals are likely to be less precise in their
estimates, and have more error, then CA may indeed bias their responses towards whichever
error they are making. If we observe differences within the results from the experiments, then
these are potential aspects that could ensure they are accounted for.
A.4.3 Simulated Data Estimates – Comparing Levels of Precision
While for both Pairwise Choice and Discrete Slider designs elicitation procedures can be
used, for the Continuous Allocation design estimation is a necessity. While more complicated
an additional benefit is that we can simulate data, according the model and error story
constructed. This can be done before the experiment to identify potential pitfalls in the
experiment and to reveal necessary considerations. By plugging in ‘true’ parameter values
and running the model it can be observed how accurate the estimation will be for different
assumed levels of error. For this estimation the ‘true’ parameter values of α = 0.7 and
r = 0.5 have been used with varying levels of precision, s, where; s = s1 = s2. By generating
random ‘actual’ values for x1, x2 and x3 for each of the 18 rounds, from the beta distribution,
the estimation process for an ‘estimated’ α and r value could begin. In order to establish a
large sample, 2000 separate random allocations were used; the resulting ‘estimated’ parameter
values are shown in Figure 1.26.
What is clear is that they higher the s, and therefore lower the error, the more tightly
clustered is the ‘estimation’ around the ‘true’ parameter values. Table 1.10 shows a summary
of the parameter values from the simulations that were ran. To put these parameter values
into context Table 1.11 shows the resulting X allocations from each of the corresponding mean
and confidence interval values. There are several notable differences between each precision
value. First is the size of the confidence intervals, perhaps obviously, the higher the degree of
precision the smaller the confidence interval. Importantly the number of correct observations
also differs, with a higher degree of precision the estimation procedure generates estimates
87.6% of the time, in comparison to 40.9% of the time in the lowest degree of precision. The
number of observations could have been increased by specifying a larger number of initial
starting values, therefore if there is a lower degree of precision in estimates then this number
may need to be increased. While it is clear that the highest precision value has the closest
mean parameter values, this is not the case for the second highest in comparison to the lowest.
Indeed, it appear that a jump from 20 to 50, in terms of s, gives mean parameter values further
away from the true values. Yet, when considering the optimal X allocations, it is clear that
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Figure 1.26: Comparison of Simulated Data Estimates; α = 0.7, r = 0.5
this holds. For the estimation procedure what is important is not the precise values of α
and r, but what they mean in the context of the utility function, and the resulting optimal
allocations it prescribes.
Table 1.10: Simulation Summary
Precision, s Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Lower 95%
CI
Upper 95%
CI
20 α 818 0.691 0.08 0.535 0.847
r 818 0.555 0.398 -0.224 1.335
50 α 1548 0.713 0.059 0.597 0.829
r 1548 0.584 0.264 0.066 1.102
1000 α 1751 0.701 0.018 0.665 0.737
r 1751 0.508 0.077 0.356 0.659
The lessons to be drawn from these simulations is that the higher s the greater confidence
can be put in the estimates. That if individuals are prone to making larger errors, then
estimating their parameters is more difficult. But also that the parameter values on their own
may have less importance than the implications they have, in terms of the optimal allocations
they may give.
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Table 1.11: Optimal X Allocations: Simulation Estimates
x1 x2 x3
Lower
95% CI
Mean Upper
95% CI
Lower
95% CI
Mean Upper
95% CI
Lower
95% CI
Mean Upper
95% CI
20 17.83 16.94 17.39 3.7 5.26 5.35 8.47 7.8 7.26
50 17.42 17.3 17.75 4.57 5.17 5.19 8.02 7.54 7.06
1000 17.37 17.4 17.47 4.97 5.09 5.15 7.66 7.52 7.38
Actual 17.41 5.08 7.51
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A.5 Using the Beta-with-Effort-Bias Model to Detect Effort
The bias parameter within the beta-with-effort-bias model can arguably be used as a proxy for
effort. There are two functional forms within the beta-with-effort-bias model, that associated
with b is the allocation functional form, while (1−b) the outcome functional form. The former
can be seen as low effort, as individuals only consider a basic proportion of allocations to give
to themselves, and the remainder to the others, not taking into account the multiplication
factors. While the latter demands more cognitive effort to establish the final payoffs which will
be consistent with their ‘true’ preferences. Figure 1.27 shows a scatter plot of the individual-
level estimates of b against the average time taken to click Finish once the minimum time has
ran out.
Figure 1.27: Scatter Plot and Fitted-Line; Average Time Taken vs Bias
From a bootstrapped and clustered OLS regression we find a constant of 0.4554(0.1051)
and an observed coefficient of -0.0202 (0.0079), which have p-values of 0.000 and 0.010 re-
spectively. Meaning that for every extra second, after the minimum time had expired, the
participant took their bias parameter was reduced by 0.0202. An individual who took an
average of 10 seconds longer would have an expected bias parameter of 0.2534, and would
take an average of 22.54 seconds extra to have a beta parameter of 0. The results from here
are quite intuitive. Individuals who were willing to put more effort, as proxied by time, were
more likely to have a lower bias parameter. The lower the bias parameter the closer the
individual’s responses fit to the outcome utility function, rather than the allocation function.
In order to calculate the optimal response for an outcome individual more effort, and time,
would be required.
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A.6 Skillings-Mack Test
An alternative method to identifying significant differences between treatment effects is the
Skiilings-Mack test statistic. Stemming from the Friedman test (M. Friedman, 1937), the
Skillings and Mack test (Skillings and Mack, 1981) is a test which can be applied to data with
an unknown distribution. Importantly, as the statistic is dependent upon ranks the usual
assumption of normally distributed errors in not needed. Moreover it can be used in any
block design with arbitrarily missing data and is appropriate for small samples, which is why
here it is preferable to the Friedman test (Chatfield and Mander, 2009). The general form of
the randomised block design is:
Yit = µ+ βi + τj + ij (1.22)
Where Yit denotes the response for the jth treatment in the ith block. The overall mean is
denoted by µ, the jth treatment effect by τj and the independent and identically distributed
errors by ij . The null hypothesis states that the treatment effects τj are all identical (Chatfield
and Mander, 2009).
The SM test requires data to be arranged long into blocks, or treatments, then removes
any block with only one observation. For those blocks left the observations are ranked, where
ties are computed as the average rank of those tied. When there is missing data the ranks
are centred, then the ranks are weighted; from this the Weighted Sum of Centred Ranks, Aj ,
is calculated. A simple covariance structure is produced, and the test statistic is calculated
from the covariance of the treatment sums. This test statistic is then tested against the null
hypothesis that all the treatment effects are equal, and is rejected if the SM statistic is greater
than, or equal, to some critical value (Chatfield and Mander, 2009).
Within the SM tests conducted there are several reported numbers. Firstly, the Weighted
Sum of Centred Ranks, denoted as W. Sum, shows which treatments have the higher or
lower ranked observations. The Standard Errors are reported, alongside the Weighted Sum of
Centred Ranks/Standard Errors which allows for an informal examination of these differences.
The Skillings-Mack statistic will be reported, alongside two P-Values. The first P-Value is
calculated for no-ties, and is a conservative estimate. The second is a simulated P-Value
when ties occur, which is necessary (and less conservative) as when there are ties there is less
variation amongst Aj (Chatfield and Mander, 2009).
A.6.1 Results
Table 1.12 shows the results from the Skillings-Mack test. The Empirical P-Values show that
there are significant differences, to the 5% level, for all of the models, with the exception of
(6) to the 10% level and (7) which is not significant. The WS/SE numbers are again intuitive,
a positive sign implies a higher weight, which implies a higher EDE, which corresponds to
greater self-interest and less inequality aversion, while a negative sign represents the opposite.
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When considering (1) a clear pattern, similar to that of the above regressions emerges,
each of the PS treatments are ranked significantly higher than either VOI or IS in all of
the designs. However, the pattern for within perspective is less clear, indeed from the other
models these conditional differences become apparent. Models (2), (3) and (4) do not reveal
much more, confirming what was already known, and further showing that the effect of the
assumption that α = 1/3 makes a significant difference. The final models (5), (6) and (7)
do, however show more detail. When considering IS there is no significant difference between
designs, the EDE established appears robust regardless of the experiment design. However,
when PS or VOI are assumed the differences between designs are mixed. For PS, PC gives a
higher EDE, while CA gives a lower EDE with DS in the middle, as found from the previous
regressions. Yet, for VOI it is DS which gives the lower EDE, PC the highest and CA lies in
the middle.
It appears that regardless of the design the perspective significantly affects the EDE,
but when considering the effect of difference of design it depends on which perspective the
individual sees the problem from as to which biases the EDE in which way.
Table 1.12: Skillings-Mack Results: EDE Welfare
All Differences in Perspective Differences in Design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
N WS/SW WS/SW WS/SW WS/SW WS/SW WS/SW WS/SW
PC
PS 26 5.01 3.25 . . 1.68 . .
VOI 28 -0.07 -1.73 . . . 2.31 .
IS 24 -0.44 -1.52 . . . . 1.64
DS
PlS 30 4.90 . 4.92 . 1.00 . .
VOI 30 -2.99 . -2.57 . . -0.49 .
IS 30 -2.97 . -2.35 . . . -1.00
CA
PS 30 3.38 . . 4.87 -2.62 . .
VOI 30 -3.89 . . -2.95 . -1.78 .
IS 29 -2.74 . . -1.93 . . -0.55
Skillings-Mack 89.67 10.57 24.22 23.98 7.08 5.91 2.753
P-value 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.052 0.253
E. P-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.056 0.254
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.7 Alternative Cluster Analysis Methods
A preliminary method for establishing cluster solutions is that of agglomerative hierarchical
clustering. This establishes a hierarchy of different cluster solutions from which one solution
can be chosen. The method begins by beginning with each observations as singleton clusters,
calculates the distance between these clusters, then merges the two clusters with the smallest
dissimilarities into a new single cluster. This is iterated until there is only one cluster remain-
ing. There are two variable components herein which need to be chosen; the distance measure
and the linkage method.
The distance measure defines the distances between the clusters, but are defined in sev-
eral ways. Measures include: the Euclidean distance, weighted Euclidean distance, Maha-
lanobis distance, Manhattan distance and Maximum distance amongst many others. Sim-
ilarly the different methods define how the clusters are to be linked; Complete Linkage
(Sørensen, 1948), Single Linkage (Florek et al., 1951), Centroid Linkage (Sokal, 1958), Av-
erage Linkage (Sokal, 1958) and Ward’s Linkage (Ward, 1963) are all examples of linkage
methods. The nature of the clusters created is dependent upon these two components. The
results shown below use the Euclidean Distance, as this is standard in the literature, and the
Average Linkage method. Each of the alternative linkage methods above were conducted but
results found identical clusters being formed. The Average Linkage method is defined to be
the “average of all the distances between all pairs of points with one point from cluster A and
one point from cluster B”.8
One intuitive way in which to conduct hierarchical clustering is through a dendrogram.
This graphical plot shows each observation (or cluster) as a leaf, the vertical line, which are
joined at certain heights to form larger clusters, at the horizontal lines. The different clusters
which emerge due to close proximity are show as the height is increase until only one cluster
remains at the top. The larger the gap between clusters the further away they are, and less
suitable they are to be considered a cluster. While the number of clusters left is subjective
the Dendogram provides an intuitive way in which to visualise the potential clusters within
the observations.
Figure 1.28: Cluster Dendogram; Proportional Payoffs to P1, P2 and P3
8Quoted from Nema Dean’s workshop.
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The figure shows a range of possible clusters which are apparent in the data. There is
a definite two cluster scenario which appears with 22 individuals in the first cluster and 8
individuals in the second. A further ‘cut’ could be made where the second cluster is split
into a group of 3 and 5; giving three clusters. Alternatively four cluster could be made, with
the first cluster being split into 12 and 10. As mentioned previously this ‘cut’ is subjective,
therefore further methods are required to ascertain the ‘best’ clusters.
The second method to be used relies upon the K-means approach (MacQueen, 1967).
Unlike the previous method there is no hierarchical component. K-means tries to find an
assignment of the observations into a predefined K number of clusters. It does this by “min-
imising the sum over all clusters of the sum of squares within clusters”.9 While again this
can be done easily with r-code the predefined number K is still a subjective decision to make;
K-means can find the ‘best’ clustering for a predefined number of clusters (given certain prop-
erties) but choosing which number K should be is more difficult. One method which allows a
circumvention of this issue is by using silhouette widths. A silhouette width gives a criterion
which allows comparison and ranking for different numbers of K clusters, so that the ‘best’
can be found. The silhouette width can be thought of as the dissimilarity of the cluster, to
which an observation belongs, in comparison to its ‘neighbouring’ cluster (b(i)) minus the
average dissimilarity between that observation and all other points within its cluster (a(i)) all
divided by the maximum of the two:
s(i) =
(b(i)− a(i))
max(a(i), b(i))
The ‘best’ number of clusters is the one which gives the largest average silhouette width,
over all the clusters. The plot below shows four possible K-means clusters, two, three, four and
five. In each case the silhouette width is shown for each of the individuals, denoted the width
of the bar, the cluster and the average silhouette width. From the results (and for testing for
much higher levels of K) it appears that it is two clusters which are the ‘best’ solution. Indeed,
notice that the two cluster solution for K-means is identical for the hierarchical clustering
results.
While both dendogram and silhouette plots are useful at providing a visual aid for deter-
mining clusters issues emerge due to the nature of their construction. Both methods tend to
try to divide the sample into equally sized spherical clusters. What this means is that they are
unlikely to find clusters which show dependence between two variables. As this is certainly
the case between our variables of interest, then another method can be used to generalise
these methods. Rather than relying upon spherical clusters, finite mixture models allow these
clusters to take any elliptical form. What this method does is to propose a ‘mixture’ of indi-
vidual density functions which accurately fit the data, and it is this method which is used in
the main analysis.
9Quoted from Nema Dean’s workshop.
80
A. Appendices
Figure 1.29: Silhouette Plot; 2, 3, 4 and 5 Clusters
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A.8 Relaxing the assumption of α = 1/3
A further assumption to be made was that when considering the Veil of Ignorance and Im-
partial Spectator treatments is that individuals took an α value of 1/3. This assumption is
consistent with the models assumptions for others in society, when the individual knows they
are Player 1, as the weighting parameter for Player 2 and 3 is equal, and is simply (1−α)/2.
To further generalise this to the three person case, where the weight is again equal leads to
α = 1/3. Yet individuals may not exhibit these preferences, there could indeed be biases
aligning their preference towards a certain player within the society. By using the Continuous
Allocation method, this hypothesis is indeed testable. Rather than setting α = 1/3, the esti-
mation procedure can estimate α alongside the other parameters. Then two hypothesis can
be tested for both IS and VOI; are the estimated α’s significantly different from 1/3 and is
the estimated r significantly different from those previously estimated values, when α 6= 1/3?
The latter of which is highlighted in Figure 1.30, as it shows the distribution of estimated
inequality aversion parameters, for these differing assumptions regarding α.
Figure 1.30: Distribution of Inequality Aversion for Alternative α Values
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In terms of statistical tests there are two different tests, dependent upon the hypothesis
being tested. Firstly, to test if α is significantly different from 1/3 a Paired T-Test was run
for both IS and VOI treatments. Secondly, to test if r is significantly different when α = 1/3
and α 6= 1/3 a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test was ran, due to issues with r approaching infinity.
Table 1.13 shows the results below, in both cases, for both treatments the differences are not
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significant. The assumption that α = 1/3, for VOI and IS, therefore seems like a reasonable
assumption to make.
Table 1.13: Paired T-Test and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test Results
Paired T-Test Impartial
Spectator
Veil of
Ignorance
Self-Interest, α Mean Mean
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
α=1/3 0.3333 0.3333
0 0
α!=1/3 0.3729 0.3701
-0.0358 -0.0446
Pr(| T |>| t |) 0.2783 0.4128
Obvs. 29 30
Rank-Sum Test Impartial
Spectator
Veil of
Ignorance
Inequality
Aversion, r
Rank Sum Rank Sum
α=1/3 884 962
α!=1/3 827 868
Pr >| z | 0.6576 0.4871
Obvs. 29 30
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A.9 Varying Parameters for the EDE Regression
One assumption made when comparing treatments concerns the EDE regressions conducted.
What was assumed was that the society for which the EDE would be calculated was for an
unequal society with a distribution of payoffs: [10, 1, 1], for P1, P2 and P3 respectively;
and multiplication factors of [1, 1, 1]. Yet, if this initial distribution were to differ the EDE
valuations of the society would change. Table 1.14, Table 1.15 and Table 1.15, show the
effects of changing this initial distribution and multiplication factors on the magnitude and
significance of the Random Effects model, previously specified. The former shows differences
in P1’s payoff, while holding that of P2 and P3 constant, while the latter varies the payoffs of
P3 while holding the other two constant. The results are perhaps to be expected, when the
distribution becomes more unequal (in Table 1.14) both constants and magnitudes increase.
When the society is all but equal the average EDE valuations shrink to almost one, and
the resulting treatment effects are also reduced. All treatment effects do, however, remain
significant throughout. When considering Table 1.15 very little changes, both in regards to
significance and magnitude. As long as the distribution is unequal then differences between
treatments are clear. Table 1.16 shows a similar pattern, the significance and directions of
the coefficients change little, the effects of altering the multiplication factors just multiply the
magnitude of the effects. Indeed, it appears that the distribution and multiplication factors
assumed make little difference, what is clear is that the magnitudes of the coefficients are only
important in the context of the specific distribution assumed.
Table 1.14: Sensitivity Analysis for EDE Regression: Changes in x1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[1.1,1,1] [2,1,1] [5,1,1] [10,1,1] [20,1,1] [100,1,1]
Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E.
Perspective
Veil of Ignorance -0.0486∗∗∗ -0.4603∗∗∗ -1.5197∗∗∗ -3.0730∗∗∗ -5.9610∗∗∗ -26.8359∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.030) (0.130) (0.313) (0.683) (3.671)
Impartial Spectator -0.0468∗∗∗ -0.4508∗∗∗ -1.4908∗∗∗ -3.0072∗∗∗ -5.8145∗∗∗ -26.0023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.030) (0.132) (0.317) (0.693) (3.726)
Design
Discrete Slider -0.0069∗∗ -0.0634∗∗ -0.3096∗∗ -0.7717∗∗ -1.7402∗∗ -9.8112∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.030) (0.134) (0.320) (0.700) (3.761)
Continuous Allocation -0.0064∗∗ -0.0889∗∗∗ -0.4906∗∗∗ -1.2203∗∗∗ -2.7642∗∗∗ -16.0574∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.030) (0.134) (0.321) (0.702) (3.771)
Constant 1.0754∗∗∗ 1.6571∗∗∗ 3.1752∗∗∗ 5.4361∗∗∗ 9.7162∗∗∗ 41.8047∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.033) (0.142) (0.335) (0.723) (3.839)
N 30 30 30 30 30 30
Observations 257 257 257 257 257 257
R-squared 0.5710 0.5096 0.3819 0.3171 0.2773 0.2284
ρ 0.1278 0.1843 0.1636 0.1419 0.1293 0.1154
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.15: Sensitivity Analysis for EDE Regression: Changes in x3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[10,1,1] [10,1,2] [10,1,4] [10,1,6] [10,1,8] [10,1,10]
Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E.
Perspective
Veil of Ignorance -3.0730∗∗∗ -3.1262∗∗∗ -3.1104∗∗∗ -3.0702∗∗∗ -3.0218∗∗∗ -2.9677∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.304) (0.307) (0.315) (0.327) (0.342)
Impartial Spectator -3.0072∗∗∗ -3.0571∗∗∗ -3.0518∗∗∗ -3.0185∗∗∗ -2.9718∗∗∗ -2.9145∗∗∗
(0.317) (0.308) (0.311) (0.320) (0.332) (0.347)
Design
Discrete Slider -0.7717∗∗ -0.7394∗∗ -0.7011∗∗ -0.7012∗∗ -0.7274∗∗ -0.7740∗∗
(0.320) (0.311) (0.315) (0.324) (0.336) (0.351)
Continuous Allocation -1.2203∗∗∗ -1.1803∗∗∗ -1.1530∗∗∗ -1.1736∗∗∗ -1.2253∗∗∗ -1.3002∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.312) (0.315) (0.324) (0.337) (0.352)
Constant 5.4361∗∗∗ 5.7211∗∗∗ 5.9416∗∗∗ 6.0871∗∗∗ 6.2161∗∗∗ 6.3414∗∗∗
(0.335) (0.330) (0.340) (0.354) (0.370) (0.388)
N 30 30 30 30 30 30
Observations 257 257 257 257 257 257
R-squared 0.3171 0.3294 0.3155 0.2952 0.2732 0.2508
ρ 0.1419 0.1605 0.1834 0.1969 0.2050 0.2094
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.16: Sensitivity Analysis for EDE Regression; Changes in pi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[1,1,1] [1,1,2] [1,1,0.5] [2,1,1] [5,1,1] [10,1,1]
Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E. Coef./S.E.
Perspective
Veil of Ignorance -3.0730∗∗∗ -3.1262∗∗∗ -3.0584∗∗∗ -5.9610∗∗∗ -13.9563∗∗∗ -26.8359∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.304) (0.346) (0.683) (1.793) (3.671)
Impartial Spectator -3.0072∗∗∗ -3.0571∗∗∗ -2.9729∗∗∗ -5.8145∗∗∗ -13.5540∗∗∗ -26.0023∗∗∗
(0.317) (0.308) (0.348) (0.693) (1.820) (3.726)
Design
Discrete Slider -0.7717∗∗ -0.7394∗∗ -0.8448∗∗ -1.7402∗∗ -4.7371∗∗∗ -9.8112∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.311) (0.349) (0.700) (1.837) (3.761)
Continuous Allocation -1.2203∗∗∗ -1.1803∗∗∗ -1.3527∗∗∗ -2.7642∗∗∗ -7.7235∗∗∗ -16.0574∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.312) (0.358) (0.702) (1.842) (3.771)
Constant 5.4361∗∗∗ 5.7211∗∗∗ 5.0490∗∗∗ 9.7162∗∗∗ 21.9271∗∗∗ 41.8047∗∗∗
(0.335) (0.330) (0.364) (0.723) (1.885) (3.839)
N 30 30 30 30 30 30
Observations 257 257 250 257 257 257
R-squared 0.3171 0.3294 0.2805 0.2773 0.2447 0.2284
ρ 0.1419 0.1605 0.1379 0.1293 0.1212 0.1154
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 2
Incorporating Oneness: A Ugandan
Lab-in-the-Field Experiment
Preferences relating to inequality aversion, self-interest and oneness (the closeness of
connection to others) are incorporated in a structural model and estimated in order
to explain prosocial behaviour. An incentivised lab-in-the-field experiment was run
in Mbale, Uganda (n=156), with both general population and student samples. The
experiment was a modified three-person dictator game, run on touch-screen tablets.
Decision problems were repeated (54 rounds) to ensure individual-level preferences
could be estimated; using the Dirichlet distribution to rationalise noisy behaviour.
Two within-subject treatments varied if the identity of the ‘recipients’ was anony-
mous or known. Results find extensive heterogeneity in prosocial behaviour, which
is accounted for through individual preference parameters. On average, there is a
substantial regard for others with a preference for reducing inequality, rather than
increasing efficiency. Oneness is found to have large and significant effects on giving;
with distinctions between self-other and between-other trade-offs emerging.
***
Chapter 2. Incorporating Oneness
1 Introduction
Inequality in society is, in part, determined by the distributional preferences held by individ-
uals. The heterogeneity of such preferences leads to differences in prosocial behaviour. When
making distributional decisions, some prefer to allocate resources equally, while others give
priority to themselves. Notions of efficiency are important for particular individuals, but of
little concern to others. Yet, it is not only distributional preferences which determine prosocial
behaviour; the ‘recipient’s’ identity is also an integral consideration. Particular individuals
will maintain the same prosocial behaviour regardless of the identity of the ‘recipient’, while
some will exhibit preferential treatment to those they are closely connected to.
Developed here is a utility function which incorporates inequality aversion, the trade-off
between equality and efficiency, and self-interest, the degree to which the ‘self’ is weighted
in relation to the ‘other’. Preferences parameters are introduced which reflect behavioural
responses to changes in oneness, the closeness of connection to others. These parameters
distinguish between how elastic self-other and between-other trade-offs are, to better explain
the distributional effects that differential oneness can have. To account for ‘noise’ in decision
making, the Dirichlet distribution is proposed as a random behavioural model. Together the
proposed utility function and stochastic error model seek to explain individual behaviour,
by accounting for heterogeneity in preferences and intuitively modelling ‘noise’ in decision
making.
In order to observe individual behaviour, an incentivised lab-in-the-field experiment was
run in Mbale, Uganda. The form of the experiment was a modified three-person dictator
game, where participants distributed payoffs amongst themselves and two ‘others’. The sample
(n=156) was made of two separate groups, general population (n=108) and students (n=48).
Two within-subject treatments were administered over 54 rounds. In the budget treatment,
the ‘others’ were anonymous and budget (stake-size) was varied. In the oneness treatment,
anonymity was lifted as the identity of the ‘others’ was made known. Decisions were made on
touch-screen tablets, using a Z-Tree interface (Fischbacher, 2007). Alongside the experiment,
an in-depth survey was conducted to establish an extensive list of demographic characteristics.
This work is situated within the distributional preferences literature, within which exists
a wide body of research.1 Papers by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, Kariv, and
Markovits (2007), are most closely related; where modified dictator games are used to observe
the prosocial behaviour of subjects. Both estimate preference parameters within CES utility
functions; where the former uses two-person dictator games, and the latter extends the analysis
to focus on individual preferences and includes a three-person variant of the dictator game.
Several papers have incorporated social distance as an explanatory construct within dis-
tributional decision making. Leider et al. (2009) use an online field experiment, with real
world social network data, to study prosocial behaviour. Using modified two-person dictator
games, as in Andreoni and Miller (2002), they find that as social distance increases generosity
1Including: E. Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Charness and Rabin (2002); Cox,
D. Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007); Cappelen et al. (2007); Dolan and Tsuchiya (2009); Breitmoser (2013) and
Jakiela (2013)
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decreases. Branas-Garza et al. (2010), Goeree et al. (2010), Ligon and Schechter (2012) and
Binzel and D. Fehr (2013) reveal similar trends; where the former two use student samples,
in a laboratory setting, and the latter two run lab-in-the-field experiments in rural Paraguay
and Cairo, respectively.
While the above predominantly establish social network data through named relationships
(i.e. friend, friend-of-a-friend, stranger) an alternative is to characterise the closeness of rela-
tionship through ‘oneness’; a ‘measure of perceived self-other overlap’ (Cialdini et al., 1997).
Ga¨chter, Starmer, and Tufano (2015) adopt the oneness scale, from the psychology literature;
which is calculated as the average of the ‘Inclusion of the Other in the Self’ (IOS) scale (A.
Aron, E. Aron, and Smollan, 1992) and the ‘we-scale’ (Cialdini et al., 1997). The advantage
of such a scale, is that it provides a numerical index of the closeness of connection; without
delving into its determinants.
This paper seeks to contribute to the above literature; by proposing a CES utility function
which incorporates oneness levels, to account for the explanatory power that social distance
can have on individual decision making. By estimating preferences relating to inequality aver-
sion, self-interest and oneness, the intricacies of their interactions are explored and individual
level behaviour, observed from a lab-in-the-field experiment, is explained.
2 Experiment
2.1 Experimental Session
The general form of the experiment is a modified three-person ‘dictator’ game. ‘Dictators’ are
given a budget, m, which they must distribute amongst three players. Player 1 denotes the
self, while Player 2 and 3 are two other real participants (the ‘recipients’). The allocations,
xi, are chosen for each Player i; where i ∈ [1, 2, 3] and
∑3
i xi = m. These allocations are then
divided by the corresponding divider, 1/pii, to give the payoff, piixi, to each Player i. The
dividers change the relative prices of giving; meaning that equality-efficiency trade-offs need
to be made.
Within the experiment there are multiple rounds, 54 in total. There are two treatments;
the budget treatment and the oneness treatment, each with 27 rounds. In each round the
participants are randomly assigned to a group of three. The dividers change every round;
ensuring the relative price of giving to each player varies. Table 2.1 shows how the dividers
change; only Rounds 1 to 9 are shown, but this pattern is repeated every nine rounds. Note
that the dividers are such that each player has the same average divider, over all rounds, and
that they each have the same number of 1’s, 2’s, 3’s and 4’s that the other has.
Within each experimental session there are six participants. Each of the participants make
individual decisions; as if they were the ‘dictator’. One individual’s decisions, from each
group of three, is randomly selected (at the end of the experiment) to determine the payoffs
of each member of their group. It is from one randomly selected round that all participants
receive their payoffs, determined by the ‘dictators’ of that round. In this way, participants are
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Table 2.1: Dividers per Round
Dividers, 1/pii
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
Round 1 1 1 1
Round 2 1 2 2
Round 3 2 1 1
Round 4 1 2 3
Round 5 2 3 1
Round 6 3 1 2
Round 7 1 2 4
Round 8 2 4 1
Round 9 4 1 2
incentivised ; as each distributional decision they make has an equal chance of determining their
payoff and the payoffs of two other individuals within the room. Importantly, each decision
is entirely anonymous and without feedback; participants neither know the decisions of any
other participants nor the identity of the ‘dictator’ in any round. This removes considerations
of reputation and reciprocity, allowing for ‘pure’ altruism to be identified.
Participants make their decisions using a Z-Tree interface, on touch-screen tablets. They
are given extensive instructions, including an interactive on-screen tutorial to enable them
to use the tablets. A screenshot of the interface is shown in Figure 2.1. There are three
players, Player 1, 2 and 3, amongst whom participants must make allocations, so that the
remaining budget reaches zero. Each player has a divider (changing every round), which is
used to calculate the payoff to that player. Allocations can be made by using: the slider,
arrow keys and written input. The slider (the black bar) can be dragged to make allocations,
the arrow keys tapped to make incremental changes (1 or 10), and the written input used to
type exact amounts. Calculations of the payoffs are made automatically, and are shown by
both the orange numbers and by the height of orange bars. The gap between payoffs, the
highest payoff minus the lowest payoff, and the sum of payoffs (aptly named) are shown. All
allocations, payoffs and budgets are in Ugandan shillings (shs).
2.1.1 Budget Treatment
Within the budget treatment, the budget (or stake-size) is varied; shs30, 000, shs60, 000 or
shs90, 000. The order of this variation was random, however, in order to aid the understanding
of the participants it was varied only every nine rounds. For the first nine rounds there was a
budget of A, B for the next nine and C the last. The order was random for each participant,
but each participant had all of the budgets mentioned above. Importantly, within the budget
treatment the other participants remained anonymous. Player 2 and 3 were randomly assigned
each round, so while they were known to be selected from the other five participants, their
identity was not known.
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Figure 2.1: Z-Tree Interface
2.1.2 Oneness Treatment
The oneness treatment was preceded by the oneness questionnaire, based on the work by
Ga¨chter, Starmer, and Tufano (2015).2 Oneness denotes the degree of closeness that the
respondent (the ‘self’) feels towards another individual (the ‘other’). It is more precisely
defined here as the connection the self feels in everyday life with the other. Figure 2.2 shows the
computer interface with diagrams which represent the ‘oneness level’ - an integer scale between
1 (‘most distant’) and 7 (‘closest’). The simple tool effectively captures what a multitude of
psychometric questions could do, in a quick, easy and accessible form. Participants were asked
the question in Figure 2.2 for each of the other five participants in the room.
Following this they began the oneness treatment. Unlike the budget treatment, here the
budget was kept constant (at shs60, 000). But crucially participants now knew the identity of
Player 2 and Player 3, revealed by their desk number. They were encouraged to look around,
every round, to see which players were in their group and only then to make their decisions.
As before, the participants within each group randomly changed every round and decisions
were made anonymously, as before.
2.2 Survey Session
Alongside the experiment an in-depth survey was run. The surveys were implemented with
the World Bank’s Survey Solutions, on Asus touchscreen tablets, and ran one-on-one; one
2The interface is derived from A. Aron, E. Aron, and Smollan (1992), the IOS (‘Inclusion of the Other in the
Self’) Scale. Ga¨chter, Starmer, and Tufano (2015) introduce oneness to the economics literature constructing
their ‘Oneness Index’ from both the IOS scale and the We-Scale (Cialdini et al., 1997). Due to language
barriers, the We-Scale was dropped from our experimental design, so our ‘oneness level’ is measured only
by the IOS scale. The words ‘in everyday life’ were used instead of ‘before the experiment’, as the cultural
interpretation of ‘before the experiment’ would have meant the time immediately before the experiment, which
was not desirable.
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Figure 2.2: Oneness Questionnaire
enumerator-one participant. The survey was split into four sections: Individual Characteris-
tics; Household Characteristics; Assets, Wealth and MPI; and Preferences. The survey allowed
for the creation of variables which represented individual level characteristics; including the
creation of a Wealth Index (WI) and Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).
2.3 Sampling and Sample
Two sampling frames were created in order to recruit participants for the experiments. The
first, from a general population in the Mbale District, the second, from student records from
the Ugandan Christian University (UCU), Mbale. Between experimental days there were two
separate samples, the general population (n=102) and the student population (n=48).
Further details of the experimental design (B.1), sampling (B.2), sample characteristics (B.3),
wealth and multidimensional poverty indices (B.4) alongside the script (B.5) and tutorial
script (B.6), can be found in the Appendix.
3 Theoretical Model
3.1 Utility
The theoretical model proposed takes the form of a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
function, similar to that of Andreoni and Miller (2002), where utility is equivalent to the
Equally Distributed Equivalent (EDE).3 Utility is determined by payoffs, xipii, distributed
3The EDE represents the mean level of payoffs, if equally distributed, which would ensure the individual
was indifferent between that and the current distribution of payoffs (Atkinson, 1970). It provides a meaningful
ranking of alternative distributions of payoffs (or income) and is, as such, a Social Welfare Function.
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amongst the ‘self’ (i = 1) and ‘others’ (i > 1). Individuals striving to maximise utility would,
then, make decisions based upon distributing allocations, xi according to: their preferences,
r, α, φ and ψ; how closely connected they were to the others θi; and the multiplication factors:
pii, the reciprocals of the dividers, 1/pii.
Our utility function is, then:
U1 =
(
N∑
i=1
(
ωi(piixi)
−r))− 1r (2.1)
Where:
ω1 =
α
α+ 1−αn
N∑
j=2
θφj
, ωi 6=1 =
θψi
N∑
j=2
θψj
(1− ω1)
Self-interest is denoted by α, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and can be thought of as the extent to
which the individual weights themselves, in relation to others. Where n is the number of
others (and N = n + 1) the weight to each other is denoted by (1− α)/n. If α = 1 (and
therefore 1− α = 0) individuals are ‘egoists’, whose utility is only dependant upon their own
payoff. When α decreases more weight is put upon others; where α = 1/N reflects equal
weighting of themselves and others.
Inequality aversion is represented by r, where −1 ≤ r ≤ ∞ and r 6= 0, and can be in-
terpreted as the trade-off individuals are willing to make between efficiency and equality.
When r = −1 preferences reflect a concern for efficiency, or ‘Utilitarianism’, where utility
is determined by summing (weighted) payoffs. As r increases less concern is given to effi-
ciency. ‘Cobb-Douglas’ preferences are represented when r → 0; which implies that optimal
allocations reflect the proportions set by ωi. As r increases more weight is placed upon the
payoff of the worst-off, ‘Weighted Prioritarianism’ (Parfit, 1997), until r =∞ which represents
‘Maximin’ preferences, where only increases to the worst-off increase utility (Rawls, 1999).
The closeness of connection to others is characterised by the oneness levels denoted by θi,
for each respective i.4 These levels are bounded between 1 (‘most distant’) and 7 (‘closest’).
The inclusion of oneness levels, within the functional form, allows for two additional properties:
(A) in general, as connectedness to the others increases, less weight is given to Player 1; (B)
the greater the connectedness to Player 2, relative to Player 3, the more weight is given
to Player 2, relative to Player 3, and vice versa. The parameters φ and ψ are the oneness
elasticities; determining the responsiveness of the individual weights, ωi, to changes in oneness
levels, where φ, ψ ≥ 0. The self-other oneness elasticity, φ, determines the responsiveness of
(A), while the between-others oneness elasticity, ψ, determines that of (B). The higher φ the
greater the willingness to trade-off between the self and others, as oneness varies; the higher ψ
the greater the willingness to substitute between others as their relative oneness levels change.
4In the Budget treatment, where the identity of each player is unknown, θi is calculated as the ‘expected
oneness level’. An alternative function which could model ‘expected utility’ rather than ‘expected oneness’
is formulated in Appendix B.11. But due to reasons of tractability of the model the latter was assumed.
Sensitivity analysis in Appendix B.7, compares parameter estimations using data from all 54 rounds and only
the 27 rounds of the oneness treatment (to circumvent this assumption).
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The oneness elasticities, φ and ψ, allow distributional decisions to be affected by how
closely connected to the others the individual is. Self-interest, α, represents the weight the
individual gives to themselves, when they have the least possible connection to the others.
The higher φ and ψ the greater the weights deviate from α when oneness levels increase.
Indeed, when θ2 = θ3 = 1 or φ = ψ = 0, then the weights ωi are determined solely by α.
Given the above utility function and the budget constraint m =
∑N
i=1 xi, where m is the
budget, the following optimal allocations (which maximise utility) can be obtained, ∀i:
x∗i =
m
1 +
N∑
j 6=i
(
pii
pij
(
ωjpij
ωipii
) 1
1+r
) (2.2)
Figure 2.3 illustrates how the optimal allocations change due to different preferences;
both are surface plots where the height denotes an optimal allocation for a set of preference
parameters. The left panel plots x∗1 for differing α and r values; setting θ2 = θ3 = 1, pi =
[1, 1, 1] and m = 1. As α increases, x∗1 increases, until α = 1 where individuals take all for
themselves. As r increases, x∗1 approaches equal sharing, while as r → −1 efficiency motivates
allocations to reflect the weights according to α.
Figure 2.3: Optimal Allocations to P1 and P2: r, α, φ and ψ
To illustrate the effect of the oneness elasticities the right panel shows how x∗2 differs due
to φ and ψ. Three different oneness levels are represented by the three surfaces; in order from
highest to lowest (θ2, θ3) = (7, 2), (2, 2) and (1, 2). Constant throughout, is: α = 0.5, r ≈ 0,
pi = [1, 1, 1] and m = 1. The surfaces intersect at x∗2 = 0.25, when φ = ψ = 0, but as φ and ψ
increase they diverge due to the different oneness levels. For the highest surface, when θ2 = 7
and θ3 = 2, x
∗
2 increases as φ and ψ increase; as the oneness level is higher for P2 the rate
of increase is high. For the middle surface, oneness levels are equal and both greater than 1
(θ2 = θ3 = 2); therefore, increases in ψ have no effect on x
∗
2, as no between-other substitution
occurs, however, as φ increases so does x∗2, as trade-offs are made between the self and others.
The lowest surface, when θ2 = 1 and θ3 = 2, shows a decrease to x
∗
2 as φ, ψ increase; due to
an increase in ω3 relative to ω2.
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As an alternative to the utility function, a heuristic model is formulated in Appendix B.9.
Instead of maximising utility, participants are assumed to follow heuristic rules-of-thumb and
make decisions sequentially. Individual-level parameters are estimated for the proportion to
the self, the proportion between others and rounding precision.
3.2 Dirichlet Error Modelling
While the above utility model provides precise optimal allocations, x∗i , for a particular decision
problem and preference set, participants are assumed to make ‘error’ when calculating, or
choosing, these allocations. Instead, we assume they draw their actual allocations, xi, from the
Dirichlet distribution (Dirichlet, 1839); where the expected values, E[Xi], equal the optimal
allocations, x∗i .
This is an extension of work done by Hey and Panaccione (2011) and Hey and Pace (2014)
where the Beta distribution is used for similarly bounded decision problems, for ambiguous
and risky decisions. The Dirichlet distribution is a multinomial Beta distribution, allowing
for N variables, which here correspond to individual allocations (i.e. x1, x2, ..., xN ), where
xi ∈ (0, 1) and
∑N
i=1 xi = 1. The below formulates the Dirichlet distribution as a random
behavioural model.
The following assumptions are made: (1) E[Xi] = x
∗
i , and (2) V ar(Xi) =
(x∗i (x
∗
0−x∗i ))
s ,
therefore:
E[Xi] =
ai
a0
= x∗i (2.3)
V ar(Xi) =
(ai(a0 − ai))
(a20(a0 + 1))
=
(x∗i (x
∗
0 − x∗i ))
s
(2.4)
Where:
a0 =
N∑
i=1
ai, x
∗
0 =
N∑
i=1
x∗i
It follows that, ∀i:
x∗i (s− 1) = ai (2.5)
The ai’s determine the shape of the Dirichlet probability density function (pdf ) and repre-
sent the weight given to a particular i. Precision, or how noisy decisions are, is represented by
s. Note that, the higher the value of s, and therefore the higher α0, the lower the variance will
be. To illustrate the above, Figure 2.4 shows the pdf ’s of alternative Dirichlet distributions,
where N = 3 and x3 = 1− x1− x2. The left shows an imprecise individual, s = 10, who aims
to allocate equally E[X] = [0.33, 0.33, 0.33], with A = [3, 3, 3]. Second, with A = [10, 6, 6],
an individual allocating slightly more to themselves, E[X] = [0.45, 0.27, 0.27], with a greater
deal of precision, s = 23. Third, with A = [4, 1, 1] more self-interested preferences, here
E[X] = [0.67, 0.17, 0.17], can be represented; with a mode where x1 → 1 (here precision is low
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(s = 7) but precision can be increased). The flexibility of the Dirichlet distribution is a useful
property, and the above derivations allow for easily interpretable parameters to be estimated.
Figure 2.4: Dirichlet Distribution: Probability Density Function
The preference parameters: α, r, φ, ψ and s; are estimated, for each individual, through
maximising the following log-likelihood function. The preference parameters determine the
optimal allocations, x∗it, and consequently the shape parameters, ait, in each round t ∈ T .
The multiple integral of the pdf, determined by ait, is taken over the n-dimensional ‘rounding’
interval Vt. Vt is determined by the observed decisions, xit; where the ‘rounding’ interval,
around the observed decision, is necessary as decisions are not strictly continuous (only to
the nearest shs). Estimated parameters are those which maximise the log-likelihood function,
hence are the ‘most likely’ fit for the observed data.
T∑
t=1
log
∫ · · · ∫
Vt
(
1
B(a0t)
Nt∏
i=1
x¨ait−1it
)
dx¨1t . . . dx¨nt
 (2.6)
Where:
B(a0t) =
∏Nt
i=1 Γ(ait)
Γ
(∑N
i=1 ait
) , x¨Nt = 1− nt∑
i=1
x¨it,
Vt =
{
(x¨1t, . . . , x¨nt) ∈ Rnt : xit − 0.5
mt
≤ x¨it ≤ xit + 0.5
mt
,∀i ∈ [1, nt]
}
The multiple integral is reduced to n dimensions (hence x¨tNt = 1−
∑nt
i=1 x¨it) as
∑Nt
i=1 xit =
1. This ensures the above condition is met and computational demands are lowered. Due
to the flexibility of the Dirichlet distribution, if ai < 1, ∀i the PDF is no longer unimodal,
leading to singularity at the bounds. A penalty function is used when ai < 1 to ensure pa-
rameter estimates exclude this possibility. For sample parameter estimates, the log-likelihood
contributions for the decisions of every individual within that sample are summed.
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4 Results
4.1 Proportional Payoffs
The Proportional Payoff to P1 (PP to P1) is the share of payoffs given to Player 1 in relation
to the total payoffs (pi1x1/(
∑N
i=1 piixi)). Figure 2.5 illustrates the distribution of observed PP
to P1; split into per Round decisions (n = 8, 046) and the individual treatment Average, the
mean over the 27 rounds of each treatment (n = 298). The ‘grand’ mean is 0.5045; on average
participants gave 50.45% of the payoffs to themselves. The percentage of the sample who
distributed 0.33 to themselves (to the nearest 2d.p.) was 13.57% and 5.03%, for the round
and average respectively. While there were only 3.58% and 0.34%, respectively, who took all
payoffs for themselves.
Figure 2.5: Proportional Payoff to Player 1: Per Round and Average
To explain the variation in the PP to P1 (per round), explanatory variables for experi-
mental effects and demographic characteristics are used within a random effects model (with
robust standard errors); the results of which are shown in Table 2.2. Observations in the
oneness treatment, where others are known, are 2.9pp higher than in the budget treatment,
where others are anonymous. Partaking in experiment in the PM session rather than the
AM session has no significant effect, neither does the round number of the decision, nor the
presence of a foreign enumerator in the tutorial session. Getting more questions correct in
the tutorial has no significant effect and there are no significant differences between the gen-
eral population and the student samples. The relative divider (pii/(
∑3
j=1 pij)) is included to
account for changes in the relative price of giving; a more in depth analysis on the effect of
the dividers on allocations is in Section 4.1.4.
Although extensive demographic data has been obtained the PP to P1 is not significantly
effected by any of the included demographic characteristics, with the exception of the religious
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activity. Those who had participated in more ‘religious activity’ in the previous 30 days were
more generous, 0.38pp less to themselves per activity. From the results, neither the gender,
attainment of a higher education degree, the household size, belonging to the Bagisu tribe,
being a Christian, the level of wealth nor extended MPI significantly affect the responses. Age
also has no significant effect, but is dropped due to missing data. The explanatory variables in
Table 2.2, bar the first, are included as controls in all following random effects models; as the
effects of some controls become significant in particular models they are included to reduce
potentially confounding effects. Further analysis on the relationship between demographic
characteristics and preferences is found in Appendix B.8.
Table 2.2: Random Effects Model: Proportional Payoffs to P1
(1)
PP to P1
Coef. Std. err.
Experiment Effects
- Treatment Dummy 0.0290∗∗∗ (0.0094)
- Round Number 0.0004 (0.0003)
- PM Session Dummy 0.0054 (0.0300)
- Foreign Enumerator Dummy -0.0573 (0.0378)
- Correct Questions -0.0242 (0.0390)
- Student Dummy -0.0221 (0.0367)
- Relative Divider -0.4403∗∗∗ (0.0341)
Demographics
- Gender 0.0051 (0.0259)
- Higher Education Dummy 0.0353 (0.0335)
- Household Size 0.0087 (0.0075)
- Religion Dummy 0.0150 (0.0411)
- Religious Participation -0.0038∗∗ (0.0016)
- Tribe Dummy -0.0333 (0.0287)
- Wealth Index 0.1036 (0.1292)
- EMPI Index 0.0658 (0.1872)
Constant 0.5615∗∗∗ (0.1322)
N 149
Observations 8046
R-squared 0.1323
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.1.1 Budget Treatment
Within the budget treatment the effects of a change in the budget upon behaviour were tested.
Three budgets - shs30, 000, shs60, 000 and shs90, 000 - were varied, randomly, between rounds
for each participant. These budgets were chosen as they represented substantial increases
in the amount of wages; approximately two, four and six times the median daily wage of
the participants, respectively. The mean PP to P1 was 0.4813, 0.4934 and 0.4953, for the
three respective budgets. As the size of the budget is increased, participants are, on average,
allocating relatively more to themselves and less to the others. These differences are, however,
only significant (p < 0.1) between the budgets of shs30, 000 and shs90, 000, there is no
significant difference between shs60, 000 and the others.
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4.1.2 Oneness Treatment
Within the oneness treatment each of the others were known, identified by their desk number.
Before the session the oneness questionnaire was conducted to determine the oneness levels
between the participant and the other five people in the room. Table 2.3 shows the descriptive
statistics for the oneness levels, where 1 is the least connected, and 7 the most. Just under half,
49.3%, of responses show that participants consider the others to be the least connected, with
the remaining responses showing some degree of connection. The mean oneness levels are, 2.15,
2.03 and 2.11 for the general, student and total samples, respectively. While these samples
are not statistically different (10% level), there is a higher proportion of ‘most connected’
individuals in the general sample.
Table 2.3: Oneness Levels
Sample
General Student Total
No. % No. % No. %
Oneness Level
1 - Least Connected 263 52.4% 102 42.9% 365 49.3%
2 109 21.7% 71 29.8% 180 24.3%
3 45 9.0% 32 13.4% 77 10.4%
4 25 5.0% 15 6.3% 40 5.4%
5 20 4.0% 11 4.6% 31 4.2%
6 13 2.6% 5 2.1% 18 2.4%
7 - Most Connected 27 5.4% 2 0.8% 29 3.9%
Total 606 100.0% 288 100.0% 894 100.0%
Table 2.4: Random Effects Model: Proportional Payoffs to P1, P2 and P3
(1) (2) (3)
PP to P1 PP to P2 PP to P3
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Oneness Level
- Player 2, θ2 -0.0123
∗∗∗ (0.0021) 0.0162∗∗∗ (0.0021) -0.0042∗∗∗ (0.0013)
- Player 3, θ3 -0.0128
∗∗∗ (0.0022) 0.0004 (0.0014) 0.0123∗∗∗ (0.0023)
Constant 0.5746∗∗∗ (0.1409) 0.3802∗∗∗ (0.0703) 0.3872∗∗∗ (0.0721)
N 149 149 149
Observations 3969 3969 3969
R-squared 0.1394 0.1347 0.1372
Controls YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Using oneness levels as explanatory variables, the effect of the closeness of connection on
distributional decisions can be tested. Table 2.4 shows the effects of the oneness level on the
distribution of payoffs amongst P1, P2 and P3. The results show that when participants are
more connected to the other players they sacrifice their own payoffs in order to give more
to that individual. Each increase of the oneness level decreases the PP to P1 by 1.23pp and
1.28pp, for P2 and P3 respectively. A change in the oneness level of Player 2, from the least to
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the most connected, would result in a 7.39pp decrease in the PP to P1, and a 7.67pp decrease,
if it were Player 3. If the closeness to both P2 and P3 changed, as such, there would be a
15.06pp decrease.
Similar results (in the opposite direction) can be seen for PP to P2, an increase of 1.62pp,
and for PP to P3, an increase of 1.23pp, for an increase in their respective oneness levels.
The results are, however, asymmetric when considering the oneness level of the alternative
other (i.e. the oneness level of P3 when considering the PP to P2 and vice versa). When
distributing to P3, if the oneness level of P2 is higher, there is a significant negative effect.
Yet, there is no significant effect on the PP to P2, when P3’s oneness level is increased.
Further analysis in Appendix B.10 delves into the origins of oneness; incorporating re-
ciprocated oneness, homophily (interpersonal similarity) and demographic characteristics as
explanatory variables. Results show reciprocated oneness, being the same age and belong-
ing to the same religion are positively correlated with oneness, while differences in wealth,
participating in more religious activities and working longer hours are negatively correlated.
Furthermore, the robustness, and importance of oneness in explaining behaviour is tested, in
comparison to homophily. Oneness remains strongly correlated and significant.
4.1.3 Cluster Analysis
In order to identify differential effects amongst those in the sample, clusters of individuals
can be classified into types. A finite mixture model has been run to determine the optimal
clusters of responses. The PP to P1, averaged over all rounds and both treatments, has been
used to denote decisions. The analysis reveals three types, shown in Figure 2.6, denoted as
A, B and C. From the clusters we find: mixing proportions of 0.4096, 0.4885 and 0.1019;
means of 0.3748, 0.5330 and 0.8893; and variances of 0.0012, 0.0098 and 0.0057 for A, B and
C, respectively. In other words, a group of 41% of the sample who share payoffs roughly
equally, 49% who weight themselves somewhat higher than others, and the remaining 10%
who distribute the majority to themselves.
Table 2.5 models the Proportional Payoff to Player j (PP to Pj), separately for each type;
where j 6= 1. Pooling the data allows for the oneness level for Player j (θj) and Player k (θk),
to be used as explanatory variables, where j 6= 1 and k 6= 1, j. The results show differential
effects between types. An increase in θj , increases the PP to Pj by (0.44pp), (1.81pp) and
(2.19pp), for Type A, B and C, respectively. An increase in θk, however, only significantly
decreases the PP to Pj for Type A (0.44pp) and Type B (0.25pp).
This implies that those who share most equally, Type A, alter distributional giving by
substituting between others, but are not willing to sacrifice their own payoffs as their connec-
tion to others increases. Type C individuals, on the other hand, are not, on average, willing
to trade-off between others, but sacrifice their own payoffs in order to increase the payoffs to
those they are more closely connected to. Type B lies in between the two, willing to substitute
payoffs between themselves and others and between others, but to a lesser magnitude for the
latter. To reinforce these observations Table 2.6 shows the effects of increases to θ2 and θ3
on the PP to P1. Type A individuals do not, on average, significantly change the payoffs to
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Figure 2.6: Clustered Proportional Payoff to Player 1
Table 2.5: Random Effects Model: Proportional Payoff to Others, Dependent Upon Cluster
(1) (2) (3)
Type A Type B Type C
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Oneness Level
- Player j, θj 0.0044
∗∗∗ (0.0013) 0.0181∗∗∗ (0.0030) 0.0219∗∗∗ (0.0059)
- Player k, θk -0.0044
∗∗ (0.0017) -0.0025∗ (0.0014) 0.0024 (0.0018)
Player 3 Dummy -0.0017 (0.0039) -0.0065 (0.0046) -0.0050 (0.0040)
Constant 0.4239∗∗∗ (0.0300) 0.3182∗∗∗ (0.0634) 0.0402∗∗ (0.0181)
N 66 67 16
Observations 3470 3604 864
R-squared 0.1390 0.1766 0.3379
Controls YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
themselves, while Type B do significantly reduce their own proportional payoffs, and Type C
does so to an even greater magnitude.
Table 2.6: Random Effects Model: Proportional Payoffs to P1, Dependent Upon Cluster
(1) (2) (3)
Type A Type B Type C
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Oneness Level
- Player 2, θ2 -0.0002 (0.0025) -0.0162
∗∗∗ (0.0029) -0.0241∗∗∗ (0.0045)
- Player 3, θ3 -0.0027 (0.0022) -0.0150
∗∗∗ (0.0033) -0.0285∗∗∗ (0.0069)
Constant 0.4597∗∗∗ (0.0544) 0.9464∗∗∗ (0.1436) 1.0939∗∗∗ (0.0525)
N 62 58 16
Observations 1640 1559 432
R-squared 0.1724 0.2266 0.4425
Controls YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.1.4 Proportional Allocations
To identify the effects of the dividers on decision making, the proportional allocations (xi/
∑N
j=1 xj)
are used, rather than the proportional payoffs, as the dividers constitute part of the latter’s
calculation. Table 2.7 shows how the proportional allocations, change in relation to an in-
crease in the dividers; the inverse of which can be interpreted as an increase in the price of
giving. An increase of each respective divider leads to an increase in the proportional al-
location of that respective player; 4.59pp, 4.71pp and 4.59pp. The opposite is true for the
opposing dividers, for instance an increase of the dividers for P2 and P3 lead to a decrease in
the proportional allocations to P1 by 3.31pp and 2.53pp, respectively. These results hold, and
are highly significant (p < 0.01), for each divider in relation to each proportional allocation.
The results show that participants are, on average, more concerned with distributing more
equally, than maximising the total surplus. When it is relatively more efficient to give to a
particular player, less is given, so those efficiency gains can be redistributed.
Table 2.7: Proportional Allocation to P1, P2 and P3; Random Effects
(1) (2) (3)
PA to P1 PA to P2 PA to P3
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
- Divider for P1 0.0459∗∗∗ (0.0050) -0.0205∗∗∗ (0.0032) -0.0254∗∗∗ (0.0022)
- Divider for P2 -0.0331∗∗∗ (0.0025) 0.0471∗∗∗ (0.0041) -0.0140∗∗∗ (0.0029)
- Divider for P3 -0.0253∗∗∗ (0.0029) -0.0206∗∗∗ (0.0017) 0.0459∗∗∗ (0.0039)
Constant 0.4318∗∗∗ (0.1353) 0.2843∗∗∗ (0.0666) 0.2839∗∗∗ (0.0699)
N 149 149 149
Observations 8046 8046 8046
R-squared 0.1389 0.1735 0.1698
Controls YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.2 Aggregate Preference Parameters
Preference parameters can be estimated on a sample level; to identify an aggregate preference
of the society or group. These parameter values are the ‘most likely’ given the allocations
made by all individuals within the sample. The sample estimates show r = 0.0191 and α =
0.5094, reflecting a weakly ‘Weighted Prioritarian’, allocating just under half to themselves,
and distributing the remainder between the other two. The oneness elasticities, φ = 0.1552
and ψ = 0.0001, reflect a greater willingness to trade-off between the self and others, as
oneness increases; but less willingness to substitute between others, as the relative oneness
between them changes. A low precision parameter, s = 5.1152, reflects the ‘noise’ within
decisions, which reflects heterogeneity in decisions.
102
4. Results
4.3 Individual Preference Parameters
While the above analysis delves into aggregate trends, it reveals little of the decisions made by
individuals. To address this, individual level preferences are estimated; as parameters within
the proposed utility function. The results shown below are estimated from the full 54 rounds.
4.3.1 Inequality Aversion and Self-Interest Parameters
Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of each Self-Interest, α, Inequality Aversion, r and Equally
Distributed Equivalent (EDE). The top-right and bottom-left histograms show the distri-
bution of α and r, respectively, and map onto the scatter plot in the top-left. The EDE,
which conveniently combines both preferences to form an index from 1 to 10, is shown in the
bottom-right.
The distribution of r reveals how individuals trade-off between equality and efficiency. We
observe 15.44% of the sample are ‘Efficiency Prioritarians’ (r < −0.005), 2.01% are ‘Cobb-
Douglas’ (−0.005 ≤ r < 0.005), 74.50% are ‘Weighted Prioritarians’ (0.005 ≤ r < 15), and
8.05% are ‘Maximin’ (r ≥ 15). The median respondent has an r value of 0.69, a ‘Weighted
Prioritarian’.
Figure 2.7: Distribution of Individual Level Parameter Values: α, r and EDE
The self-interest parameter is somewhat more difficult to interpret. Within the estimation
procedure, as higher values of r are estimated the interpretation of α becomes increasingly
irrelevant. This is problematic when interpreting the distribution of α. As a result the
histogram for α is shown as a stacked distribution, estimated values of α when r ≥ 3 are
shown in light grey. The dark grey distribution, then more closely resembles what is expected
from the average PP to P1 results.
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The scatter plot highlights the bivariate distribution of r and α; splitting the observations
into the three clusters: A, B and C. The heterogeneity of preferences is further highlighted
here, although patterns do emerge from the clustered results. Those who are the least self-
interested (Type A), tend to be the most averse to inequality, while the most self-interested
(Type C) tend to be the least. The median r, for Type A, B and C respectively, are 2.029
0.496 and -0.024.
The EDE values are an intuitive measure, which combines the two preferences. If each
individual were to consider a society where the payoffs to P1, P2 and P3 were: 10, 1 and
1, and they had no connection to either P2 or P3, then according to their preferences they
would be indifferent between that distribution and an equal distribution of EDE’s. Those
whose EDE is 10, reflects pure self-interest, an individual’s only concern is their own payoff.
If EDE = 1 then participants are ‘Maximin’, caring only for the payoff to the worst-off. Those
values in-between reflect ‘Weighted Prioritarianism’ and/or a regard for others. EDE’s which
are less than 1.2 make up 6.04% of the sample, 29.53% are less than 2 and 63.09% less than
3.33. Those greater than 9.8 make up 2.01%, while 10.07% are greater than 8. The median
EDE is 2.90.
4.3.2 Oneness Elasticities
To illustrate the estimated oneness elasticity parameters Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of φ
and ψ, in the left panel, and the difference between the two, as the proportion φ/(φ+ψ), in the
right. Due to lack of variance in elicited oneness levels of a particular individual, 15 individuals
are excluded from analysis on oneness elasticity parameters; as no such parameters could be
estimated. From the left panel; both φ and ψ have similarly right skewed distributions. For
φ, 33.58% of parameters are less than 0.01, 55.97% are less than 0.5 and 73.88% less than 1.
While for ψ, 28.36% are less than 0.01, 64.18% are less than 0.5 and 80.60% less than 1. For
the medians: φ = 0.36 and ψ = 0.23. As shown by the CDF plot, ψ tends to be lower than φ,
at the sample level. This observation is confirmed by the right panel, the proportion φ/(φ+ψ)
shows the difference between the elasticities for each individual. There are 41.04% for whom
ψ > φ, with ψ < φ for 58.96%. Spikes at the extremes imply one elasticity dominates the
other for a significant proportion of the population; 22.39% < 0.01 and 17.16% > 0.99.
These results reflect, and explain, those results shown in Table 2.4. On average, the sample
is willing to trade-off between the self and others, to a greater extent than between others.
This observed trend in the data is because, for the majority of the sample, φ > ψ. Delving
further, by identifying the preferences of those individuals belonging to each cluster, we observe
the mean φ/(φ + ψ) is equal to 0.498, 0.533 and 0.687, for Type A, B and C respectively.
This supports the results of Table 2.5 and 2.6, as Type A substitute between-others, but not
between themselves and others, while Type C predominantly trades-off between themselves
and others, but not between-others, with Type B in-between the two.
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of Oneness Elasticities, φ and ψ
4.3.3 Precision and Fit
In addition to the estimation of preferences parameters, the ability of the utility function to
fit individual behaviour also necessitates consideration. Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of
s in the left panel; s is the precision, which characterises individual level ‘noise’. The higher
s the more ‘precise’ decisions are, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. Those with s < 7 make up
only 10.07% of the sample, for 40.27% s < 15 and for 61.07% s < 25. To illustrate how well
the model fits the data, the middle and right panel of Figure 2.9, show the distribution of
goodness-of-fit measures for each individual. The measures establish the difference between
the observed allocations x1 and optimal allocations x
∗
1, to Player 1.
5 The middle panel provides
an intuitive measure for bias; the closer to zero the lower the bias in the optimal allocations.
The majority of the sample are clustered around zero, 93.29% are within 0.05, 68.46% are
within 0.01 and 46.98% are within 0.005. The right panel highlights efficiency, how close the
optimal allocations are to the observed in absolute terms; 89.93% have a value less than 0.2,
64.43% are less than 0.1 and 14.09% are less than 0.05.
4.4 Model Predictions
Once estimated, preference parameters allow for the prediction of behaviour, according to
particular environmental factors (i.e. a budget, set of dividers and oneness levels). Rather
than relying on the observed behaviour, which may be contingent on a particular set of
environmental factors, a ‘clean’ ceteris paribus analysis can be undertaken to identify changes
in predicted behaviour. It provides a meaningful analysis, based on individual level preferences,
to reveal how the distribution responses would change in response to a shift in environmental
factors.
5The mean GOF for P1 =
54∑
t=1
(x1t−x∗1t)
54
, while the mean absolute GOF for P1 =
54∑
t=1
|x1t−x∗1t|
54
.
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of Precision, s, and Goodness of Fit
The below analysis will identify how predicted behaviour changes, in response to differing
oneness levels. Three different sets of oneness levels have been proposed. Where θ = [θ2, θ3], in
the first set, A, θ = [1, 1], in the second, B, θ = [7, 1] and in the third, C, θ = [7, 7]. Given the
estimated individual-level preferences, assuming pi = [1, 1, 1] and m = 1, the optimal payoffs
can be established for each individual, in each A, B and C. Both deterministic, assuming
decisions are optimal, and stochastic, accounting for the errors each individual would make,
forms of analysis will be conducted; the former showing changes in optimal payoffs, the latter
illustrating the sample distribution of payoffs.
4.4.1 Deterministic
To identify changes in behaviour, due solely to a change in oneness, the differences between
the proportional payoffs, to a particular player, in A and B (B−A), and in A and C (C −A)
can be compared. The former highlights a behavioural change due to an increased connection
to one other, while the latter shows the change due to an increased connection to both others.
Figure 2.10: Distribution of Changes in Predicted Optimal Proportional Payoffs; Differing
Oneness
Figure 2.10 shows the distribution of these changes, where the magnitude and sign of the
individual change depends on the preferences of that particular individual. A negative change
106
4. Results
shows a decrease in the proportional payoff, to that respective player, when moving from A
to B (or C), while a positive change shows the opposite. The closer to zero, the less that
change has been. Looking at C−A we observe that as the closeness to both players increases,
less is given to P1 while more is given to P2 and P3. On average, the PP to P1 decreases
by −13.02pp, while the PP to P2 and P3 both increase by 6.51pp. Considering B − A, the
behavioural changes due to an increase in the oneness to P2, only, can be observed. The
change in PP to P2 is as expected, each individual increases the PP to P2 and the magnitude
is greater than in C − A; 9.40pp on average. For majority of the sample, 76.87%, there is
a decrease in the PP to P1, however, the remaining minority do actually increase the PP
to P1. When considering the PP to P3 a split occurs, 52.24% decrease that to P3, while
the remainder, perhaps counter-intuitively, increase the PP to P3; the mean is only slightly
negative, −0.51pp. This split will be more thoroughly discussed in Section 5.1. These results,
similar on average in magnitude and sign to those in Table 2.4, reveal how individual’s optimal
behaviour is shaped by a change in oneness to those to whom they are giving.
4.4.2 Stochastic
While the above shows how the sample optimally responds to changes oneness levels; it ne-
glects the noise in individual decision making. By combining both utility function and error
model a more representative distribution of decision making can be made. Figure 2.11 utilises
individual level preferences and precision parameters to predict the distribution of propor-
tional payoffs, according to differing oneness levels. The three sets of oneness levels (A, B and
C) are used as above, but the distribution of proportional payoffs, rather than the changes,
are plotted. By using a monte-carlo simulation, taking 10,000 random draws each individual
level probability density function, the plots reflect an ‘asymptotic’ distribution of predicted
decisions.
Figure 2.11: Distribution of Predicted Proportional Payoffs; Differing Oneness
The first observation is that A reflects an ‘objective’ distribution, where participants have
no connection to others. The mean proportional payoffs are [0.539, 0.230, 0.230], for P1, P2
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and P3, respectively. As oneness increases the distribution of PP to P1 shifts left, reflected
by the decrease in the average to 0.450 and 0.409 for B and C, respectively. For the PP to P2,
an increase is observed in both cases, as the plots shift right, however, the shift to B is greater
than that of C; with means of 0.324 and 0.295, respectively. For the PP to P3, a decrease
is shown, when moving to B, while an increase occurs to C; with means of 0.225 and 0.296,
receptively. Of most note are the changes at the extremes. Those observations for which the
PP to P1 is greater than 0.98, is 2.28%, 0.44% and 0.33%, for A, B and C respectively. While
those observations, for which the PP to P3 is less than or equal to 0.01 is 4.11%, 4.21% and
1.02%, for A, B and C respectively.
5 Discussion
5.1 Oneness Peculiarities
Predictions from the utility function, in Section 4.4.1, have two apparently peculiar tendencies.
Both occur when identifying the change in optimal allocations from a situation where θ2 =
θ3 = 1 to that where θ2 = 7, θ3 = 1; when, ceteris paribus, the oneness to P2 increases. As
expected, x∗2 always increases, and for the majority of individuals, x∗1 and x∗3 decrease. There
are, however, two peculiarities, first, with regards to an increase in x∗1 and, second, with an
increase to x∗3.
The former occurs only when r > 0 and φ/ψ is sufficiently low. If ψ > φ, individuals
place a higher weight on substituting between-others, than on self-other trade-offs. If ψ is
sufficiently high, then as θ2 increases relative to θ3, ω3 → 0. When φ is low, ω1 only decreases
relatively little. As a result, as ω1, ω2  0 and ω3 → 0; individuals consider the problem
as one of distributing between P1 and P2 only. As individuals are inequality averse, r > 0,
they share between P1 and P2; the increase to P2 is greater, but x∗1 does actually increase.
Intuitively, this peculiarity makes sense, when faced with a situation where the individual is
disconnected to both P2 and P3, they decide to share between all three (especially as r > 0).
A change in absolute terms of oneness, as described above, leads to a relative reduction in
the connection to P3, as the individual is willing to substitute between others, ω3 → 0, but
as they are not very willing to trade-off between themselves and others, ω1 does not. Then,
they consider the problem of distributing between themselves and one other, they then give
more to P2 but also more to themselves.
The latter occurs when φ/ψ is sufficiently high. When φ > ψ, individuals place a higher
weight on self-other trade-offs, than substituting between-others. The reason for this is that,
in the model, as θi increases, ∀i > 1, ω1 decreases; as a result 1 − ω1 increases. If ψ is
sufficiently small, little substitution occurs between ω2 and ω3, and therefore both ω2 and ω3
increase. Intuitively, this could be due to the relative amounts given to P2 and P3. If, due to
an increase in θ2, x
∗
2 increases, it could lead to an increased generosity to P3. Being close to
one other makes me consider that I would want to share with others, rather than giving all
to myself; as I now consider sharing more, I will actually give more to P3, even though my
closeness to them has not increased.
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5.2 Comparability
5.2.1 Giving and Social Distance
Engel (2011) conducts a meta-analysis on dictator games from 129 papers, calculating a
’grand mean’ of 0.717, as the proportion kept by the dictator. Our results show a ‘grand
mean’ of 0.505, significantly lower than that calculated by Engel. Two factors may explain
this heightened generosity; both of which are stated in Engel’s conclusion: that dictators give
more ‘when they come from a developing country’ and ‘if there are multiple recipients’.
In support of the latter, Andreoni (2007) finds that as the number of recipients increases
dictators give themselves less, however, the rate at which they give is congested. For the
representative agent a ‘gift that results in one person receiving x is equivalent to one in which
n people receive x/n0.68’. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that (all else being equal)
the equivalent mean PP to P1, from our experiment, would be 0.603, in a 2-player dictator
game. Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007) observe a similar trend, as their mean PP to P1
is 0.75, in the three-player variant, and 0.79 in the two.
In the social distance literature dictator games usually have two-players. Considering
the most similar treatment in Leider et al. (2009), when the exchange rate is 1:1, the PP
to P1 0.761 and 0.875 for the most and least connected respectively. From lab-in-the-field
experiments in ‘developing economics’, when matched with a stranger and a friend, respec-
tively, dictators took 0.636 and 0.5573 on average in Binzel and D. Fehr (2013). In Ligon and
Schechter (2012), when the recipient was chosen the average to the self was 0.637, while when
they were random it was 0.615. The level of giving is somewhat lower in the later two, giving
support to the findings by Engel (2011). While not directly comparable to other papers,
combining the unilateral effects above provides an explanation for the difference in the levels
of giving.
Aside from the difference in levels, the results appear consistent with those in the social
distance literature. Giving is shown to increase with oneness; the predicted mean PP to P1 is
0.539, when there is the least connection to both others, and 0.408 with the most. Due to the
three-player design, this work is able to tease out between-other, alongside self-other, trade-
offs when closeness to others differs. Combining this with the the proposed utility function
and error model, we observe a great deal of heterogeneity in preferences, as found in Fisman,
Kariv, and Markovits (2007). By accounting for this heterogeneity, and incorporating oneness
considerations, the average effects of changes in oneness can be explained by the distribution
of individual behaviour.
5.2.2 Error Models
The random behavioural model proposed here diverges from that which is most common. Usu-
ally random behavioural models assume that an individual has some optimal payoff, according
to their preferences and the decision problem, say y∗i . The individual then makes some error
calculating, or choosing, y∗i , meaning the observed decisions are y
∗
i + i, where i is normally
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distributed with mean zero. The issue is that with some probability, y∗i + i will exceed the
bounds of the problem (i.e. 0 and 1, in the case of the share to the self). As a result, censor-
ing must ensue, usually in the form of a tobit model; as in Andreoni and Miller (2002) and
Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007). With greater dimensions, a further issue may arise due
to the i.i.d nature of the errors; in the three player case (assume y3 = (m− y∗1 + 1 + y∗2 + 2)),
if 1 and 2 are sufficiently large, y3 could be negative.
An alternative is that suggested here, where observed decisions are said to be drawn from
the Dirichlet distribution, which is bounded between 0 and 1, where the expectation of the
distribution is y∗ and the sum of observed decisions will always equal 1 (or m if scaled). The
flexibility of the distribution, intuition of its formulation and generalisability to n dimensions
are useful in these bounded decision problems. Further comparison between the Dirichlet
distribution and normal error model could identify which of the two best fits individual or
aggregate level behaviour. While the Dirichlet distribution could potentially provide a more
intuitive fit for individuals, at the aggregate level the normal error model could provide a better
fit, the distribution of round decisions in Figure 2.5, for instance, has responses clustered at
the upper bound.
5.2.3 Incentives
One point of divergence in this paper, from others in the literature, is the incentive structure.
Within both Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007), partici-
pants receive the payoffs they gave to themselves plus the payoffs other participants gave to
them; in effect getting two (or three) sets of payoffs. In this paper, the decision made by only
one dictator from each ‘group’ was carried out, meaning individuals would only get one set of
payoffs. In the former incentive mechanism (henceforth (1)), the total experimental payoffs
received included their own payoff to themselves plus what the others gave them; and they
knew that others had the same payoff structure. Whereas, in the incentive mechanism used
here (henceforth (2)) participants knew that, if they were chosen as dictator, then the payoffs
they distributed would be the only experimental payoffs that each member of the group would
receive.
This subtle difference could lead to a substantial divergence in decision making (if a
consequentialist approach is taken). Imagine an individual who is an egalitarian; they wish
everyone to leave the room with an equal payoff. In (2), individuals would allocate equally,
while in (1) more strategic considerations are necessary. If they believe that everyone in
the room is an egalitarian, then they would share equally, but if they believe everyone else
is an egoist (who keeps all for themselves) then they would take everything for themselves.
Interpreting the behaviour in the latter case would lead to the conclusion that the egalitarian
was an egoist, due to a difference in the beliefs of the behaviour of the others in the room.
A further consideration, relates to the construct of the impartial spectator (Smith, 1790).
The perspective of the spectator can be considered by putting oneself in the situation of the
other; imagining how one’s behaviour would be viewed from the standpoint of all members
of society. When considering this perspective, behaviour is likely to reflect a greater degree
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of prosociality.6 In (1) it is arguably less likely that this perspective would be considered.
Participants know that the payoffs they distribute are certain, but that an additional uncertain
amount will be added to those payoffs, by others. Participants would consult their beliefs
about what others would give when making their decision, but still consider the problem
from their individual perspective. In (2) the participant has the same chance of being the
recipient, as the others in the room. Moreover, if they are chosen to be the dictator, the
payoffs they distribute will be the only experimental payoffs to each player. As participants
know this it is easier to imagine the situation of the other (when that other is a recipient of
their giving), knowing that the other would receive the exact experimental payoff chosen by
the participant. Imagining receiving only the payoff given to the other could, then, led to an
increase in generosity.7
Due to these two observations, a divergence in observed behaviour could occur. For the
former, results from (1) could be biased towards more ‘apparently’ self-interested decisions,
while for the latter, results from (2) could be biased toward more equal distributions, than
individuals would otherwise have done. This difference could perhaps further explain the
differences in average giving (see Section 5.2.1) and is, perhaps, an interesting area for further
inquiry.
5.3 Applicability
Two potential applications of this work are first, in the charity sector, and two for government
distributional policies. For the former, by estimating oneness elasticities the extent to which
charitable donations would fluctuate, due to an increase in oneness could be established.
Then, if the cost of increasing an individual’s oneness to the charity could be established,
a cost-effectiveness analysis could be conducted to estimate the optimal level of investment
to increase that individuals connection to the charity, in order to increase donations. For
the latter, if individual level preferences were estimated, then a set of alternative government
redistributive policies could be ranked. The one which was determined to be optimal could be
implemented; rather than striving for one goal of efficiency (such as raising GDP per capita)
or equality (increasing the welfare of the worst-off); a policy could be implemented which
reflected individual’s distributive preferences.
6 Conclusion
To conclude, distributional preferences are an integral component in explaining heterogeneity
in prosocial behaviour. Through intertwining distributional preferences with considerations
of oneness, the impact that social distance has on distributional decision making can be
6Smith writes of the social passions: ‘all the social and benevolent affections’. Arguing that to the spectator,
the social passions are the most agreeable, as ‘we enter into the satisfaction both of the person who feels them,
and of the person who is the object of them’ (Smith, 1790). Given this, by taking the perspective of the
spectator our behaviour should strive to satisfy these passions.
7Indeed, it may be easier to imagine the situation of an other to whom you are more closely connected to.
If being better able to consider their situation leads to increased giving, this could partially explain why we
observe an increase in giving, when oneness increases.
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further explored and understood. This paper has formulated a model which incorporates
both elements; estimating individual-level preferences to explain behaviour from a lab-in-
the-field experiment. Results show that participants tend to favour reducing inequality, as
opposed to reducing inefficiencies, and exhibit a substantial regard for others. On average,
there is a greater willingness to trade-off between the self and others, when the closeness
to others increases, than there is to substitute between-others, when relative oneness levels
change.
Heterogeneity in behaviour, is however, the most notable aspect of these findings. There is
not a consensus on how to share, nor how to trade-off between equality and efficiency, nor how
to redistribute to those who are close. Differences in prosocial behaviour have been shown to
depend both upon distributional preferences of individuals and the closeness of connection to
others. Accounting for both would, therefore, seem necessary in order to better understand
prosocial behaviour.
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B Appendices
B.1 Experimental Design
An incentivised lab-in-the-field experiment, with an accompanying survey, was run in Mbale,
Uganda. On each experimental day, two parallel sessions were ran with groups of six par-
ticipants. The first group partook in the experimental session, and then the survey, while
the second group did the survey followed by the experimental session. The experimental ses-
sion began with the script, moved onto the interactive tutorial (one-on-one with enumerators
with questions to check understanding), then the budget treatment. This was followed by the
oneness script, the oneness questionnaire, finishing with the oneness treatment. The survey
began with a group discussion, then the survey, one-on-one with an enumerator. The whole
experiment lasted between 3 and 5 hours, depending on the speed of the participants. At
least six enumerators were present throughout the experiments. Figure 2.12 shows how the
experiment was set-up.
Figure 2.12: Photographs of Experiment Set-Up 8
B.1.1 Scripts
Participants were firstly given instructions in the form of a verbal script, a transcript of which
can be found in Appendix B.5. The script was split into two parts, the general script and
8Photos clockwise from top-left: (1) Experiment set-up, each participant had a Linx Tablet, with Z-Tree
software, to make their decisions, tables were numbered from 1 to 6. (2) Chairs set up for General, Part 1
and Part 2 of the script. Semi-circle to ensure equal distance, with A2 posters showing screenshots of the
experiment. (3) Survey set-up, one enumerator per participant. Using Asus tablets with Survey Solutions
software to conduct the survey. (4) Chairs set up to encourage group discussion for Group 2, before the survey,
and a waiting room for those not doing the survey, throughout.
113
Chapter 2. Incorporating Oneness
oneness script; the former of which was given when participants entered the experimental
session, the later between Part 1 and Part 2. The general script explained all the necessary
precursors to the experiment, explained the payoffs, the decisions they would be making and
what Part 1 entailed. Throughout the script visual aids were used to enhance the under-
standing of the participants; a Linx tablet, the round selection bag and a poster. The poster
showed a screenshot of the Z-Tree interface, which was used to show the layout of the screen
and exactly which decisions they would be required to make. There were no distribution of
payoffs, or allocations, shown to avoid any anchoring effects. The oneness script was delivered
after the break, before the oneness treatment, where both the oneness decisions and Part 2
were explained. Another poster was used to explain the oneness decisions to be made, and
references were made to the previous poster for Part 2. The scripts were delivered by two of
the enumerators; Zam the General Script and Isaac the Oneness Script.
B.1.2 Tutorial
To further ensure that participants understood the decisions they were making after the
general script they went through an extensive on-screen tutorial. Each participant went
through the tutorial one-on-one with an enumerator.9 The tutorial was split into three parts.
The first was a simplified version, with one player (rather than three) which built up each
element step-by-step and was led by the enumerator. Starting with only the allocations,
then adding the payoffs, alongside differing dividers. The three methods were taught in turn,
slider, arrow keys, then written input, before all three could be used. After the first part, the
participants had to answer six questions to check their understanding. Enumerators recorded
if they had answered correctly, or not, from the first time the participant understood the
question. If they got the answer wrong the enumerators explained the correct answer. Once
the questions were complete they moved onto a tutorial with the entire interface. Participants
then made the decisions, with no input from the enumerators, who were still there to check
they understood the decisions they had made. Two practice rounds were given, one where the
dividers were [1, 1, 1], the second [1, 2, 3]. Once participants were confident with the interface,
then the enumerators left the participants to make their decisions for real, in private. A script
of the wording of the on-screen tutorial, questions, and instructions to enumerators (in [ ])
can be found in Appendix B.6.
B.1.3 Survey
Alongside the experiment an in-depth survey was ran. The surveys were implemented with
Asus touchscreen tablet and ran one-on-one; where one enumerator went through the sur-
vey with one participant. The survey was split into four sections: individual characteristics;
household characteristics; assets, wealth and MPI ; and preferences. The individual charac-
teristics section comprised predominately of demographic questions, about the participant’s:
gender, date of birth, religion, tribe, occupation, level of education, hours of work/study,
9The exact enumerator was recorded to test for enumerator effects.
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income, height and weight. Household characteristics asked questions regarding each mem-
ber of their household: gender, age, relation to the participant, level of education, school
attendance and literacy. Alongside this more general household level questions were asked:
child mortality, food shortages, bank accounts, health insurance, social insurance, healthcare
and unemployment. Assets, wealth and MPI, asked questions about their household: house-
hold type; housing arrangement; bedrooms; floor, roof and external wall materials; water
source and distance; toilet; lighting; cooking fuel and rubbish collection. Further questions
on ownership of livestock, vehicles and household assets were made. The final section, pref-
erences, asked participants to allocate hypothetical tokens between three pots which denoted
the health, education and household assets, of the household. They were asked to allocate
the tokens to denote how much importance these three elements had to them.
B.1.4 Group Discussion
In order to test whether having group discussion had an effect on the oneness scores, or
the behaviour of participants in the experiment, a group discussion was part of the design.
The second group, who did the survey first and experiment second, were firstly sat down to
partake in a group discussion. This was informal, and led by the enumerators, but allowed
the chance to talk amongst themselves. Further to this, before the experiment, they had
lunch together to further any group dynamics, or individual relationships, which could have
emerged throughout that time. In contrast, the first group did the experiment as soon as all
members of their group arrived.
B.1.5 Pilot Experiments
Prior to the main experiment two pilot sessions were ran. The first, a preliminary paper
version was ran with 23 participants in September 2015. The second, was a first run through
of the final experiment, ran with 12 participants at UCU, Mbale, in June 2016. The major
changes relate to timing, firstly that paper based methods were too time consuming, hence
the move to touchscreen tablets, and secondly that only one session could be ran each day,
rather than two. Other changes included simplification, ensuring dividers had were equal for
each Player, ensuring privacy of decisions was paramount and minor tweaks to the script to
enhance understanding.
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B.2 Sampling
Two sampling frames were created in order to conduct the experiments. The first, from a
general population in the Mbale District, the second, from student records from the Ugandan
Christian University (UCU), Mbale. The majority of the sample, 108, were from the general
population, the remainder, 48, from the student population.
B.2.1 General Population
In order to create the sampling frame for the general population, mobilizers were employed to
gather information for each individual, within each household, within their Cell.10 There were
9 Cells selected, within two Divisions. From the Industrial Division the cells selected were:
Bumasfa (n=169), Pallisa (n=255), Malawa (n=241), Butaleja (n=127), Bugwere (n=248)
and Wanyera (n=185). Within the Northern Division the cells were: Mugisu (n=289), Gudoi
(n=305) and Nkokonjeru (n=282).11 A total sampling frame size of n = 2101, where there
were 51.5% women and a mean overall age of 26.15.
The characteristics recorded were household ID, gender, age and the relationship to the
household head for every member of the cell. For those individuals who were between the age
of 18 and 45 further information was taken: if they had a good level of English; if they were
in secondary school; if they would be willing to participate in the experiment; their phone
number; and the answers to three selected questions. The three questions were: Q1: Do you
own a touch-screen phone? Q2: Would you be comfortable using a touch-screen gadget in a
study? Q3: Do you regularly use a personal computer?
In order to select a sample from the sampling frame individuals had to meet certain
characteristics. They had to: be between 18 and 45; have a good level spoken and written
English, not be in secondary school, be willing to participate; and have answered yes to two
or more of the three questions. Those who met such requirements numbered 541. Gender
characteristic remained similar with 50.01% being female; while the age was censored there
was a mean age of 27.96. This criteria was necessary to ensure that participants would be able
to participate within the study. With such criteria a bias is indeed created within the sample,
while as many steps were made to ensure the sample was random and as unbiased as possible,
the claim being made here is not that the sample is representative. A trade-off did have to be
made, however, between representativeness and ability to be able to make informed decisions
with the tablets provided. Figure 2.13 shows the composition of age and sex for both the
”total” sampling frame and the ”select” sampling frame. The histogram highlights the age
cut-off points and the reduced sample frame size, alongside the population’s general age and
gender characteristics.
10A cell is a geographical area which is smaller than a Division, which is smaller than a District. They are
the urban equivalent of a rural village.
11There were issues with the sampling frame. The general consensus from the Mobilisers was that they had
recorded 70-80% of participants within the cell. Reasons given for the lack of coverage included: Suspicion that
the information was being collected for taxation purposes, as the study was going to be in UCU individuals
were worried that the aim was to convert them to being born again Christians, some people identify the
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Figure 2.13: Composition of Age and Sex: Total and Selected Cells
Once the sampling frame was created, and the eligible participants identified, random
sampling was conducted to invite participants to the experiment. Two groups of six were
selected, from each cell, for each day; alongside a backup list of the next randomly selected
participants. Mobilizers were given the information of the first 12 participants there were
to invite and bring to the experiment and if difficulties arrived in getting participants then
they were replaced by the next participant. Replacements were common, and on average the
experiments began an hour late, due to mobilization issues.12
B.2.2 Student Population
The student sampling frame was somewhat easier. The Dean of Students, at UCU Mbale,
was approached to provide a list of students who were registered. A list of 640 students was
acquired and random sampling was carried out to invite the 48 participants to the experiment.
A postgraduate student at UCU, was recruited to mobilize the participants.
mobilisers with a particular political party and claim they were tired of government programmes because they
only register people but never deliver their promises.
12Further issues concerned the gender bias. Although the ratio of men to women, who were randomly
selected, was approximately equal, the drops outs were far more often women. To attempt to resolve this issue,
when selecting replacements women’s names were prioritised.
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B.3 Sample Characteristics
Between experimental days there were two separate samples, the general population (n=108)
and the student population (n=48). Of these 156, 7 participants were excluded from the
analysis: ID 1 11, 6 11 and 8 01 had a clear lack of comprehension (where enumerators had
to assist decision making); concerns of contamination between sessions led to the exclusion of
9 03 and 9 08; 1 05 was as an outlier; and data for 3 09 was lost due to a tablet crashing.
Table 3.11 shows the characteristics for the remaining 149, within the two samples. In both
samples there are fewer women, 43% on average, than the 51.5% collected from the sampling
frame. In both samples the modal age group is 22−25, but the student population has signif-
icantly less over 25 year old participants. Both samples are relatively well educated, 56.4% of
the general population are educated to the bachelors level. Every member of the general pop-
ulation have completed at least primary school, but there is a significant proportion who have
either not completed secondary, or have only completed secondary. Every participant identi-
fied themselves as being religious, not one was agnostic or atheist as is common in western
samples. The majority are Christian, with the largest proportion of these being Anglicans in
both samples. There is a substantial minority of Muslims within the general population, but
not in the student population; as they were sampled from, the Ugandan Christian University.
It is important to note that the general population is not representative, due to the necessary
selection criteria.
Table 2.8: Sample Characteristics
Sample
General Student Total
No. % No. % No. %
Gender
Male 59 58.4% 26 54.2% 85 57.0%
Female 42 41.6% 22 45.8% 64 43.0%
Age
18-21 16 15.8% 10 20.8% 26 17.4%
22-25 37 36.6% 33 68.8% 70 47.0%
26-30 18 17.8% 2 4.2% 20 13.4%
31+ 30 29.7% 3 6.3% 33 22.1%
Religion
Catholic 25 24.8% 12 25.0% 37 24.8%
Anglican 37 36.6% 21 43.8% 58 38.9%
Muslim 16 15.8% 0 0.0% 16 10.7%
Seventh Day Adventists 0 0.0% 1 2.1% 1 0.7%
Born Again 23 22.8% 14 29.2% 37 24.8%
Highest Level of Education
Secondary: Incomplete 11 10.9% 0 0.0% 11 7.4%
Secondary: Complete 14 13.9% 0 0.0% 14 9.4%
Tertiary: College 19 18.8% 0 0.0% 19 12.8%
Tertiary: Bachelors 56 55.4% 48 100.0% 104 69.8%
Tertiary: Masters 1 1.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.7%
Total 101 100.0% 48 100.0% 149 100.0%
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B.4 Wealth and Multidimensional Poverty Indices
B.4.1 Wealth Index
Alongside the experiment an in-depth survey was run. Part of this survey contained vari-
ables to assess the wealth of the individual participants. Rather than using income data,
which are notoriously unreliable in developing countries, or consumption data, which are very
time consuming to collect, a focus upon assets was made. An extensive list of variables has
been collected, in order to calculate a relative wealth index; using methods standard to the
literature.
Data were collected for 57 variables to be included within the Wealth Index. Dummy
variables were established for: access to electricity; material of the floor, roof and exterior
walls; water source; toilet type; shared toilet; lighting; cooking fuel and rubbish collection.
Numerical values were established for number of bedrooms; distance to water source (mins);
livestock; vehicles; and household assets. Each of these variables, split into subcategories, are
shown in Table 2.9. The mean value shows either the proportion of the populace who own
that asset, for dummy variables, or the mean number owned by the population. The standard
error shows the variance of ownership between individuals.
In order to establish the Wealth Index the methods set out in Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006)
have been followed. Whereby Principal Components Analysis is run, on the variable list, then
the weights from the first component are used to form the base of the wealth index. These
weights, shown in Table 2.9, are used to weight each observation for each participant, to pro-
vide a single index. This index is then normalised for the sample, providing an index between
0 and 1, where 0 is the least wealthy and 1 is the most wealthy, in relative terms.
What this method reveals is the impact that owning a particular asset has upon the
wealth of the individual. The direction and magnitude of the weight implies a relationship
between a particular asset and the expected wealth. For instance, having electricity shows
that individuals are more wealthy. As do more bedrooms, closer water, rubbish collection,
the number of vehicles (apart from bicycles) and the number of household assets (with the
exception of handmills). Delving into particular materials it can be observed that the higher
quality materials lead to higher wealth. For floor, there is a high positive weight for cement,
while dung and earth/sand have negative weight, the former being the higher weight of the
two. This can be seen throughout each category: tiled roofs, brick/cement walls, private
piped water sources, flush toilets, electric lighting and gas/electric cooking fuel all relate to
a higher wealth. On the opposite scale, thatch/straw roofs, mud/pole walls, boreholes as a
source of water, pit latrines, paraffin/gas lighting and wood for cooking fuel all lead to lower
wealth levels. Interestingly, we observe that owning livestock, apart from hens, leads to lower
wealth. This is likely explained by the urban nature of the sample, those who owned large
animals are more likely to be rural, and possibly poorer than their urban counterparts, in
terms of the other assets mentioned. Hens within a city are more feasible, and owning them
is, perhaps, a sign of wealth. The ownership of vehicles increases wealth, with the exception
of a bicycle as perhaps the someone with more wealth may dispense with the bicycle in favour
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Table 2.9: Wealth Index Construction; PCA
(1)
Weights Mean Std. Err.
Electricity 0.245 0.846 (0.363)
Number of Bedrooms 0.042 2.309 (1.456)
Floor Material
- Earth/Sand -0.077 0.020 (0.141)
- Dung -0.240 0.101 (0.302)
- Cement 0.120 0.698 (0.461)
- Ceramic Tiles 0.059 0.067 (0.251)
- Vinyl/Carpet 0.042 0.114 (0.319)
Roof Material
- Thatch/Straw -0.133 0.020 (0.141)
- Iron Sheets 0.002 0.872 (0.335)
- Asbestos 0.003 0.034 (0.181)
- Tiles 0.051 0.047 (0.212)
- Cement 0.042 0.027 (0.162)
Exterior Wall
- Mud/Poles -0.238 0.101 (0.302)
- Brick/Mud -0.049 0.040 (0.197)
- Brick/Cement 0.200 0.805 (0.397)
- Cement 0.009 0.054 (0.226)
Water Source
- Private Pipe/Bottled 0.215 0.617 (0.488)
- Public Taps -0.033 0.215 (0.412)
- Protected Well -0.170 0.067 (0.251)
- Borehore -0.161 0.101 (0.302)
Water Distance (mins) -0.244 6.544 (14.194)
Toilet
- Flush 0.180 0.503 (0.502)
- VI Pit Latrine 0.030 0.282 (0.451)
- Pit Latrine -0.252 0.215 (0.412)
Shared Toilet -0.015 0.315 (0.466)
Lighting
- Electric 0.256 0.826 (0.381)
- Paraffin/Gas -0.228 0.107 (0.311)
- Solar -0.105 0.067 (0.251)
Observations 149
(1)
Weights Mean Std. Err.
Cooking Fuel
- Gas/Electric 0.067 0.074 (0.262)
- Charcoal/Coal 0.172 0.725 (0.448)
- Wood -0.264 0.161 (0.369)
No Food Cooked 0.015 0.040 (0.197)
Rubbish Collected 0.139 0.416 (0.495)
No. of Livestock
- Heifer/Cow -0.115 0.624 (2.042)
- Bull/Oxen -0.089 0.148 (0.608)
- Calves -0.096 0.114 (0.458)
- Donkey -0.070 0.007 (0.082)
- Goats -0.095 0.732 (1.814)
- Sheep -0.013 0.376 (4.109)
- Pigs -0.060 0.040 (0.305)
- Hens 0.024 1.295 (8.339)
No. of Vehicles
- Bicycles -0.050 0.342 (0.655)
- Motorcycles 0.025 0.208 (0.424)
- Cars 0.108 0.275 (0.624)
- Vans 0.041 0.020 (0.141)
- Trucks 0.056 0.134 (1.239)
- Tractors 0.049 0.013 (0.115)
Household Assets
- Sofas 0.139 0.893 (0.617)
- Radios 0.064 1.000 (0.678)
- Tables 0.110 1.034 (0.911)
- Fridges 0.167 0.362 (0.548)
- Televisions 0.193 0.926 (0.679)
- Computers 0.134 0.564 (0.738)
- Clocks 0.110 0.913 (0.830)
- Jewellery 0.107 2.027 (2.043)
- Mobile Phones 0.097 4.148 (2.675)
- Handmills -0.009 0.336 (0.565)
Observations 149
of a car. While owning all assets, with the exception of a handmill (a traditional pestle and
mortar, predominately owned by rural or poorer individuals who do not have more modern
electric blenders) also increased wealth.
In order to split the population into socio-economic groups two methods are common in
the literature; an arbitrary split, into quintiles for example, or through cluster analysis. Here
the later approach has been taken, using K-means with three degrees of freedom to create
three cluster: Low, Middle and High. Figure 2.14 shows the overall distribution of wealth,
split into these three clusters. Table 2.10 shows the percentage of the population who fall into
these three clusters, the mean Wealth Index and the standard deviation. From these results
the largest proportion, 51.01%, of the population lies within the high wealth category. The
lowest socio-economic group is the smallest cluster, while the middle is in-between.
To provide comparability between this study and potential others a further wealth index
was calculated, the International Wealth Index (IWI). The index was proposed by Smits and
Steendijk (2015) as a way in which to compare between studies, due to the relative nature
of typical wealth indices. The index is made up of a subset of the variables used above:
floor material, toilet facility, number of rooms, access to electricity, water source. Alongside
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Figure 2.14: Wealth Index Distribution
Table 2.10: Wealth Index Categories
% Mean WI Std. Dev.
Low 15.44% 0.209 (0.115)
Middle 33.56% 0.586 (0.0561)
High 51.01% 0.714 (0.061)
dummies for consumer durables: television, refrigerator, phone, car, bicycle, cheap utensils
and expensive utensils. The only divergence which was necessary, was that phone had to
include only mobile phones and that number of rooms had to be number of bedrooms, due to
data limitations.
The mean IWI was 66.308, with a minimum of 12.003, a maximum of 100 and a standard
deviation of 20.871. In terms of headcount cut-offs the IWI-30 poverty line is 8.05% and the
IWI-50 poverty line is 19.46%; which most closely correlates to the $1.25 and $2.00 poverty
cutoff lines, respectively. The IWI and Wealth Index are highly correlated, with a Pearson’s
Correlation Coefficient of 0.8750.
B.4.2 Multidimensional Poverty Index
The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is a poverty index, which accounts for severe
deprivations in Health, Education and Living Standards. An absolute measure of poverty
which considers the necessary capabilities that individuals need in order not to be in poverty.
It follows the Alkire and Foster Methodology (Alkire and J. Foster, 2011); where individual
households are assessed on nine indicators. The intensity of poverty is calculated by summing
the weighted indicators, where each of the dimensions: health, education and living standards;
are equally weighted. Education contains two indicators: years of schooling and child school
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attendance. Health is equally split between child mortality and nutrition. Living standards
contains five indicators: electricity, improved sanitation, safe drinking water, adequate floor-
ing, cooking fuel and asset ownership. Data are usually gathered from sources such as DHS,
MICS and WHS surveys which are provide large scale, cross-country, datasets. The indicators
have been chosen to maximise the sensitivity and usefulness of the index, alongside avoiding
issues of missing data.
An alternative, Extended MPI (EMPI) has also been calculated. This makes use of the ex-
tensive survey data collected, avoiding issues of missing data that may have limited the number
of indicators previously. Adding to the education dimension are the indicators: schooling gap
and adult education. Food shortage and health care have been added to the health dimension.
While, external wall and roofing have been included within living standards. In addition, a
further dimension, urban, has been added to account for particular urban characteristics of the
sample. Within this dimension the indicators are: overcrowding, unemployment, underem-
ployment, bank account and rubbish collection. These additional dimensions have stemmed
from a combination of recent additions to the literature and Mbale specific issues. Other
extended indices include the MPI-LA (Santos and Villatoro, 2016), the Mexican MPI (J. E.
Foster, 2007), the Colombian MPI (Angulo, Dı`az, and Pardo, 2016), and Bhutan’s Gross
National Happiness Index (Ura et al., 2012); alongside MPI’s in Chile and Ecuador. Specific
indicators to Mbale, which could also be widespread issues, include the government clinic
access and underemployment issues the town has.
Table 2.11 shows each of the dimensions and indicators. Showing the cutoff thresholds
for the cut-off points, alongside the weights for the standard and extended MPI. The weights
for the EPMI have been calculated according to similar principles, each dimension has an
equal weight, and given a dimension indicator has an equal weight, within. Although the
surveys were extensive, they were conducted on an individual level. As a result two indicators,
nutrition and underemployment, can only consider the individual rather than the household
this may lead to an under-measurement of poverty for both indicators.
A further index, the Preference MPI (PMPI), is calculated; incorporating the preference
survey responses. In the above MPI calculations the weights between dimensions are chosen
to be equal. The choice of weights is, however, open to debate. Is education of equal impor-
tance as health and living standards when assessing the intensity of poverty, or do different
weights better capture poverty? Alternative weightings could be used, and by using them the
resulting indices would differ. An alternative approach, which could be used is to identify the
weights that the individuals in question would give to each dimension. The Preference MPI
illustrates how this could be done. Using the elicited weightings for health, education and
living standards, from the survey data, to calculate the index.
Once the Dimension, Indicators and Weights have been decided upon the statistics relating
to the MPI, EMPI and PMPI can be calculated. Figure 2.15 shows the distribution of the
uncensored intensity (the proportion of simultaneous deprivations experienced). The average
uncensored intensity is 0.126, 0.178 and 0.105, for MPI, EMPI and PMPI, respectively. A
percentage of the population classed as MPI, EMPI and PMPI Poor: 6.04%, 10.07% and 5.37%
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Table 2.11: MPI Dimensions, Indicators, Deprivation Thresholds and Relative Weights
Weight
Dimension Indicator Deprived if... Std. Ext.
Education Years of Schooling No household member has completed five years of
schooling.
1
6
1
16
Child School
Attendance
Any school-aged child is not attending school up to
class 8.
1
6
1
16
Schooling Gap Any child is over two years delayed with respect to
their school grade for age.
. 1
16
Adult Education Any adult in the household can not read and write, or
have not completed secondary school.
. 1
16
Health Child Mortality Any child has died in the family 1
6
1
16
Nutrition The participant is malnourished, BMI ≤ 18.5 1
6
1
16
Food Shortage The household has suffered a food shortage in the last
Month
. 1
16
Health Care The household only has access to a Government Clinic
and has no Health Insurance
. 1
16
Living
Standard
Improved
Sanitation
The household’s sanitation facility is not ”improved”,
or shared.
1
18
1
32
Electricity The household has no access to electricity. 1
18
1
32
Drinking Water The household does not have access to safe drinking
water or it is at least a 30-minute roundtrip away.
1
18
1
32
Flooring The household has a dirt, sand or dung floor. 1
18
1
32
External Wall The household has external walls made from thatch,
straw or mud and poles.
. 1
32
Roofing The household has a roof made from thatch, straw or
banana fibres.
. 1
32
Cooking Fuel The household cooks with dung, wood or charcoal. 1
18
1
32
Assets Ownership The household does not own more than one radio, TV,
telephone, bike, motorbike or refrigerator and does not
own a car or truck.
1
18
1
32
Urban Overcrowding The household has three or more people per bedroom. . 1
20
Unemployment Any household member is long term unemployed and
noone receives Social Insurance.
. 1
20
Underemployment Participant works four hours or less daily. . 1
20
Bank Account No household member has access to any form of bank
account.
. 1
20
Rubbish
Collection
Rubbish is not collected from the household. . 1
20
respectively. These incidence rates are rather low in comparison to elsewhere in Uganda, where
(in 2011) the average across Uganda was 69.9% and the Urban average is 29.2% (OPHI, 2017).
Two main observations emerge from these results. The first, that the EMPI reveals a
higher level of multidimensional poverty than the MPI. Two factors could explain this: (1)
the EMPI is a richer index and, therefore, better identifies poverty, implying MPI measures
of poverty are biased downward. (2) The thresholds in the additional indicators in the EMPI
are ‘too low’, biasing the EMPI upwards. The second, is that the PMPI reveals a lower level
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of multidimensional poverty than the MPI. Again two, possible, factors could explain this: (1)
As active agents, individual’s preferences shape their priorities over dimensions of poverty. As
particular dimensions are weighted higher, household resources are directed towards reducing
poverty in that dimension, and poverty is therefore reduced. (2) Poverty shapes prefer-
ences, households weight lower those dimensions in which they are deprived. Here, these two
observations cannot be further investigated, but highlight a potentially interesting area of
investigation.
Figure 2.15: Distribution of Uncensored Intensity for MPI, Extended MPI and Preference
MPI
Analysing specific indicators reveal the dimensions in which are deprived in. Censored
Headcounts, show the proportion of the sample who are classed as MPI Poor and deprived in
that particular indicator. Firstly, considering the MPI, the censored headcount in education
is low (1.01%), health the next lowest (3.36%), followed by living standards (3.69%). Years
of schooling is particularly low (0%), as every member of the survey had had at least 5 years
of schooling themselves, so are not deprived in that measure. Child mortality (5.37%) is
somewhat higher than nutrition (1.34%), but this is perhaps affected by the individual level
nature of the measure. Households are typically not deprived in assets (0.67%), but indicators
such as cooking fuel (6.04%), electricity (4.70%) and flooring (4.70%) score relatively high.
The Extended MPI shows the censored headcounts in each dimension are: education:
2.01%, health: 2.52%, living standards: 3.44% and urban: 2.28%. Adult education is high
5.37%, school attendance is 2.01%, the schooling gap is 0.67% and years of schooling remains
at zero. Food shortage (1.34%), nutrition (1.34%) and healthcare (2.01%) are similar to
one another, with child mortality (5.37%) remaining high. The external wall (4.03%) appears
similar to the other house related indicators, but roofing deprivations (1.34%) occur less often.
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Figure 2.16: Percentage of the Population who are MPI Poor and Deprived in each Indicator
The greatest contributor to the urban dimension is rubbish (5.37%), with unemployment
(2.68%) followed by overcrowding (2.01%), then bank account (1.34%). Underemployed has a
zero incident rate. To reduce multidimensional poverty, the main considerations are, therefore,
the levels of child mortality, cooking fuel, housing materials and drinking water. Alongside
these, rubbish collection and unemployment appear the worst within the additional urban
dimension.
B.4.3 Comparison of Poverty Indices
The five poverty indices (MPI, EMPI, PMPI, WI and IWI) are different in their construction,
but can be compared to identify how correlated they are. Table 2.12 shows a pairwise correla-
tion matrix between each of the indices. Each pairwise relationship is statistically significant
at the 0.01% level. The strongest relationships are between the similar indices, MPI, EMPI
and PMPI; and IWI and WI, which is to be expected. Strong relationships do also emerge
between the wealth and multidimensional poverty indices.
Table 2.12: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Wealth Indices
MPI EMPI PMPI IWI WI
MPI 1.0000
EMPI 0.7255*** 1.0000
PMPI 0.9275*** 0.6523*** 1.0000
IWI -0.5741*** -0.6628*** -0.4713*** 1.0000
WI -0.6341*** -0.6812*** -0.5344*** 0.8750*** 1.0000
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B.4.4 Comparison to National and Urban Samples in Uganda
In order to compare our sample with the wider population in Uganda, data from the Uganda
National Panel Survey is used (UBOS, 2016). Both a national and urban sample was analysed
with a sample size of 3,200 households for the former, and 830 households for the latter.
Both the standard MPI and the IWI were calculated, to provide a meaningful comparison
with our sample. Figure 2.17 shows the distribution of MPI intensity and IWI levels for the
national and urban samples, alongside our experiment sample. The comparison shows that the
experimental sample has lower intensity of multidimensional poverty and higher asset wealth
levels, than both the national and urban sample. To summarise, the mean MPI intensity is
0.375, 0.257 and 0.136, while the mean IWI levels are 25.66, 41.16 and 73.07, for the national,
urban and experiment samples respectively.
Figure 2.17: Wealth and MPI comparisons to National and Urban Sample
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B.5 Script
B.5.1 General
Welcome. Thank you for taking the time to come today. My name is . . . . . . and I am working
with researchers from the EXEC laboratory at the University of York. This University is found
in the UK. We have invited you here, today, because we want to learn about how people in
this area make decisions. We are conducting both this study and a survey, and you will be
required to take part in both. This section is the study where you are going to be asked to
make decisions that will earn you some money. The money that results from your decisions
will be yours to keep.
What you need to do will be explained fully in a few minutes. But first, there are three
things I would like to explain to you clearly and you should consider them as very important.
First of all, this is not our money. As I told you before, we work for a university and this
money has been given to us by that university for this research. Participation is voluntary.
You may still choose not to participate in the study. We also have to make clear that this is
research about your decisions. Therefore I will not allow you to talk with anyone else during
the study. This is very important. I’m afraid that if I find you talking with someone else
during the study I will kindly ask you to go back home and what this means is that you will
not earn any money. If you have any questions, please ask any of us.
Do you have a mobile phone? [If yes] Can I please ask you to switch it off? Make sure
that you listen carefully. You could earn a good amount of money today, and it is important
that you follow my instructions. There are no right or wrong decisions here, we are interested
in exactly what decisions you want to make. But think seriously about your decisions as it
will possibly affect how much money you will take home. In this study you will be making
decisions about the distribution of money between yourself and other participants in this
room. How this is done will be explained to you shortly. You will get an attendance fee of
shs5000 in addition to the money you will earn from the study as a result of the decisions
that are made.
In order to make your decisions you will be using tablets that we shall provide. This is
what they look like [Show Tablet]. The decisions you make will be made by interacting with
the screen. These tablets are touch screen similar to the smart phones that some of you use.
They are easy to use. Do not get worried if you are not familiar with using them because
before making your decisions we shall guide on how to use them.
In this study we shall have two parts. Part 1 and Part 2. In Part 1 there will be 27
rounds and in Part 2, there will also be 27 rounds. So in total, there will be 54 rounds. In
order to determine your final payment. Out of the 54 rounds, one shall randomly be chosen
by asking one of you to pick a number of out this bag [Show the Round Selection Bag].
This bag has 54 tokens which represent the 54 rounds. One token will be selected like this
[Pick One Token] and this will be the round that will determine the final payment that
all participants receive. This means that every round has an equal chance of determining
your final payment, so consider each decision you make carefully. Everyone will finish at the
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same time, as you need to wait for every participant to finish before the payments can be
determined. The decisions that you make will involve distributing money amongst a group of
three participants; yourself and two others in the room. In each round you will be randomly
linked to the two other people.
Now listen carefully, I will explain how the distribution of the money works. Do not worry,
it is easy to understand, but it is important that you remember it. The money you have to
Allocate amongst the group will come from a Budget. You must decide how to Allocate all
of the money from the Budget. The Allocations that you make will then be divided by a
Divider to give the Payoff that a player will get in a particular round. This will be done by
dividing the Allocation you make by the number referred to as the Divider. The Payoff can
be thought of as the final amount of money that everyone gets in that round.
The decisions you make in each round will determine the Payoffs for yourself and the other
two people in your group would receive. Each of you will make your decisions independently of
one another, but only the decision of one person will be selected, randomly, to determine the
final Payoffs for all the people in the group. You will not know whose decision has been chosen
and will receive your Payoff, individually, at the end. This means that every decision you make
is entirely anonymous. Importantly, there are no right or wrong answers, the decisions you
make are entirely up to you.
To make your decisions you will be using the tablets, the screen you will see will look like
this [Show Tablet Poster]. You will always be Player 1, the player on the left [Point to
Player 1]. Player 2, in the middle [Point to Player 2] and Player 3 on the right [Point to
Player 3] will be the other two participants who you are linked to.
You will be given a budget to allocate among the three of you. This is shown on the
left [Point to Budget Remaining], and in this example is shs60,000. You must spend the
entire budget in each of the rounds. This means the Remaining Budget must be zero. You
will be able to make the allocations in three ways. The first is with the sliders [Point to the
Sliders]; you can drag the sliders to any allocation that you want, for each of the players
[Pretend to Drag the Sliders]. The second is with the arrow keys [Point and Pretend
to Press the Arrow Keys]. They allow you to make small increases and decreases in your
allocations to each player. The third is the written input [Point to Written Input]; you
can click in each of the boxes, type your desired allocations to each player with the keyboard
and click update [Point to each Box and then to Update].
Within each of the rounds there will be different dividers for each player [Point to the
Dividers at the Top]. The actual payoff that each player will get will be the allocation
you give, divided by the divider [Point to the Payoff at the Top]. These dividers are
important as they change every round. It is the payoff which will be given to each participant
so it is important to consider the distribution of payoffs. The payoffs will be always be in
shillings and will be shown by the height of the orange bars, the orange numbers beside them
and by the numbers at the top of the screen, which you will see later in the tutorial.
You will also see the Sum of Payoffs [Point to the Sum of Payoffs] and the Gap Between
Payoffs [Point to the Gap Between Payoffs]. The Sum of Payoffs is the Payoffs of Player
128
B. Appendices
1, 2 and 3 added together. The Gap Between Payoffs is the highest Payoff minus the lowest
Payoff. Notice how these change when making your decisions. You must make a decision in
every round, and then click Next or Finish to confirm your decision [Point to Next/Finish].
B.5.2 Part 1
In Part 1, the budget you have to allocate will change. The others, Player 2 and Player 3, will
always be random and anonymous participants in the room. As earlier mentioned, there will
be 27 rounds. After Part 1, you will have a short break, before we explain Part 2. Now we
shall guide you on how to use the tablets, and how to participate in the study. One of us will
be there with you to guide you. The first tutorial you will see is not the whole picture, it will
just explain to you how to use the tablets. The second tutorial will show you the interface
which is on the poster here [Point to Poster], and explain in more detail. If you have any
questions now, or throughout the study, please raise your hand and we will help as best we
can. There will be at least two of us in the room at all times.
B.5.3 Part 2
[Do Not Read Part 2 Until After the Break]. In this part, we shall start by asking you
a question on how connected you are to each of the other people in this room in real life. By
this we mean how close you are to the other people in everyday life. You will be shown seven
diagrams which look like this [Show Oneness Poster]. You will find these diagrams on the
tablets that you used in Part 1. In each diagram there are two circles, the one on the left
denotes yourself [Point to One Circle on the Left] and the one on the right show another
person in the room [Point to One Circle on the Right]. Each diagram represents the
degree of closeness between you. If we start at diagram A [Point to A] where the circles are
very far apart, we see a very distant connection. As we move to G [Move from A through
G] we see the circles moving closer, representing closer connections, with G as the closest
connection.
You will be asked to select the diagram which best represents your connectedness with
each person in the room. You will know who the ’other’ person is as it will be denoted by
their desk number. You will have a sheet of paper on your desk which shows the layout of the
desks by number. There is also a number on your desk and each of the other participant’s
desks which you can see if you look around the room. You should look around to see exactly
who is sat at each desk, when making your decisions. In order to select the diagram click on
it, it will be highlighted, then you can click on Next in the bottom right corner to move to
the next question, about another person.
When you have finished these questions for all 5 other people in the room you will move
onto Part 2. Part 2 is similar to Part 1, but in this case you will know the players in the
group by their desk number. The layout and interaction with the tablet will be the same as
before [Point to Tablet Poster]. However, you will now get to know who Player 2 and
Player 3 are [Point to Player 2 and Player 3] by their Desk Number. Remember to look
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at exactly who are sat at the desks you are distributing between. As before the decisions and
payoffs will remain anonymous and so the other players will not know the decisions you make
and you will not know the decisions of others.
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B.6 Tutorial Script
B.6.1 Tutorial 1 – One Player
[Enumerators are here to Guide Them One-on-One, Let Them Read the Instruc-
tions Themselves, but Carry Out the Instructions in this Script]
Screen 0 - Welcome to the Tutorial. During this tutorial your decisions do not affect your
payoffs. They are only to help you learn the experiment. You can click Next and Back in the
bottom right corner to move between Tutorials [Click on Next, then Click Back]. Follow
the instructions to work through the tutorial. Now click Next.
Screen 1 - This is the Allocation Slider. It allows you to distribute the Budget amongst
each player. Click the Slider and Drag it upwards. Notice the higher you drag the slider the
higher the allocation is, and the lower the Remaining Budget. [Drag the Slider to Several
Points, Each Time Show How the Allocation Increases and the Remaining Budget
Decreases, Then Let Them Try]. When you have done so, click Next.
Screen 2 - Now you have some more information move the Slider again. Notice the Orange
Bar, and orange number, these represent the Payoffs. [Drag the Slider, Pointing Out the
Allocation and the Payoffs, both the Numbers and the Heights, Let them Drag
the Slider]. The Payoff is the Allocation divided by the Divider. The Divider is shown at
the top, and is 1 in this round. [Point to the Divider]. That means that the Allocation
and Payoffs are the same. [Highlight this with an Example]. When you are finished click
Next.
Screen 3 - In each round the Divider will change for each Player. Now the Divider has
been increased to 2. [Point to the Divider]. Move the Slider and notice the difference
to the Payoff. [Drag the Slider to Several Points, Show Them the Link Between
Allocation and Payoff, Emphasize the Payoff is Important, Let Them Drag the
Slider]. It is now always the Allocation divided by 2. When you are finished click Next.
Screen 4 - Alongside the Slider you can also click the Arrow Keys to change the Allocation
by small amounts. The Dark Grey arrows change the allocation by 10. The Light Grey arrows
change the allocation by 1. Click each of the arrows to see how they change the Allocations.
[Show Them How to Click Up and Down On Both Arrows, Showing How the
Allocation/Payoff is Changing]. Once you have done this, click Next.
Screen 5 - The final way of changing the Allocations is through the Written Input. Click the
light blue box, then type an Allocation using the keyboard. Once you have done this, click
Update. [Show Them How to Use the Written Input, Showing How the Alloca-
tion/Payoff is Changing]. After trying the Written Input, click Next.
Screen 6 - Now try and change the Allocations with all three methods. When you finish
Allocate all of the remaining Budget and click Finish to end this part of the Tutorial.
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B.6.2 Questions
[Enumerators are here to Ensure they Answer Every Question Correctly the
First Time they answer, so long as they understand the question. If They Do
Not Answer Correctly, Explain Until They Understand, If They are Struggling
Go Back to Tutorial]
Q1. Point to the numbers representing the Allocation, Divider and Payoff, on this screen.
Then to which of the Slider and Orange Bar represents the Allocation and Payoff.
Q2. What are the three methods of Allocating the Budget?
Q3. If an Allocation is $20,000 and the Divider is 1, as on the screen, what is the Payoff?
Q4. If an Allocation is $20,000 and the Divider is 2, as on the screen, what is the Payoff?
Q5. If the Remaining Budget is $5000 can you proceed to the next Round? Explain why.
Q6. If, in one round, the Allocation is $45,000, the Divider is 3 and the Payoff is $15000, to
yourself, what is the Final Amount of Money you will get from that round?
B.6.3 Tutorial 2 – Three Players
[Enumerators are now here to Answer any Questions One-on-One, Let Them Read
the Instructions Themselves, and Make any Allocations Themselves].
Screen 1 - Three Person Tutorial. Throughout the experiment you will be allocating
between three players, one of which is yourself. You will always be Player 1. While Player 2
and Player 3 will be random anonymous other people in the room. You must allocate all of
the budget between the three players. Use the sliders, arrows and written input, as before.
This Tutorial round is still a practice round and is not for real. Click Next to proceed. [Do
Not Do Any of the Allocations for Them, Let Them Do it, But be There to
Help if They Need].
Screen 2 - Three Person Tutorial. Now try when the Dividers are different. Notice to the
Sum of Payoffs and Gap Between Payoffs, to the right hand side. The Gap Between Payoffs
if the difference between the highest payoff and the lowest payoff. [Point to Sum of
Payoffs and Gap Between Payoffs; Do Not Do Any of the Allocations for Them,
Let Them Do it, But be There to Help if They Need].
Screen 3 - Three Person Tutorial. You have finished the tutorial. Now every decision you
make will be for real. So take care each round, as it is equally likely to be the actual payoff
for yourself and the others in the group. [Leave Them to Do the Experiment].
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B.7 Sensitivity of Treatment Selection
Within the main analysis one particular assumption is made concerning how participants view
oneness when others are anonymous. Anonymity here, means that the ‘dictator’ knows that
Player 2 and 3 are others in the experimental session, but does not know their identity. It is
assumed that distributional decisions may be affected by how closely connected the ‘dictator’
is to the others in the group, as a whole; meaning that ‘dictators’ may be more generous when
they are (randomly placed) in a group with whom they feel close. To account for this, the
oneness levels, which enter into the utility function in the budget treatment, are assumed to
be the expected value of the elicited oneness levels for the group.
The main analysis incorporates this assumption, so that oneness can be incorporated in
decision problems where the ‘recipients’ are anonymous; as is most common in the literature.
It could prove to be an interesting area of investigation, for giving in other dictator games.13
Yet, objections could be made to this assumption. To circumvent this assumption, preference
parameters can be estimated using data only from the oneness treatment, where the identity
of the other players is known. Below sensitivity analysis shows the comparison of estimated
preferences from the both treatments (54 rounds) and the oneness treatment (27 rounds).
Figure 2.18: Sensitivity of Treatment Selection: r, α, φ and ψ
Figure 2.18 shows the distribution r, α, φ and ψ; estimated using data from both and one-
ness treatments. The comparisons imply that, on average, estimates of inequality aversion
and self-interest are higher; when using only the oneness treatment data. Oneness magni-
tude parameters, φ and ψ appear very similar, but less extreme values of ψ are estimated
using oneness treatment data. Kolmogorov-Smirnov corrected test-statistics (non-parametric
tests used to identify differences in two arbitrary distributions) show that α distributions are
13For example, as the number of participants within a given experimental session increase, and are selected
from a more disperse sample, it is likely that average oneness will decrease. This predicted decrease could be
an interesting source of variation in behaviour, and using this model could address that variation.
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significantly different (p = 0.081), while r (p = 0.144), φ (p = 0.190) and ψ (p = 0.960)
distributions are not significantly different. When accounting for the matched nature of the
data, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test examines the null hypothesis both distributions are the
same. Results show the null cannot be rejected (at 10%) for either α, φ or ψ; for r the null
can be rejected at 10%, but not at 5%.
Figure 2.19 shows the distribution of the s and the mean Euclidean goodness-of-fit; es-
timated using data from both and oneness treatments.14 Precision, s, estimates are higher
and mean Euclidean GOF measures appear lower, when estimated using oneness treatment
data. However, Kolmogorov-Smirnov corrected test statistics and Wilcoxon signed-rank test
statistics reveal that only the distribution of s is significantly different (p < 0.000).
Figure 2.19: Sensitivity of Treatment Selection: s and GOF
The sensitivity analysis results are reassuring. The preference parameters estimated from
the oneness treatment alone are similar to those estimated from both treatments. When
considering that the data are matched pairs, neither α, φ nor ψ distributions are significantly
different. Only the unmatched distribution of α and matched r, are significantly different,
and this only at the 10% level. Higher precision parameters are estimated for the oneness
treatment, but the mean Euclidean GOF measures are not significantly different. These results
imply that the estimation of preference parameters is relatively insensitive to inclusion of
treatments where ‘recipients’ are known and anonymous. Precision parameters are somewhat
higher, but the ability of the model to fit behaviour is similar in both treatments.
14The mean Euclidean GOF = 1
T
∑T
t=1
(∑N
i=1(xit − x∗it)2
)1/2
, where: T is the number of rounds in a
treatment. It is a measure of goodness-of-fit which incorporates differences in optimal (x∗it) and actual (xit)
allocations for Player 1, 2 and 3. The value is less intuitive, than that used in Section 4.3.3, but for the purposes
of comparison encompasses more dimensions.
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B.8 Parameter Regression Results
To ascertain if any individual characteristics, or experimental variables, are the root of pref-
erences the following ordinary least-squares (OLS) and ordered probit (OP) regressions, in
Table 2.13, were ran. The five models keep the independent variables constant, but alter
the dependant variable; α, r, EDE, φ and ψ, respectively. From the first model those who
are: students, female, older and participate in more relgious activities are less self-interested,
while those who have a higher level of education and answered more questions in the tutorial
correctly are more self-interested. Within Model (2) those who are female are less inequality
averse, as are those who are older or have a higher intensity of household education poverty.
Those who have larger household sizes, are Christian, belong to the Bagisu tribe or answered
more questions correctly are more averse to inequality. Model (3) provides the EDE, which
combines the preferences of α and r. Here those with a higher level of education have signif-
icantly higher levels of EDE, while those who participate in more religious activities have a
lower EDE. Common to bith φ and ψ are that those with a larger household size have higher
values, while those with a higher intensity of household education poverty have lower values.
Students have a significantly lower φ parameter, in comparison to the general population. All
other variables are insignificant, at the 10% level.
The models used above, while based upon the prior that preferences could be determined
by demographic characteristics, are not necessarily optimal models. Using alternate sets of
regressors could lead to differing coefficients and levels of significance. There are, however,
analytical models which seek the ‘optimal’ set of regressors to include within the model. Below
two alternate methods of achieving this are proposed, and their results shown.
The first method is the LASSO, a concept introduced by Tibshirani (1996), which ”min-
imises the sum of squares subject to the sum of the absolute value of the coefficients being
less than a constant” (Tibshirani, 1996). This constant works as a tuning parameter, which
‘shrinks’ the coefficients towards zero, making some parameters exactly zero. As the tuning
parameter is relaxed the coefficients, of the regressors which are most correlated with the de-
pendant, are allowed to increase. When the tuning parameter is sufficiently large the variable
coefficients converge to the full OLS estimates. Choosing a tuning parameter is equivalent
to choosing a subset of the ‘best’ regressors. A post-LASSO regression is then ran with that
subset of regressors.
By running LASSO, through using adapted STATA code from Christian Hansen (Belloni,
Chernozhukov, and Hansen, 2014), for a set of tuning parameters we can observe at which level
each regressor will become zero. In doing this, a ranking of the most correlated regressors can
be established. Table 2.14 shows the ranking of each of the 13 regressors, used in Table 2.13, for
each of the four dependant variables. The four ‘best’ regressors are: religious participation,
age, gender and correct questions, for α; age, correct questions, tribe and gender, for r;
religious participation, education level, tribe and being a student, for EDE; being a student,
EMPI education, EMPI health and household size, for φ; and EMPI education, EMPI health,
gender and household size, for ψ. The resulting regressions for these ‘best’ four regressors are
shown in Table 2.15.
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Table 2.13: Parameter Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
α r EDE φ ψ
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(Std. err.) (Std. err.) (Std. err.) (Std. err.) (Std. err.)
Student Dummy -0.112∗ -0.237 -1.060 -0.561∗ -0.183
(0.060) (0.255) (0.658) (0.295) (0.244)
Gender -0.064∗ -0.362∗∗ -0.005 -0.134 -0.227
(0.037) (0.183) (0.400) (0.186) (0.189)
Age -0.009∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.010 0.005
(0.004) (0.014) (0.038) (0.017) (0.017)
Education Level 0.036∗ -0.006 0.466∗∗ -0.013 -0.046
(0.022) (0.115) (0.227) (0.116) (0.119)
Household Size 0.014 0.090∗ 0.082 0.088∗ 0.090∗
(0.011) (0.047) (0.113) (0.046) (0.048)
Religion Dummy 0.067 0.559∗ 0.154 -0.055 -0.029
(0.054) (0.303) (0.577) (0.328) (0.377)
Religious Particpation -0.004∗ 0.015 -0.057∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.007
(0.002) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012)
Tribe Dummy 0.011 0.441∗∗ -0.705 0.037 0.080
(0.041) (0.177) (0.429) (0.198) (0.193)
Correct Questions 0.079∗ 0.445∗∗ -0.038 -0.040 0.112
(0.042) (0.203) (0.478) (0.201) (0.218)
Wealth Index -0.002 -0.720 -0.482 -0.493 -0.244
(0.133) (0.653) (1.774) (0.587) (0.610)
EMPI Education -0.029 -1.219∗ 0.649 -1.081∗ -1.318∗∗
(0.126) (0.659) (1.306) (0.563) (0.668)
EMPI Health 0.088 -0.015 -0.954 -0.624 -0.995
(0.107) (0.607) (1.277) (0.543) (0.698)
EMPI Urban -0.055 -0.677 0.014 0.174 0.148
(0.122) (0.637) (1.227) (0.559) (0.613)
Constant 0.801∗∗∗ 3.651∗
(0.161) (1.904)
N 147 147 147 147 147
R-squared 0.1378 0.0936
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0406 0.0189 0.0216
Model OLS OP OLS OP OP
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.14: LASSO Rankings of Regressors
Regressors α r EDE φ ψ
Student Dummy 8 12 4 1 5
Gender 3 4 13 =5 =3
Age 2 =1 8 9 7
Education Level 7 11 2 13 12
Household Size 9 8 6 =3 =3
Christian Dummy 5 5 9 12 13
Religious Participation 1 6 1 =7 8
Tribe Dummy 12 3 3 11 6
Correct Questions 4 =1 12 =7 10
Wealth Index 10 9 =10 10 11
EMPI Education 13 7 5 2 1
EMPI Health 6 13 7 =3 2
EMPI Urban 11 10 =10 5= 9
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Table 2.15: LASSO Parameter Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
α r EDE φ ψ
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(Std. err.) (Std. err.) (Std. err.) (Std. err.) (Std. err.)
Student Dummy -0.6924 -0.4166∗∗
(0.431) (0.207)
Gender -0.0597∗ -0.3181∗ -0.2261
(0.036) (0.173) (0.184)
Age -0.0054∗∗ -0.0355∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.011)
Education Level 0.3338
(0.206)
Household Size 0.0791∗ 0.0739∗
(0.041) (0.040)
Religious Particpation -0.0042∗∗ -0.0559∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.017)
Tribe Dummy 0.4320∗∗ -0.6108
(0.169) (0.408)
Correct Questions 0.0660 0.4047∗∗
(0.041) (0.191)
EMPI Education -0.9183∗ -1.2403∗∗
(0.524) (0.629)
EMPI Health -0.6336 -0.9521
(0.535) (0.656)
Constant 0.9085∗∗∗ 3.3187∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.691)
N 147 147 149 149 149
R-squared 0.0839 0.0704
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0230 0.0157 0.0169
Model OLS OP OLS OP OP
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The second method is based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1998).
AIC is a criterion rewards models for goodness-of-fit, but penalises them for a greater number
of regressors. By running regressions every possible combination of regressors (2N ), and
finding that combination of regressors which minimises the AIC, the ‘best quality’ model (in
relation to the others) can be found.15 The ‘best’ models, for each of the dependant variables
are shown below.
By comparing the three methods (Full, LASSO and AIC) we can check for robustness
and allow a trade-off between fit, and therein bias, and predictability, or variance. The Full
model, is that with the highest R2 statistics, for each model, this greater fit does, however,
come at a price. Standard error is, here, greater than in the other two models; prediction is
less accurate. This trade-off between fit and predictability is a sliding scale, each criterion is
different and none are the absolute ‘best’.
As a result we rely upon the robustness of the results. If we focus upon those results which
are significant (to the 10% level) we find that, for α: gender, age and religious participation
are chosen throughout the three models. Each model shows that those who are female, older
and participate in more religious activities are less self-interested. When considering r gender,
15Thanks goes to Andre´ Casalis, with whom this was discussed over a pint and a curry.
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Table 2.16: AIC Parameter Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
α r EDE φ ψ
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(Std. err.) (Std. err.) (Std. err.) (Std. err.) (Std. err.)
Student Dummy -0.0971∗ -0.7971 -0.5052∗∗
(0.050) (0.497) (0.208)
Gender -0.0644∗ -0.3747∗∗
(0.035) (0.177)
Age -0.0095∗∗∗ -0.0451∗∗∗ -0.0186 -0.0056 0.0101
(0.003) (0.013) (0.032) (0.016) (0.015)
Education Level 0.0367∗ 0.4260∗
(0.021) (0.219)
Household Size 0.0134 0.0609 0.0764∗ 0.0655
(0.009) (0.045) (0.041) (0.040)
Religion Dummy 0.5381∗
(0.298)
Religious Particpation -0.0047∗∗ 0.0152 -0.0551∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.010) (0.017)
Tribe Dummy 0.4832∗∗∗ -0.6526
(0.170) (0.409)
Correct Questions 0.0772∗ 0.3905∗
(0.041) (0.201)
EMPI Education -1.0261 -0.9811∗ -1.1891∗
(0.635) (0.521) (0.625)
EMPI Health -1.0043
(0.719)
Constant 0.8606∗∗∗ 3.5066∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.966)
N 147 147 147 147 147
R-squared 0.1238 0.0789
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0373 0.0145 0.0163
Model OLS OP OLS OP OP
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
age, tribe and correct questions appear in each model. Those who are female and those who
are older have less aversion to inequality, while those who are in the Bagisu tribe and answer
more questions correctly are more averse. For EDE only religious participation is significant
throughout, showing a higher level of religious participation leads to lower EDEs, which are
less self-interested and more inequality averse. Indeed, this result explains that shown in Table
2.2, where it is only religious participation which significantly effects giving behaviour. For
φ, those who are students or have a higher intensity of EMPI education have lower self-other
oneness elasticities, while for those who have larger household sizes it is higher. It is only a
higher intensity of EMPI education which leads to a significantly lower ψ throughout all three
models.
From the results shown here a mixed picture emerges, if we were to try to explain the
preferences of this sample we would perhaps not be doing such a good job. It appears that
within these regressors: gender and age explain some variation in α and r, but as the direction
is the same, do not explain EDE. It is only religious participation which significantly effects
EDE throughout all models. For oneness elasticities, φ and ψ, similar regressors seems to
explain variation in either, but it is only EMPI education which is significant throughout. Of
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interest is to note that a lot of characteristics, particularly being wealthy in assets, do not
explain differences in preferences. If not these long lists of demographic characteristics, then
what (if any) are the factors which formulate our preferences, and value judgements, relating
to distributional concerns?
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B.9 Heuristic Model
B.9.1 Theoretical Model
Alongside the utility function proposed, an alternative Heuristic function will be proposed.
The structure of the model was formulated after the experiment, due to behaviour observed.
It aims not only to estimate parameters which explain the decisions, but also to explain the
thought process behind the decisions. From observations in the one-to-one tutorial it became
clear that some participants considered their allocations to each player in turn; P1 then P2 and
then P3 (indeed, due to this the difference between screen position was tested in Chapter 3).
Furthermore, dependent on their mathematical ability participants seemed to heavily round
their allocations. For example, for a budget of shs45, 000, shs20, 000 was given to P1, then
out of the remaining shs25, 000, shs15, 000 was given to P2, then the remaining shs10, 000
to P3. Due to observations such as these, the following heuristic model will be proposed try
to accommodate these decisions.
We assume that participants have some ideal proportion of payoffs amongst the three
players, represented by:
y˜1 =
m∗
p
, y˜2 =
m∗ − y˜1
q
, y˜3 = m
∗ − y˜1 − y˜2 (2.7)
Or alternatively, as y˜1 = x˜ipii,∀i:
x˜1 =
m∗
ppi1
, x˜2 =
m∗ − x˜1pi1
qpi2
, x˜3 =
m∗ − x˜1pi1 − x˜2pi2
pi3
(2.8)
Where y˜i, x˜i and pii show the respective payoffs, allocations and multipliers for Player i.
Individual preferences are denoted by p, p ≥ 1, and q, q ≥ 1. The proportion of the total
payoffs, that participants want to distribute to themselves, is represented by 1p . While
1
q
represents the proportion of the remaining payoffs, after y˜1 has been chosen, to give to Player
2, rather than Player 3. The budget is m, with the constraint of: m = x˜1 + x˜2 + x˜3. It can
be shown, due to the above optimal y˜i
′s and the budget constraint, that the sum of payoffs,
m∗, is :
m∗ =
m
1
ppi1
+ 1qpi2
(
1− 1p
)
+ 1pi3
(
1− 1p − 1q + 1pq
) (2.9)
Now, we assume that when participants calculate their optimal allocations they make
some rounding error, which is denoted by δ, 1 ≤ δ ≤ m. Moreover, the decisions they make
are not simultaneous but consecutive. The three decision steps are shown below:
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Step (1): Participants decide upon a proportion, p, of the budget, m, which they wish to
allocate to themselves, Player 1. Then depending on their mathematical ability, round that
allocation/payoff to a particular degree, δ.16 This is then xˆ1.
xˆ1 = round (x˜1, δ) (2.10)
Step (2): Once xˆ1 has been chosen, consider the remaining budget, m − xˆ1, and decide
upon another proportion, q, to which determines their next allocation, xˆ2. Again rounding to
a certain level of precision, δ.
xˆ2 = round (x˜2, δ) (2.11)
Step (3): The remainder is given to Player 3, xˆ3.
xˆ3 = m− xˆ1 − xˆ2 (2.12)
In order to estimate the parameters p, q and δ, a goodness-of-fit measure was calculated and
the minimum value was established using a constrained multivariable solver, patternsearch.
The goodness-of-fit measure is as follows:
gof =
k∑
t=1
3∑
i=1
(xit − xˆit)2 (2.13)
Where, we take the sum of the squared difference between xˆit, our estimated allocation to
each player, and xit, the actual allocation the participant made, for each player i. This value
goft is calculated for each round t, then all rounds, 1 : k, are summed to give our goodness-
of-fit statistic. Intuitively, it represents the total squared difference between our estimated
allocation and the actual allocation, over the three players and k rounds.
B.9.2 Heuristic Parameter Results
Within the Heuristic model, three parameters of interest are estimated: the Self Proportion,
1/p; the Other Proportion, 1/q; and the Precision parameter, δ. Figure 2.20 shows the
distribution of each of these parameters. As 1/p → 1, individuals are more self-interested,
distributing a greater proportion of payoffs to themselves. If 1/q = 0.5 then individuals weight
the payoffs given Player 2 and 3 equally, however, if 1/q > 0.5 then P2 is preferred over P3,
while if 1/q < 0.5 the opposite is true. Similar to α the level of 1/p varies with a mode around
1/3, a median of 0.4497 and a mean of 0.5127. There are 9.4% of the sample for whom
1/p > 0.9. For 1/q, the distribution is concentrated around 0.5, with 63.76% of the sample
between 0.45 and 0.55. The median parameter is of 0.5140, which shows a slight preference for
16More specifically, δ is used to create a vector 0 : δ : m∗, where δ denotes the increments between 0 and
m∗, the lower the δ the smaller the increments and the larger the vector. x˜1 is then rounded to the nearest
element of this vector.
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P2, over P3. Those more extreme values for 1/q are, however, predominantly characterised
by those who are more self-interested, as seen in the scatter. Respondents here, are perhaps
choosing payoffs for themselves, then quickly allocating amongst the others (indeed, results
from the time-taken imply those self-interested individuals take far less time).
The Precision parameter, δ, reveals how finely participants rounded their allocations (in
shs). For some individuals, 14.77%, this rounding error was very high, only to the closest
shs10, 000. The median of shs5281 shows that half the population were rounding to just over
shs5000 (roughly equivalent to £1), with only 12.75% rounding to less than shs2500. This
low level of Precision, and differing levels of 1/q may go someway to explaining the differences
between allocation to P2 and P3.
Figure 2.20: Distribution of Individual Level Heuristic Parameter Values: p, q and δ
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B.10 Oneness Origins and Homophily
Further to the distribution of oneness levels, in Section 2.3, a model can be constructed to
identify the origins of the oneness levels. Table 2.17 seeks to explain the elicited oneness
levels through regressors categorised as homophily (similarity between characteristics) and
demographics are proposed as explanatory variables, alongside the reciprocated oneness level.
Three random-effects models are ran: for General Population, Students and Total samples.
Within the Total sample, results show that oneness levels to the other participant are
significantly and positively correlated with the oneness levels from the other participant (re-
ciprocated oneness). We observe that individuals within the same age category or religion are
(significantly) more connected, while those with a higher absolute difference in wealth are less
connected. Belonging to the same gender, education level category, tribe or having a similar
EMPI does not have a significant effect on oneness. For demographic characteristics, signifi-
cantly lower oneness levels are observed for those who spend more time in religious activities,
are more wealthy or work more hours. With the exception of those in the same age category
and with a higher level of wealth, the significance levels and coefficient directions hold (or
are magnified) for the general population. For the student population, however, there are no
explanatory variables significant at the 5% level, with the exception of religious participation.
While this is perhaps partially due to sample size, it highlights the importance of using a
general population to draw out meaningful connections.
Table 2.17: Origins of Oneness
(1) (2) (3)
General Pop. Students Total
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Reciprocated Oneness 0.4812∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.0554 (0.072) 0.3883∗∗∗ (0.049)
Homophily
- Same Gender -0.0324 (0.135) 0.1009 (0.132) -0.0492 (0.103)
- Same Age Cat. 0.2275 (0.154) 0.2295 (0.196) 0.2512∗∗ (0.116)
- Same Education Cat. -0.0519 (0.175) -0.0663 (0.175)
- Same Religion 0.2995∗ (0.155) -0.1927 (0.134) 0.1937∗ (0.114)
- Same Tribe -0.0227 (0.151) 0.1652 (0.196) 0.0447 (0.121)
- Absolute Wealth Diff. -1.2659∗ (0.759) -0.6124 (0.452) -0.7421∗ (0.384)
- Absolute EMPI Diff. 0.7634 (1.126) 0.2842 (0.529) 0.2513 (0.545)
Demographics
- Gender 0.1470 (0.179) -0.1227 (0.296) 0.0354 (0.155)
- Age -0.0055 (0.015) -0.0153 (0.026) -0.0037 (0.013)
- Education Category 0.0451 (0.093) 0.0463 (0.088)
- Religious Participation -0.0180∗∗ (0.007) -0.0180∗∗ (0.009) -0.0193∗∗∗ (0.006)
- Wealth Index -1.0453 (1.097) -0.7674 (0.649) -0.9423∗ (0.568)
- Daily Work Hours -0.0865∗∗∗ (0.031) -0.0513 (0.075) -0.0784∗∗∗ (0.028)
- Student -0.2760 (0.258)
Constant 2.3634∗∗ (0.937) 3.3333∗∗∗ (1.092) 2.5411∗∗∗ (0.649)
N 97 48 145
Observations 448 236 684
R-squared 0.2891 0.0711 0.1950
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
While previous results have shown that demographic characteristics do not explain distri-
butional concerns, by incorporating variables reflecting homophily further explanatory power
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can be gained. Table 2.18 presents results from three random effects models, which regress
the Proportional Payoff to Player j, on a set of regressors which include oneness effects and
homophily. This data, from the oneness treatment, considers the individual allocations to
both P2 and P3 for each of the 27 rounds. A dummy marking those payoffs to P3, shows
there are no significant differences between the payoffs to P2 and P3. Model (1) incorporates
the oneness effects, the first to the player to whom the payoff is being attributed, Player j, the
second the oneness level to the other player, Player k. As before, the higher the oneness level
the higher the payoffs, however the effects for the oneness level to Player 3 are not significant
at the 10% level (p = 0.110). Model (2) incorporates the homophily variables, showing that
those in the same age category receive higher payoffs, while those of the same gender received
less. These results hold for Model (3), however, just less than half of the effect from the same
age category is absorbed by the inclusion of oneness levels. When considering the R2 values
between Model (1) and (2) it is Model (1) which explains most variance, even though it is the
most parsimonious.
Table 2.18: Oneness and Homophily Random Effects Model: PP to Others
(1) (2) (3)
PP to Pj PP to Pj PP to Pj
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Player 3 Dummy -0.0030 (0.0027) -0.0036 (0.0028) -0.0033 (0.0028)
Oneness Levels
- Player j, θj 0.0142
∗∗∗ (0.0019) 0.0138∗∗∗ (0.0018)
- Player k, θk -0.0018 (0.0011) -0.0018 (0.0011)
Homophily
- Same Gender -0.0088∗∗ (0.0043) -0.0087∗∗ (0.0041)
- Same Age Cat. 0.0135∗∗∗ (0.0046) 0.0077∗ (0.0040)
- Same Education Cat. 0.0025 (0.0061) 0.0044 (0.0058)
- Same Religion 0.0006 (0.0047) -0.0025 (0.0041)
- Same Tribe 0.0059 (0.0046) 0.0028 (0.0040)
- Absolute Wealth Diff. -0.0087 (0.0174) 0.0105 (0.0146)
- Absolute MPI Diff. 0.0117 (0.0219) -0.0013 (0.0198)
Constant 0.3849∗∗∗ (0.0701) 0.4327∗∗∗ (0.0707) 0.3993∗∗∗ (0.0711)
N 149 147 147
Observations 7701 7490 7465
R-squared 0.1367 0.1331 0.1425
Controls YES YES YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
144
B. Appendices
B.11 Anonymous Decisions Involving Risk
When considering how individuals think about oneness when the others are anonymous a
natural extension is to consider decisions under risk. In the main analysis the assumption
was that when making decisions within the anonymous setting the oneness levels for P2 and
P3 were both designated as the participants average oneness level for the group. In the
experiment participants knew the five others in the room, so anonymity can be considered as
a gamble between all possible realised positions (i.e. where the others in the room would be
in the position of P2 and P3). Below is a model which incorporates these concerns.
U =
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
(Uk)
−γ
)− 1
γ
(2.14)
Where:
Uk =
(
N∑
i=1
(
ωik(piixi)
−r))− 1r (2.15)
ω1k =
α
α+ 1−αn
∑N
j=2 θ
φ
jk
, ωj 6=1,k =
θψjk∑N
j=2 θ
ψ
jk
(1− ω1k)
Intuitively the above function represents a gamble over all K possible realised Player
positions of each participant in the room. With five others there are 20 possible realised
player positions (i.e. (1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 3), ..., (5, 4) represents two desk numbers in the realised
position of P2 and P3, respectively). In order to estimate preference parameters the oneness
treatment data could be used to estimate r, α, φ and ψ, as the desk numbers are known. Then,
using these estimated parameters, γ is estimated using the data from the budget treatment.
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Chapter 3
Giving to Varying Numbers of
Others
Within a modified N-person dictator game, we test the extent to which giving be-
haviour changes as the number of recipients varies. Using a within-subject design,
in an incentivised laboratory experiment, individual-level preference parameters are
estimated within five alternative utility functions. Both goodness-of-fit and predic-
tive accuracy of each model are analysed, with the ‘best’ model identified for each
individual. The Dirichlet distribution is proposed as a random behavioural model to
rationalise noise; with parameters accounting for differential error arising from the
complexity of decision problems. Results show that, on average, participants are will-
ing to give more total payoffs to others as the number of players increase, but not
maintain average payoffs to others. Extensive heterogeneity is found in individual
preferences, with no model ‘best’ fitting all individuals.
***
Chapter 3. Giving to Varying Numbers of Others
1 Introduction
Often our behaviour has consequences for the happiness or misery of others in society. In
those instances our behaviour is shaped not only by our preferences, but by the number of
others whom we affect. This is particularly the case in the context of prosocial behaviour. In
giving to a particular individual we forego potential payoffs to ourselves and others. As the
number of others increase, so to does the complexity of the decisions we have to make. Not
only must we consider the trade-offs we are willing to make between our self and others, but
also those between-others. Are we willing to let the average amount to others decrease, in
order to maintain the same amount for ourselves, or is there a minimum acceptable level we
must give to all others?
This chapter seeks to model prosocial behaviour as the number of recipients of giving
increases. Individual-level preference parameters are estimated within five alternate CES
utility functions. Preferences accounting for inequality aversion, the trade-off between equality
and efficiency, and self-interest, the weight on the self in relation to others, are central to
each functional form. However, additional preference parameters are incorporated within
extended models, to account for alternative behavioural responses to changes in N . The first
models the distinction between self-other and between-other inequality aversion. The second
incorporations congestion, the trade-off between average and total payoffs to others. The third
accounts for minimum threshold levels of giving, denoting absolute levels of payoffs which are
deemed necessary to distribute to each player.
The relative goodness-of-fit and predictive power of each model is tested, allowing for the
identification of ‘types’ of individuals. This approach allows the flexibility to explain hetero-
geneity in individual behaviour, not only through preference parameters within a particular
model, but between different behavioural assumptions made in alternative models. To account
for noise in decision making, the Dirichlet Distribution is proposed as a random behavioural
model. Building upon work in Chapter 2, additional error parameters are incorporated, which
allow for differential error as the complexity of decision making increases.
To observe prosocial behaviour an incentivised laboratory experiment is run, in the form
of a modified N-person dictator game. The within-subject design of the experiment varies the
number of players, over 45 rounds of decision problems. Within each session two treatments
are run; the multiple slider and single slider treatments. The former allows for complex
between-other distributional decisions to be made, in addition to self-other decisions, for 2, 3
and 4 player groups. The latter simplifies the decision problem, but allows for an increased
variation in the number of players: 2, 3, 4, 6 and 12. The experimental design specifically
allows for the testing of both goodness-of-fit and predictive accuracy of the alternative utility
functions to be compared.
Within the literature surrounding dictator games, the number of players within the ex-
periment is often held constant.1 Some papers have, however, varied the number of players
1Two player dictator games are frequently used to identify prosocial behaviour, for example: Forsythe
et al. (1994), Hoffman et al. (1994) and Andreoni and Miller (2002). Extensions of such dictator games
to incorporate multiple players (for a review see Engelmann and Strobel (2007)) include: Engelmann and
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within the experiment. Charness and Rabin (2002) run a host of “simple” experimental games,
within which are two and three person dictator games. Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007)
investigate modified two and three person dictator games, using budget sets, while Macro
and Weesie (2016) use batteries of pairwise questions for two-player and four-player dictator
games. The increase in the number of recipients allows for the identification of prosocial
behaviour relating to between other trade-offs, alongside the usual self-other trade-offs. Pan-
chanathan, Frankenhuis, and Silk (2013) increase the number of dictators, and find that
dictators transfer less when there are more dictators, while Cason and Mui (1997) run both
team and individual dictator games. Schumacher et al. (2017) motivate well an experiment
where a ‘decider’ chooses the provision of a good between themselves and a ‘receiver’, where
such provision comes at a cost to a group of ‘payers’. They utilize a general form of the An-
dreoni and Miller (2002) utility function, and identify a substantial fraction of subjects which
are “insensitive to group size”, through a between-subject treatment design which varies the
number of ‘payers’.
The effect of changes in group size on behaviour has also been investigated in parallel
literatures. Papers by Isaac and Walker (1988) and Isaac, Walker, and A. W. Williams (1994),
amongst others, identify group size effects in the context of public goods games. N-person
prisoner’s dilemmas are studied by many, including Marwell and Schmitt (1972) and Bonacich
et al. (1976). The experimental oligopolies literature identifies the effects of group size on
cooperation, such as Fouraker and Siegel (1963) and Dolbear et al. (1968). The size of the
group, clearly plays an important role in the decision making process. It is, therefore, an
integral component within models which strive to explain behaviour.
Andreoni (2007) addresses this observation, proposing a CES utility function to explain
prosocial behaviour as the number of recipients of giving increases. A modified N-person
dictator game was run, where participants chose to hold a number of tokens (from a set
budget), passing the remainder to a group of other players. The budget sets, prices of giving
and number of other participants varied through the 24 rounds. Preferences were estimated
within the utility function proposed, which incorporated a congestion parameter, b, signifying
the extent to which the total or average payoffs to others were considered.
While the model proposed in Andreoni (2007) allows for extensive heterogeneity amongst
individuals, alternative models could better explain the behaviour of particular individuals.
Preference parameters can be estimated within alternative functions and the relative goodness-
of-fit of each model tested at an individual level. Hey and Orme (1995) compare the goodness-
of-fit of five alternative models in the context of risk. Hey and Pace (2014) conduct similar
work, focusing upon ambiguity, but highlight the importance of considering both the goodness-
of-fit and predictive power of each model. By comparing alternative models the ‘best’ model
can be identified for each individual; enabling the observation of ‘types’ of individual based
on the differing behavioural assumptions made.
Strobel (2004), E. Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt (2006) and Karni, Salmon, and Sopher (2008). Erkal, Gangadharan,
and Nikiforakis (2011) and Barr et al. (2015) also utilise four-person dictator games, where entitlements are
earned.
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This research seeks to contribute to the above literature, by intertwining important con-
siderations of the papers above. We propose a within-subject design which allows for the
complexities of self-other and between-other trade-offs to be observed as the number of re-
cipients increase. Individual-level preference parameters are estimated within five alternative
models, allowing for both the goodness-of-fit and predictive power of the respective models to
be analysed. In addition, the Dirichlet Distribution is formulated to account for noise in de-
cision making, incorporating parameters which model stochastic responses to the complexity
of decision problems.
2 Experiment
The general form of the experiment is a modified N -person ‘dictator’ game; where individuals
are required to make distributional decisions amongst participants within a group. ‘Dictators’
are given a budget, m, which they must distribute amongst N players; themselves and n
others, the ‘recipients’. Dictators choose allocations, xi, for each player in the group; where
i ∈ [1, ..., N ] and ∑Ni xi = m. These allocations are then divided by the corresponding
divider, 1/pii, to give the payoff, piixi, to each Player i.
2 It is the multipliers (pii) which make
the dictator game ‘modified’, as through them the relative prices of giving to each player can
vary; meaning that equality-efficiency trade-offs need to be made by participants.
There are two within-subject treatments, across 45 rounds of the experiment; the multiple
slider treatment (30 rounds) and single slider treatment (15 rounds). In each round the
participants are randomly assigned to groups, made up of N participants. Between rounds
the dividers, 1/pii, change, ensuring the relative price of giving to each player varies. The
budget, m, also changes, varying the average (per player) and total amounts available to
distribute.
Participants made their decisions on a computerized Z-Tree interface. They were given
extensive paper instructions (found in Appendix C.1), followed by an interactive on-screen
tutorial to enable them to use the interface. A screenshot of the interface, from the multiple
slider treatment, is shown in Figure 3.1. In this example, there are three players, Player 1,
2 and 3, amongst whom the ‘dictator’ must make allocations, so that the remaining budget
reaches zero. Each player has a divider (changing every round), which is used to calculate the
payoff to that player. Allocations can be made by using: the slider, arrow keys and written
input. The slider (the black bar) can be dragged to make allocations, the arrow keys clicked
to make incremental changes (0.01 or 0.1), and the written input used to type exact amounts.
The single slider treatment differs in that there is only one slider, written input and set of
arrow keys; that determines the allocations (and hence payoffs) to the self. The remaining
budget is then split equally between the recipients. Calculations of the payoffs are made
automatically, and are shown by both the orange numbers and by the height of orange bars.
The payoff gap, the highest payoff minus the lowest payoff, and the total payoffs, the sum of
all payoffs, are shown. All allocations, payoffs and budgets are shown in pounds and pence.
2The reason that dividers (1/pii) are used, rather than multipliers (pii) are due to visual constraints on the
Z-Tree interface. Multipliers are, however, used throughout the theory, for notational ease.
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Figure 3.1: Z-Tree Interface
Within each of the seven experimental sessions there were twelve participants. Each par-
ticipant made individual decisions; as if they were the ‘dictator’. One individual’s decisions,
from each group, was randomly selected (at the end of the experiment) to determine the
payoffs of each member of their group. Then, one round was randomly selected to determine
the ‘dictators’, and their distributional decisions determined the payoffs of the participants
in their group. In this way, each distributional decision participants made had an equal
chance of determining their payoff and the recipients payoffs, and hence they were fully incen-
tivised. Players within each group were randomly matched each round. Each decision made
was entirely anonymous and without feedback; participants neither knew the decisions of any
other participants nor the identity of the ‘dictator’ in any round. Removing considerations of
reputation and reciprocity, allowing for the identification of ‘pure’ altruism.
The experiments were run in the EXEC laboratory at the University of York. Randomised
invites were sent out, using hroot (Hamburg Registration and Organisation Online Tool),
amongst a pool of 2,692 users. Seven experimental sessions were run between the 28th of
March and the 6th of April 2017, with twelve participants in each session, to reach a sample
size of 84 participants.3 Each session required twelve participants in order to run. Due to
a lack of participants one session had to be cancelled. A further 30 users were invited, as
reserve participants. Nine users who showed up could not take part in the experiment, so
they (and the six in the cancelled experiment) received show-up fees. The average payoff per
participant was £15.45. Details of the demographic characteristics of the sample can be found
in Appendix C.2.
2.1 Multiple Slider Treatment
Table 3.1 shows how the design parameters change throughout the 30 rounds of the multiple
slider treatment. The number of players, N , changes every ten rounds. The change in the
3One participant had to be dropped from the analysis due to concerns of contamination.
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budget, m, is shown alongside the change in the budget per player, m/N . The dividers, 1/pii,
for each player (1 to 4) are shown, alongside the relative cost (of giving). The relative cost, p,
shows the cost in payoffs to the ‘self’ of increasing the payoffs to each of the ‘others’, where
p = pi1(
∑N
j=2 1/pij). The average relative cost, p/n, shows this cost per ‘recipient’.
Particular variations in the design parameters are ensured, to enable better identification of
preferences parameters, in the models shown in Section 3. Between differing N , both overlap
and variation is ensured in the budget variables, dividers and relative costs. This ensures
that equality-efficiency, self-other and between-other trade-offs need to be made, alongside
considerations of average vs total payoffs to others and minimum levels of payoffs to be given
to recipients. In particular the design allows for some design parameters to remain identical
between problems with differing N , while varying others. The sets (of rounds) [1,20,30], [3,
16, 23], [3, 16, 23] and [2, 22] remain constant in m and p/n. Sets [10, 13], [11, 25] and [2,
15] are constant in m and p. Both m/N and p/n remain constant in [17, 26] and [1, 11, 21],
while m/N and p is constant in [6, 27].
Rounds in each set of N maintained the order shown in Table 3.1, to ensure that the
grouping procedure was feasible and transparent to participants. The order ofN was, however,
randomised between experimental sessions, to enable the testing of order effects on decision
making. Further randomisation was applied to the screen order of the players, allowing for
the effect of screen position (i.e. left, middle, right) and player name (i.e. 2, 3, 4) to be tested.
2.2 Single Slider Treatment
The single slider treatment is a simplified version of the above, which increases the variation in
the number of players, N . There are 15 rounds within the treatment, where N ∈ [2, 3, 4, 6, 12]
and each N has a set of three rounds. Rather than the more complex decision problem, where
the participant must make distributive decisions separately for each player, only one slider
(written output and set of arrow keys) is used to make decisions. This slider denotes the
share between the self and others, where each of the others will get an equal share of the
remainder of the budget, not allocated to the self. As before the budgets and dividers change
each round, however, there are only the divider to the self 1/pi1, and divider for each other,
1/pio, as the dividers are the same for each other player.
Both budget and divider set were randomly generated in each round, for each participant.
Each set of three rounds, for each N , consisted of three sets of dividers [1/pi1, 1/pio]: in the first
[1,1], the second [1, A] and the third [B, 1]. The dividers A and B are uniformly and indepen-
dently drawn from the set [2,3,4]. The budget, m, is similarly uniformly drawn. The set, M¨ ,
from which m is drawn differs between rounds, each M¨ = {m¨− 8N + 2N.i , i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 8}}.
The m¨, within the calculation of the set differs between rounds, for each N . For the first
rounds of each N , where [1/pi1, 1/pio] = [1,1], m¨ = [24, 26, 48, 72, 144], for N = [2, 3, 4, 6, 12],
respectively. In both the second and third rounds of each N , m¨ = [40, 60, 80, 120, 240], for
N = [2, 3, 4, 6, 12], respectively. This random selection of design parameters is used as the
number of rounds is limited by time constraints, but through it the variation allows for ag-
gregate analysis to be undertaken.
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Table 3.1: Experiment Design Parameters
Round
Players,
N
Budget Dividers, 1/pii Relative Cost
m m/N P1 P2 P3 P4 p p/n
1 2 30 15 1 1 . . 1 1
2 2 40 20 1 2 . . 2 2
3 2 40 20 2 1 . . 0.5 0.5
4 2 22 11 1 3 . . 3 3
5 2 22 11 3 1 . . 0.33 0.33
6 2 70 35 1 4 . . 4 4
7 2 70 35 4 1 . . 0.25 0.25
8 2 12 6 1 3 . . 3 3
9 2 12 6 3 1 . . 0.33 0.33
10 2 35 17.5 1 1 . . 1 1
11 3 45 15 1 1 1 . 2 1
12 3 35 11.67 1 2 2 . 4 2
13 3 35 11.67 2 1 1 . 1 0.5
14 3 40 13.33 1 2 3 . 5 2.5
15 3 40 13.33 2 3 1 . 2 1
16 3 40 13.33 3 1 2 . 1 0.5
17 3 105 35 1 2 4 . 6 3
18 3 105 35 2 4 1 . 2.5 1.25
19 3 105 35 4 1 2 . 0.75 0.38
20 3 30 10 1 1 1 2 1
21 4 60 15 1 1 1 1 3 1
22 4 40 10 1 2 2 2 6 2
23 4 40 10 2 1 1 1 1.5 0.5
24 4 45 11.25 1 2 1 2 5 1.67
25 4 45 11.25 2 1 2 1 2 0.67
26 4 140 35 1 2 3 4 9 3
27 4 140 35 2 3 4 1 4.0 1.33
28 4 140 35 3 4 1 2 2.3 0.78
29 4 140 35 4 1 2 3 1.5 0.5
30 4 30 7.5 1 1 1 1 3 1
The two treatments are run as within-subject treatments to allow both goodness-of-fit and
predictive accuracy to be analysed. The data from the multiple slider treatment is used
to estimate preference parameters, allowing for goodness-of-fit measures to be constructed.
The estimated preference parameters are then used to predict behaviour in the single slider
treatment, where variation in N is increased. The combination of fit and prediction is then
analysed for each individual to test between proposed utility models, which are formulated in
the following section.
3 Utility Functions
Utility functions are proposed below to model behaviour in the experiment. All are within
the family of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) models, incorporate preference param-
eters associated with prosociality and account for variation in N . Five alternative models
are proposed. The first is the standard function, derived from Andreoni and Miller (2002),
which incorporates preference parameters for inequality aversion, r, and self-interest, α. The
three subsequent extended utility functions build upon the standard function by incorporating
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addition preference parameters, which account for alternative behaviours. The first of these
is derived from Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007), it distinguishes self-other inequality
aversion, r1, from between-other inequality aversion, r0. The second accounts for congestion,
b, and is a generalised form of the model in Andreoni (2007). The third takes the form of a
Stone-Geary utility function, which originates from Geary (1950) and Stone (1954), account-
ing for a minimum threshold level, τ . In addition to these models, the amalgamated function
incorporates each of the above preference parameters into a general model. The models are
formally presented below, while graphical analysis in Appendix C.3 illustrates the intuition
behind the models.
3.1 Standard
The models assume that decisions are based upon distributing allocations: xi according to
a set of preferences parameters and the multiplication factors: pii, the reciprocals of the
dividers, 1/pii. It is, then, the payoffs, xipii, amongst the ‘self’ (i = 1) and ‘others’ (i 6= 1)
which determine individual utility. Note that the total number of players, N , is distinct from
the number of recipients, n. The standard utility function is as follows:
U1 =
(
N∑
i=1
(
αi(piixi)
−r))− 1r (3.1)
Inequality Aversion is represented by r, where −1 ≤ r ≤ ∞ and r 6= 0. When r = −1
preferences reflect ‘Utilitarianism’, where utility is determined by summing payoffs. As r
increases more weight is placed upon the payoff of the worst-off, indicating ‘Weighted Prior-
itarianism’ (Parfit, 1997), until r = ∞ which represents ‘Maximin’ preferences, where only
increases to the worst-off increase utility (Rawls, 1999). Self-interest is represented by α1,
and αj = (1 − α1)/n, ∀j ≥ 1 denotes the weight for each ‘other’, where ∀i 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 and∑N
i=1 αi = 1. As α1 → 1, preferences reflect egoism, where utility is purely a function of the
payoffs to the self. As α1 decreases αj increases, reflecting an increased regard for others. Note
the α and α1 will be used interchangeably throughout, as α = α1. ‘Cobb-Douglas’ preferences
are represented when r → 0; which implies that optimal distributions reflect the proportions
set by α1. Intuitively, r can be thought of as the trade-off individuals are willing to make
between efficiency and equality, across the entire distribution, while α1 can be thought of as
the extent to which the individual weights themselves, in relation to others.
Given the above utility function and the budget constraint m =
∑n
i=1 xi, where m is the
budget, the following optimal allocations (which maximise utility) can be obtained, ∀i:
x∗i =
m
1 +
N∑
j 6=i
(
pii
pij
(
αjpij
αipii
) 1
1+r
) (3.2)
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3.2 Extended
Building upon the standard model are the three extended models. Each model adds an addi-
tional behavioural assumption, which effects how optimal allocations change as N increases.
3.2.1 Fisman
The first model, derived from Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007) henceforth fisman, adds
assumptions regarding inequality aversion. Two parameters distinguish between self-other
inequality aversion, r1, and between-other inequality aversion, r0. This allows for flexibility
in decision making, as different equality-efficiency trade-offs can be made, depending on who
the trade-off concerns. For example, an individual may prioritise efficiency between the self
and others, but want to ensure equality between others. The model is below:
UF1 =
(
α1(pi1x1)
−r1 + α0
N∑
i=2
(
α′i(piixi)
−r0)r1/r0)− 1r1 (3.3)
Similar to the standard model −1 ≤ r1, r0 ≤ ∞ and r1, r0 6= 0. As r1, r0 → −1 efficiency is
prioritised, while when r1, r0 →∞ equality becomes paramount. Self-interest, α1, is as before,
but now α0 shows the aggregate regard for others (1− α1). Individual between-other weights
are given by α′i, where α
′
i = υi/
∑N
j 6=1 υj , ∀i > 1; denoting the relative weight given to each
other player, the expected case, which is used throughout the analysis, is that υi = 1, ∀i > 1,
meaning α′i = 1/n. When r1 = r0 and α
′
i = 1/n, or N = 2 the fisman and standard models
are equivalent.
Optimal allocations are as follows:
x∗1 =
m
1 +
N∑
j 6=1
pi1pij (α0α′jpijα1pi1 ) 11+r1
( N∑
k=2
(
α′k
(
α′jpij
α′kpik
) r0
1+r0
)) r1−r0r0(1+r1)

(3.4)
x∗j 6=1 =
m
1 +
pij
pi1
(
α1pi1
α0α′jpij
) 1
1+r1
(
N∑
k=2
(
α′k
(
α′jpij
α′kpik
) r0
1+r0
)) r0−r1r0(1+r1)
+
N∑
l 6=1,j
(
pij
pil
(
α′lpil
α′jpij
) 1
1+r0
) (3.5)
3.2.2 Andreoni
Second is the andreoni model, a generalised form the model in Andreoni (2007). Here, a
‘congestion’ parameter, b, is incorporated in the model, where b ∈ [0, 1]. The ‘congestion’
parameter allows for a distinction between considering the average or total payoffs to others.
As an example, if a ‘dictator’ distributes £5, out of £10, to themselves in subsequent decision
problems with N = [2, 3, 4] then the total payoffs to others are [£5, £5, £5] while the average
payoffs are [£5, £2.5, £1.67], respectively. If a ‘dictator’ wanted to maintain the same average
payoffs to others, say £2, they would have to alter the payoff to the self to be [£8, £6, £4],
155
Chapter 3. Giving to Varying Numbers of Others
meaning the total payoffs to others would be increasing, as [£2, £4, £6]. The inclusion of b
allows preference for trade-offs between the self and average (b = 0) or total (b = 1) payoffs to
others to be incorporated, allowing for the above differential behaviour as N increases. The
utility function is as follows:
UA1 =
(
α1(pi1x1)
−r +
N∑
i=2
(
αi(n
bpiixi)
−r
))− 1r
(3.6)
The difference between this and the standard model is the inclusion of nb, which is a
multiplier of the payoffs to others. If b = 0, the models are equivalent, but as b → 1 the
two diverge as N increases. The model is identical to that of Andreoni (2007) when piixi =
pijxj , ∀i, j > 1 & j 6= i, and indeed is as such for the single slider treatment. The optimal
allocations are as follows:
x∗1 =
m
1 +
N∑
j 6=1
(
pi1
pij
n−b
(
αjpij
α1pi1
nb
) 1
1+r
) (3.7)
x∗j 6=1 =
m
1 +
(
pij
pi1
nb
(
α1pi1
αjpij
n−b
) 1
1+r
)
+
N∑
k 6=1,j
(
pij
pik
(
αkpik
αjpij
) 1
1+r
) (3.8)
3.2.3 Stone-Geary
Third is the stone-geary model, with a more general CES form to that derived in Geary (1950).
The function incorporates a minimum threshold level, τ . This is a level below which negative
(or undefined) utility would be obtained; therefore, ensuring τ is distributed to each partici-
pant is paramount. Above τ indifference curves take the form of the standard function, indeed
if τ = 0 the two are equivalent. Below is the model:
USG1 =
(
N∑
i=1
(
αi(piixi − τi)−r
))− 1r
(3.9)
The model is specified with individual τi, but in the analysis we assume τi = τ,∀i, to reduce
the number of estimated parameters. The parameter τ thus signifies a minimum threshold
of payoffs for all N . The inclusion of τ allows for behaviour which differs from that in the
standard model, as the budget, m, and N change. The higher τ is relative to m the more
equally the payoffs will be distributed. Those who have a higher level of self-interest (α1) will
take more for themselves, but only after the minimum threshold has been distributed to all
players. The optimal allocations, ∀i, are as follows:
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x∗i =
m+
N∑
j 6=i
((
τi
pij
(
αjpij
αipii
) 1
1+r
)
− τjpij
)
1 +
N∑
j 6=i
(
pii
pij
(
αjpij
αipii
) 1
1+r
) (3.10)
Due to the form of the model, one particular issue emerges. Given that we assume individ-
uals have a ‘true’ minimum threshold, say τ∗, it is foreseeable that due to budget restrictions,
in a particular decision problem, there is not a sufficient budget in order to meet τ∗. In this
case utility is undefined (if |r| < 1) as τ∗ > xipii, ∀i. A natural assumption to then make is
that if τ∗ is greater than the minimum feasible payoff, say x′ipi
′
i, then τ = x
′
ipi
′
i. The solu-
tion: x′ipi
′
i = m/
∑N
i (1/pii), ensures that xipii = xjpij , ∀i, j.4 In each decision problem then
τ = min(τ∗,m/
∑N
i (1/pii)). It is then the ‘true’ minimum threshold, τ
∗, which is estimated.
An alternative solution, using non-negativity constraints, is in Appendix C.4.
3.3 Amalgamated
While the above separately extend the standard model to include r0, b and τ , it is feasible
that participant’s behaviour can be explained by a combination of those factors. Here the
above utility functions are amalgamated into a general functional form, which is as follows:
U1∗ =
α1(pi1x1 − τ1)−r1 + α0 N∑
j=2
(
α′j
(
nb(pijxj − τj)
)−r0)r1/r0− 1r1 (3.11)
The parameters are as explained above. With particular preference parameters the amal-
gamated model reduce to the previous functional forms. If r1 = r0, b = 0 and τ = 0, the model
is equivalent to the standard model. Differing combinations of these simplifications can draw
out which of these considerations are important. For notation we use i to denote the individ-
uals within the set N , j within the set n and k for those in set n excluding j. Given the above
utility function and the budget constraint m =
∑N
i=1 xi the following optimal allocations can
be obtained:
x∗1 =
m+
N∑
j=2
(
Φj
τ1
pij
− τjpij
)
1 +
N∑
j=2
(
Φj
pi1
pij
) (3.12)
4To relax the assumption of τi = τ,∀i, giving individual τi, if there is only a subset of τi where τj 6=i = 0,
then the set of i is reduced to not include j, in the above solution.
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x∗j 6=1 =
m+ Φ−1j
τj
pi1
+
N∑
k 6=1,j
(
τj
pik
(
α′kpik
α′jpij
) 1
1+r0
)
−
N∑
k 6=j
(
τk
pik
)
1 + Φ−1j
pij
pi1
+
N∑
k 6=1,j
(
pij
pik
(
α′kpik
α′jpij
) 1
1+r0
) (3.13)
Where:
Φj =
1
nb
(
α0nbpijα
′
j
α1pi1
) 1
1+r1
(
N∑
k=2
(
α′k
(
α′jpij
α′kpik
) r0
1+r0
)) r1−r0r0(1+r1)
4 Dirichlet Error Modelling
While the above utility models provide precise optimal allocations, x∗i , for a particular decision
problem and preference set, participants are assumed to make ‘error’ when calculating, or
choosing, these allocations. Instead, we assume they draw their actual allocations, xi, from the
Dirichlet distribution (Dirichlet, 1839); where the expected values, E[Xi], equal the optimal
allocations, x∗i .
The Dirichlet distribution is a multinomial Beta distribution, allowing for N variables,
which here correspond to individual allocations (i.e. x1, x2, ..., xN ), where xi ∈ (0, 1) and∑N
i=1 xi = 1. The below formulates the Dirichlet distribution as a random behavioural model,
the work follows from Chapter 2, here altering the variance assumption to allow for varying
degrees of complexity, κ.5 The following assumptions are made: (1) E[Xi] = x
∗
i , and (2)
V ar(Xi) =
(x∗i (x
∗
0−x∗i ))
sκγ , therefore:
E[Xi] =
ai
a0
= x∗i (3.14)
V ar(Xi) =
(ai(a0 − ai))
(a20(a0 + 1))
=
(x∗i (x
∗
0 − x∗i ))
sκγ
(3.15)
Where:
a0 =
N∑
i=1
ai, x
∗
0 =
N∑
i=1
x∗i
It follows that, ∀i:
x∗i (sκ
γ − 1) = ai (3.16)
The ai’s determine the shape of the Dirichlet probability density function (pdf ) and rep-
resent the weight given to a particular i. Precision is represented by s, and is multiplied by
κγ . The higher the value of sκγ , and therefore the higher α0, the lower the variance will
be. The parameter γ allows for flexibility in the estimation procedure, to identify if variance
5This assumption is relaxed, with two alternative assumptions regarding the variance tested, in Appendix
C.5.
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increases or decreases as the degree of complexity, κ, increases, independently of the optimal
allocations, where γ ∈ [−1, 1]. The degree of complexity, κ, denotes how difficult the decision
problem is, by accounting for how many allocation decisions are needed to be made (minus
that which is the remainder); here for the 2, 3 and 4 player multiple slider rounds κ = 1, 2, 3,
respectively, while κ = 1, within the single slider treatment. When γ = 0, n has no effect on
variance, independently of x∗i , while γ < 0 implies sκ
γ decreases with κ and if γ > 0, sκγ
increases.
To illustrate the above, Figure 3.2 shows the pdf ’s of alternative Dirichlet distributions,
where N = 3, γ = 0 and x3 = 1 − x1 − x2. The left shows an imprecise individual, s = 10,
who aims to allocate equally E[X] = [0.33, 0.33, 0.33], with A = [3, 3, 3]. Second, with A =
[10, 6, 6], an individual allocating slightly more to themselves, E[X] = [0.45, 0.27, 0.27], with
a greater deal of precision, s = 23. Third, with A = [4, 1, 1] more self-interested preferences,
here E[X] = [0.67, 0.17, 0.17], can be represented; with a mode where x1 → 1 (here precision
is low (s = 7) but precision can be increased). The flexibility of the Dirichlet distribution is
a useful property, and the above derivations allow for easily interpretable parameters to be
estimated.
Figure 3.2: Dirichlet Distribution: Probability Density Function
The preference parameters: α, r, s and γ (alongside r0, b and τ in their respective models)
are estimated, for each individual, through maximising the following log-likelihood function.
The preference parameters determine the optimal allocations, x∗it, and consequently the shape
parameters, ait, in each round t ∈ T . The multiple integral of the pdf, determined by ait, is
taken over the n-dimensional ‘rounding’ interval Vt. Vt is determined by the observed decisions,
xit; where the ‘rounding’ interval, around the observed decision, is necessary as decisions are
not strictly continuous (only to the nearest pence). Estimated parameters are those which
maximise the log-likelihood function, hence are the ‘most likely’ fit for the observed data.
T∑
t=1
log
∫ · · · ∫
Vt
(
1
B(a0t)
Nt∏
i=1
x¨ait−1it
)
dx¨1t . . . dx¨nt
 (3.17)
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Where:
B(a0t) =
∏Nt
i=1 Γ(ait)
Γ
(∑Nt
i=1 ait
) , x¨Nt = 1− nt∑
i=1
x¨it,
Vt =
{
(x¨1t, . . . , x¨nt) ∈ Rnt : xit − 0.5
mt
≤ x¨it ≤ xit + 0.5
mt
,∀i ∈ [1, nt]
}
The multiple integral is reduced to n dimensions (hence x¨Nt = 1−
∑nt
i=1 x¨it) as
∑Nt
i=1 xit =
1. This ensures the above condition is met and computational demands are lowered. A penalty
function is also applied if ai < 0.5, ∀i, due to the increase in computational demands when
calculating triple integrals, at the bounds, when ai < 0.5. In the single slider treatment the
number of dimensions of the decision problem is two (hence κ = 1) for all N, and so allocations
to the self (x1) and total allocations to others (xo) are modelled, rather than the allocation
to each other (xj). For sample parameter estimates, the log-likelihood contributions for the
decisions of every individual within that sample are summed.
5 Results
5.1 Proportional Payoffs
The Proportional Payoff to Player i (PP to Pi), represents the share of payoffs given to a
particular player (i). Table 3.2 shows the mean proportional payoffs to each player, given a
particular group size and the type of slider used. In general, we observe a decrease in the PP
to P1 (the self ) as the group size increases. On average, participants are willing to sacrifice
their own payoffs to increase the total given to the others. This increase to others does not,
however, maintain the same average level of giving to each other. Payoffs between multiple
and single sliders are not significantly different (10% level) for any player or group size.
Table 3.2: Average Proportional Payoffs; Players and Sliders
Multiple Slider Single Slider
N Players P1 P2 P3 P4 PS PO
2 0.709 0.291 0.712 0.288
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015)
3 0.624 0.188 0.188 0.626 0.187
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.009)
4 0.586 0.139 0.138 0.137 0.604 0.132
(0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.021) (0.007)
6 0.562 0.088
(0.024) (0.005)
12 0.489 0.046
(0.026) (0.002)
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of PP to P1, given the group size and slider type, at the
per round level (n = 3,611). The top panel shows results from the multiple slider, while the
bottom panel shows those from the single slider. The underlying reasons for the differences
in the averages, shown above, emerge. In both panels, as N increases the PP to P1 decreases.
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The shift in the average is, however, predominantly due to those who are sharing equally
between themselves and others. The modal spike at 1 (an average of 23.5% and 26.4% of the
sample, for multiple and single sliders, respectively) shifts little as N increases. However, the
second model spike, at equal sharing (≈ 1/N) shifts proportionately as N increases. Indeed,
the same shift is found in both slider treatments.
Figure 3.3: Distribution of PP to P1: Differing Sliders and N
Table 3.3 shows results from two random effects models, with the Proportional Payoff to
Player 1 (the self ) and Player j (each other) as dependent variables. Results show that as N
increases there are large and significant effects on the PP to P1 and Pj. With N = 2 as the
reference category, we observe that an increase in the number of others leads to a reduction
of the PP to P1 and a decrease in the PP to Pj. This reveals that, on average, participants
are willing to significantly reduce their own payoffs, and therefore increase the total payoffs to
others, but not to the extent that the average payoffs to others remain constant. We observe
that switching from the multiple to single slider has no significant effect on behaviour, and
neither does the round number. The relative multiplier for P1 (pi1/(
∑N
j=2 pij/n)) is included
as a control, and is positively correlated. An increase in the budget, standardised within each
N, is shown to have a negative effect on PP to P1, and a positive effect on PP to Pj.
Neither the sign nor significance of any coefficient changes when those who on average
keep more than 0.99 of the proportional payoffs to themselves are excluded from the analysis.
The same is true when an extensive list of demographic characteristics (excluding parental
income), ‘oneness’ levels and opinion questions are included as controls; with the exception
of the significance levels of the budget levels, which decrease. Further analysis of the design
parameters, including the player name (i.e. 2, 3, 4), screen position (i.e. left, middle, right)
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Table 3.3: Random Effects Model: Proportional Payoff to P1
(1) (2)
PP to P1 PP to Pj
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
N Players
- 3 -0.0717∗∗∗ (0.0103) -0.1100∗∗∗ (0.0092)
- 4 -0.1037∗∗∗ (0.0134) -0.1625∗∗∗ (0.0116)
- 6 -0.1493∗∗∗ (0.0203) -0.2023∗∗∗ (0.0146)
- 12 -0.2137∗∗∗ (0.0245) -0.2476∗∗∗ (0.0172)
Single Slider Dummy 0.0092 (0.0163) 0.0050 (0.0095)
Relative Multiplier P1 0.0560∗∗∗ (0.0077) -0.0316∗∗∗ (0.0046)
Standardised N Budget -0.0270∗∗ (0.0119) 0.0124∗∗ (0.0057)
Round Number -0.0003 (0.0006) -0.0002 (0.0004)
Constant 0.6406∗∗∗ (0.0244) 0.3354∗∗∗ (0.0213)
N 83 83
Observations 3611 5985
R2 Within 0.2019 0.2659
R2 Between 0.0023 0.1044
R2 Overall 0.0839 0.1667
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
and the randomised order of N (all of which are found to have insignificant effects) are found
in Appendix C.2, alongside analysis of the effects of demographic characteristics, ‘oneness’
levels and opinion questions on giving behaviour.
6 Preference Parameters
While the above analysis describes the observed aggregate-level behaviour and treatment
effects, it lacks an explanation of why such behaviour is observed. Behaviour depends on
preferences, and aggregate-level behaviour ultimately depends on the nature and distribution
of individual preferences. Through estimating preference parameters, by assuming partici-
pants are behaving as if they are (noisily) maximising a utility function, the preferences held
by participants can be characterised. This characterisation enables intuitive insights into the
reasons why we observe such behaviour. Below, aggregate-level preference parameters are
estimated to characterise the preferences of the representative agent. Then, individual-level
preference parameters are estimated; the distribution of which accounts for the aggregate
trends observed.
6.1 Aggregate Preference Parameters
At the aggregated level preference parameters can be estimated for a representative agent,
within each of the utility functions proposed. The following results characterise how the
sample behaves on average, but also identify how additional preference parameters affect the
estimates of those in the simpler models. Table 3.4 shows the estimated preference parameters
and parameters within the error model.
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Results from the standard model shows α = 0.328 and r = 0.143, showing a high regard
for others and weakly weighted prioritarianism. Self-interest parameters are similar for both
fisman and andreoni models, but are lower than those estimated in the stone-geary and amal-
gamated models. This difference is perhaps explained by the inclusion of τ , as behaviourally
individuals will allocate equally until each player have more payoffs than the minimum thresh-
old, and then distribute according to their α (and other parameters).
We observe that the estimates for r are lower than the estimates of r1 value of 6.652, within
the fisman model. This difference perhaps accounts for the split of r into r1 and r0, showing
that individuals are more averse to inequality between themselves and others, but will slightly
prioritise efficiency between individuals. Estimates of b, show that participants will increase
the total payoffs to others as N increases, but will not maintain the same average payoff.
The inconsistency within the estimated parameters lie in the estimated r1 in the fisman and
amalgamated models, where the r1 in the latter implies efficiency prioritisation between the
self and others.
Estimates of the error parameters, are relatively consistent. We observe low values of s,
which are expected due to the pooled nature of the data. The elasticity of precision, γ, is
positive and relatively high in each estimation. This implies that as the degree of complexity
increases the variance of Xi will decrease.
Table 3.4: Sample Level Estimates of Parameter Values
Preference Parameters Error Parameters
α r r0 b τ s γ
Standard 0.328 0.143 . . . 3.547 0.600
Fisman 0.331 6.652 -0.093 . . 3.880 0.516
Andreoni 0.346 0.685 . 0.821 . 4.802 0.547
Stone-Geary 0.492 0.793 . . 2.451 2.927 0.958
Amalgamated 0.490 -0.594 -0.087 0.515 5.839 4.319 0.581
6.2 Individual Level
Preference parameters are estimated at the individual level, for each of the five models. For
the analysis that follows there are seven individuals who are excluded, as they made purely
self-interested decisions in every round. They are classed as ‘egoists’ who have α = 1. The
remaining 76 participants have individual-level preference parameters estimated.
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of inequality aversion, r, and self-interest, α, estimated
with the standard model. The top-left and bottom-right panels show histograms (and cdf
plot) of r and α, respectively, while the bottom-left shows a scatter plot of the two variables.
According to r the individuals classified into five different categories. There are 22.37%
classified as ‘Efficiency Prioritarians’ (r < −0.01), 4.95% exhibit preferences close to ‘Cobb-
Douglas’ (−0.01 ≥ r ≤ 0.01), 55.26% who are ‘Weighted Prioritarians’ (0.01 > r < 15) and
18.42% who are ‘Maximin’ (r ≥ 15). The median value of r = 1.08. As r increases α becomes
increasingly difficult to interpret, as a result the histogram of α shows a stacked histogram,
where the lighter grey plot shows the distribution of α where r > 10 and the darker plot where
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r <= 10. Of those, where r <= 10, 15.5% have α < 0.5, 44.8% have α < 0.75 and 70.7%
have α < 0.9. Note that, in addition to this, seven ‘egoists’ are omitted, who have α = 1.
These results show that, the majority of the sample have a substantial regard for others and
are willing to sacrifice total payoffs in order to increase the payoffs of the worst-off. Yet there
are significant minorities within the sample who are predominantly self-interested alongside
others who prioritise efficiency.
Figure 3.4: Distribution Standard Preference Parameters
Alongside preference parameters, the error parameters s and γ are estimated for each
individual. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the two parameters. The left panel shows s,
the precision parameter. The higher is s the lower the variance Xi. There are 23.68% of the
sample with s ≤ 5, 42.11% with s ≤ 10 and 71.05% with s ≤ 50. Elasticity of precision, γ,
identifies how the variance of Xi changes as N increases; if γ < 0, ceteris paribus, variance
decreases as N increases, while if γ = 0 there is no change, and if γ > 0 there is an increase.
The right panel show the distribution of γ. Only 7.89% of the sample have γ < 0, γ > 0 for
92.11%, and γ > 0.99 for 40.79%. These results imply that, for the majority, as N increases,
the variance of Xi decreases. In other words, individuals draw their actual allocations, xi,
closer to the optimal allocations, x∗i , more frequently as the number of recipients increases.
6.2.1 Between Model Parameter Comparisons
Within each of the five utility functions preference parameters for inequality aversion, r, and
self-interest, α, are estimated, alongside other parameters of interest. Of interest, is the
difference between the estimated parameters, as the incorporation of alternative (potentially
omitted) parameters may effect the estimates. Table 3.5 shows the p-values of a one-sided Sign-
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Figure 3.5: Distribution Standard Precision Parameters
Test of Matched Pairs, between pairs of estimates from alternate utility functions. The test is
used as it accounts for the matched nature of the data, and makes no assumptions about the
distribution of the parameters. The null hypothesis is that the median of differences, between
the parameters, is zero. The alternative hypothesis is that the median of the difference in
parameters is less than zero. A low p-value, therefore, rejects the null, showing that the
parameters estimated from the first model (denoted in the column) are lower than the second
model (denoted in the row).
Table 3.5: Between Model Comparison of r and α: Sign-Test of Matched Pairs (p-values)
Self-Interest, α
Std Fis And SG Amal
Std 1.000 0.849 0.789 0.849 0.634
Fis 0.211 1.000 0.634 0.546 0.546
And 0.283 0.454 1.000 0.546 0.546
SG 0.211 0.546 0.546 1.000 0.454
Amal 0.454 0.546 0.546 0.634 1.000
Precision, s
Std Fis And SG Amal
Std 1.000 0.008 0.151 0.849 0.004
Fis 0.996 1.000 0.932 0.986 0.008
And 0.897 0.103 1.000 0.789 0.000
SG 0.211 0.025 0.283 1.000 0.000
Amal 0.998 0.996 1.000 1.000 1.000
Inequality Aversion, r
Std Fis And SG Amal
Std 1.000 0.634 0.717 1.000 0.986
Fis 0.454 1.000 0.634 1.000 0.998
And 0.366 0.454 1.000 1.000 1.000
SG 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.151
Amal 0.025 0.004 0.001 0.897 1.000
Elasticity of Precision, γ
Std Fis And SG Amal
Std 1.000 0.634 0.789 0.454 0.897
Fis 0.454 1.000 0.789 0.283 0.932
And 0.283 0.283 1.000 0.366 0.634
SG 0.634 0.789 0.717 1.000 0.932
Amal 0.151 0.103 0.454 0.103 1.000
Results show that there are no significant differences between estimates of either α or γ,
for any pair of models. There are also no significant differences in r between the standard,
fisman and andreoni models. We do, however, observe that the estimates of r for stone-geary
are significantly lower than those in the standard, fisman and andreoni models. Likewise
the estimates for the amalgamated model are shown to be significantly lower than those in
the standard, fisman and andreoni models. This difference is apparent when considering the
proportion of the sample classed as ‘maximin’ (r ≥ 15), by each model; with only 9.3% and
7.9% for stone-geary and amalgamated, respectively, compared to 18.4%, 14.5% and 17.1%, for
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standard, fisman and andreoni respectively. The stone-geary and amalgamated estimates of
r are not significantly different. These results imply that the inclusion of τ partially accounts
for the equal-sharing behaviour, which the other models explain through a higher r.
Results from comparisons of s show that the parameters estimated from the standard
model are higher than those in the fisman model, and those estimated in the stone-geary
model are lower than those in the fisman model. The parameters within the amalgamated
model are significantly higher than those in each of the other models, indicating that the
additional parameters within the model allow for the flexibility for a more precise fit.
6.3 Extended
In addition to the preference parameters described above, the extended preference parameters
r0, r1, b and τ are estimated; the distributions of which are shown in Figure 5. The left panel
shows the distribution of r0 and r1, estimated from the fisman model, the middle panel shows
b, from the andreoni model, and the right, τ , from the stone-geary model.
The distributions of r0 and r1 show potential differences in self-other and between-other
equality-efficiency trade-offs. The distributions are similar, but r0 tends to take more extreme
values. 23.68% of the sample have r0 < −0.01, compared to 15.79% for whom r1 < −0.01.
Similarly, r0 ≥ 15 for 17.11%, while 14.47% have r1 ≥ 15. The two preferences are strongly
correlated, with a spearman’s rank correlation coefficient of 0.786. Those who have r0 and r1
with the same sign make up the majority of the sample; for 53 individuals r0, r1 ≥ 0, while
r0, r1 < 0 for 9 individuals. There are, however, 4 for whom r0 ≥ 0 and r1 < 0 and 10 for
whom r0 < 0 and r1 ≥ 0.
Figure 3.6: Distribution Additional Preference Parameters
The distribution of b shows that the ‘average’ and ‘total’ payoffs to others matter for
different individuals. For a large proportion of the sample (39.47%) it is ‘average’ payoffs
which matter (b < 0.01), however, a significant amount (13.16%) consider the ‘total’ payoffs
(b > 0.99) and do not reduce the payoffs to the self as n increases. Those who have a
parameter between 0.01 and 0.99 make up the remaining 47.37%. The mean value of b is
0.336. Minimum thresholds, τ , also vary between individuals. For 73.68% τ > 0.01, τ > 1 for
38.16%, τ > 3 for 17.11% and τ > 5 for 5.26%. Showing that for the majority of the sample
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there is a minimum threshold which they will allocate before considering other self-other and
equality-efficiency trade-offs. The median value of τ is 62p.
The differences in r1 and r0, alongside parameter values of b and τ show that the behaviour
of participants diverges from that predicted in the standard model. Indeed, by performing
likelihood-ratio tests (to identify if the additional preference parameters increase the goodness-
of-fit significantly, at the 10% level) individuals can be separated into either standard or (one
of the) extended types. The preference parameters (estimated from the extended model) can
then be compared. We observe a median τ of 1.881 for those the stone-geary model fits best,
with a lower 0.127 for those for whom the standard model fits best. The median congestion, b,
is 0.672 and 0.000 for those in the andreoni and standard models respectively. For comparing
r1 and r0, we are interested in the difference between the parameters, so calculate the weighted
euclidean distance from the estimated (r0, r1) to the closest point on the line where r0 = r1 as:
d = (((r0− r1)/2)2 + ((r1− r0)/2)2)1/2/((|r1|+ |r0|)/2 + 1). We observe a median distance, d,
of 0.616 and 0.220, for those in the fisman and standard models, respectively. The preference
parameters which ensure the extended model diverges most from the standard, are observed to
a greater degree when the extended models fit individual behaviour better than the standard
model.
6.4 Amalgamated
Of interest is not only the distribution of individual level preference parameters, but their
relation with one another. Figure 3.7 shows the histograms (combined with cumulative fre-
quency plots) of each preference parameter on the diagonal. In the bottom-left triangle, are
the scatterplots of each corresponding pair of preference parameters. The top-right trian-
gle shows Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients. Loess (local regression) fitted curves are
shown (with 95% ci) if coefficients (from the mirrored panel) are significant at the 5% level.
The distribution of preference parameters, is somewhat similar to those from the above indi-
vidual utility functions. As shown in the between model comparisons, there are no significant
differences in α, but r(1) is significantly lower.
Correlations between preference parameters can also be established. First, inequality
aversion parameters, r0 and r1, are positively correlated (0.72
∗∗∗); participants between-other
preferences appear to be closely related to their self-other preferences. Congestion, b is neg-
atively correlated with both r1 and r0 (−0.429∗∗∗ and −0.322∗∗∗, respectively), this implies
that as the number of others increases, those who are more efficiency seeking would sacrifice
their own payoffs to maintain the total to others. The minimum threshold, τ , is negatively
correlated to α, −0.44∗∗; this result is partially driven by the few individuals with very high
τ , as they are almost precisely equally distributing payoffs equally each round.
To summarise the estimated preference parameters, and to relate the estimations to the
increased complexity that the amalgamated model incorporates, Table 3.6 tabulates indi-
viduals for whom the extended parameters are ‘negligible’ or not. The ‘negligible’ extended
preference parameters are those which would collapse the amalgamated function to a more
simple functional form. Those classed as ‘negligible’ are when b ≤ 0.01, τ ≤ 0.1 and d ≤ 0.25,
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Figure 3.7: Distribution and Correlation of Amalgamated Preference Parameters
the eight possible combinations of parameters being ‘negligible’ or not are shown in Table
3.6. The top-left results shows that all parameters are ‘negligible’ for 3 individuals, while the
bottom-right shows 14 individuals for whom all parameters are ‘non-negligible’. Results be-
tween the two extremes show the combinations of which extended preferences are important.
There are 36 for whom differences in r0 and r1 are large enough, 47 for whom b > 0.01 and 52
for whom τ > 0.1. For those with only d > 0.25 and b > 0.01 there are 8, only d > 0.25 and
τ > 0.1 there are 6, while there are 20 with only b > 0.01 and τ > 0.1. This heterogeneity
points to models which could distinguish between either having any one, a combination of
two or all three extended preference parameters accounted for.
Table 3.6: Summary of Amalgamated Preference Parameters
Minimum Threshold, τ
τ ≤ 0.1 τ > 0.1
Congestion, b Congestion, b
Total
b ≤ 0.01 b > 0.01 b ≤ 0.01 b > 0.01
Inequality Aversion, d
d ≤ 0.25 3 5 12 20 40
d > 0.25 8 8 6 14 36
Total 11 13 18 34 76
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7. Goodness-of-Fit and Predictive Accuracy
Further analysis in Appendix C.6 uses a finite mixture model to identify ‘clusters’ of indi-
viduals. This allows for an intuitive summary of the high dimensional preference parameters,
characterising groups of participants with similar preferences.
7 Goodness-of-Fit and Predictive Accuracy
Analysis can be conducted on both goodness-of-fit and predictive accuracy to determine how
well the utility functions proposed explain individual behaviour. The ‘best’ utility model can
be identified for each individual, splitting the sample into different ‘types’. The alternative
utility functions can be ranked, by comparing the maximised log-likelihood (MLL) values.
The MLL is a measure which accounts for the stochastic nature of individual behaviour, as
the measures are constructed of the likelihood of observing the actual behaviour, given the
preferences estimated and error model assumed.
Due to the experimental design both goodness-of-fit and predictive accuracy can be anal-
ysed. MLL values can be calculated for multiple slider treatment on which the preference
parameters are estimated, determining goodness-of-fit, and for the single slider treatment,
using those estimated parameter values, to determine predictive accuracy. The ability of a
model to both fit and predict behaviour is important, therefore, analysis of the two separately
and as a combined measure ‘Both’ (a weighted average of the two) is conducted to identify if
particular models are ‘best’ in either criteria.
An issue with comparing the ‘raw’ MLL is that alternative models may have a differing
number of parameters. Models with a larger number of parameters are more flexible so should
fit behaviour better; yet, if the difference is small the additional complexity of the model is
perhaps not warranted. Several measures of information criterion seek to address this trade-
off between fit and model complexity. Three commonly used alternatives are the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1998), Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz et
al., 1978) and Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQI) (Hannan and Quinn, 1979).6 The
three criterion may give slightly alternative rankings, due to differences in their calculation and
different implicit trade-offs being made between the fit and model complexity. To sidestep such
differences, the three criterion are calculated for each of the five models, for each individual,
and a composite criterion, the information criterion (IC), is constructed whereby a model is
‘best’ if two or more of the criteria rank that model highest.
Table 3.7 tabulates the above. Results from the MLL are shown to the left of the IC, each
split into three columns: goodness-of-fit, predictive accuracy and both. The results show the
importance of comparing goodness-of-fit and predictive accuracy, as well as accounting for the
trade-off between fit and complexity, as mismatches in the rankings occur. The amalgamated
model shows this most starkly. In the MLL GOF it is the modal ‘type’, with 29 individuals for
whom it fits ‘best’. This number drops to only six and seven in predict and both, respectively.
The higher number of parameters allows the flexibility to fit data well, but this comes at a
6The information criteria statistics are as follows: AIC = 2k− 2(MLL), BIC = ln(n)k− 2(MLL) and HQI
= 2k. ln(ln(n))− 2(MLL), where k = number of estimated parameters and n = number of observations.
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cost of predictive power. Furthermore, when penalising the function for the higher number of
parameters the information criteria finds there are no individuals for whom the amalgamated
function is ‘best’, in either ‘Predict’ or ‘Both’. Results are opposite for the standard model,
there are less for whom the model is ‘best’ in GOF compared to ‘Predict’, and in MLL
compared to IC. The three models with five parameters, tend to lie somewhere in between
these extremes.
The results of most interest are in the final column. These rankings are those which will
be used to determine the ‘type’ of each individual. The modal ‘type’ is the standard model
and no individuals are classed within the amalgamated model. A substantial proportion of
the sample are classed as extended types, with 13 fisman types, 21 andreoni type and 9
stone-geary types.7
Table 3.7: Utility Types: Ranked by Log-Likelihood and Information Criterion
Log-Likelihood Information Criterion
GOF Predict Both GOF Predict Both
Standard 9 16 19 27 41 33
Fisman 14 17 17 11 11 13
Andreoni 21 24 23 26 19 21
Stone-Geary 3 13 10 9 5 9
Amalgamated 29 6 7 3 0 0
7.1 Likelihood Proportions and R-Squared
While the above analysis shows how the models do relative to one another, it reveals little
about how well the model performs in absolute terms. The standard metric to analyse perfor-
mance of a model is R2, which determines how much of the sample variation in the variable
of interest, is explained by the model. The likelihood proportion, ι, is an alternative metric,
which focuses on likelihood contributions. In each decision problem, t, the likelihood contri-
bution, lt, is calculated as the area under the probability density function (given by estimated
preference and error parameters) within the ‘rounding’ interval, around the observed decision
(see Section 4). Intuitively, lt, denotes the likelihood of observing the decision made, given the
error model. The uniform likelihood contribution, lUt, can likewise be derived from assuming
that the probability density function takes the form of a uniform distribution. This denotes
the likelihood of observing the decision made, given uniformly random draws are made. The
likelihood proportion in each decision problem is defined as, ιt = lt/(lt + lUt). The measure
shows how much ‘more likely’ the observed behaviour is in the specified model, in relation to
the uniform distribution. If ιt > 0.5 the proposed model does ‘better’ at explaining behaviour
than uniformly random draws, if ιt = 0.5 then the two are equal, while if ιt < 0.5 the uniform
distribution ‘better’ explains behaviour. The summary measure ι =
∑T
1 (ιt)/T shows how
well the proposed model explains behaviour for each individual, on average.
7Appendix C.7 discusses and analyses mismatches between rankings; firstly by using RSS and secondly
with preferences estimated using alternative error modelling.
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Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of ι, in the left panel, and R2, in the right, across
individuals in the sample. The model assumed for each individual is that based on their
‘type’, established in Table 3.7. The measures are calculated for each the goodness-of-fit,
predictive accuracy and both. For both ι and R2 the measures within the goodness-of-fit
measures tend to be higher than the predicted accuracy, with both lying between. The
mean values for ι = 0.806, 0.696 and 0.751, for GOF, pred and both, respectively, with mean
R2 = 0.806, 0.770 and 0.796, respectively. There are 2, 11 and 5 individuals for whom ι < 0.5
and 1, 3 and 2 for whom R2 < 0, for GOF, Pred and Both, respectively. The central panel
shows a scatter plot of ι and R2, highlighting the strong correlation between the two measures
(with Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients of 0.90, 0.88 and 0.87 for GOF, Pred and Both,
respectively).
Figure 3.8: Distribution of ‘Best’ Likelihood Proportions and R2
The two measures similarly aim to measure the strength of the models proposed. R2
focuses on how close observed decisions are to the optimal decisions proposed by the util-
ity function. The likelihood proportion, ι, however, incorporates the stochastic assumptions
made, identifying how often the model proposed would predict the observed behaviour. Both
measures show that for the majority of the sample, the models proposed and preferences
estimated explain well the observed behaviour.
8 Discussion
8.1 Comparing Giving
Results from the single slider treatment are particularly comparable with those from An-
dreoni (2007). Table 3.8 shows the mean PP to P1 and PP to PO, where PO represent the
average payoff to others, for differing N .8 Results show that in the two-player game partic-
ipants in our experiment are less generous, than those in Andreoni (2007). As N increases,
however, while participants give a lower proportion to themselves in our results, the PP to
8Results from Andreoni (2007) are calculated from individual level data from:
http://econweb.ucsd.edu/ jandreon/WorkingPapers/GARPN%20cesEstimates%20APX%20table.htm
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P1 do not decrease, and indeed appear to have an upward trend, in Andreoni. The PP to
PO follow a similar, but opposite, trend, with the average PP to others being approximately
equal in our twelve-person treatment as the six-person treatment in Andreoni (2007).
While these differences are interesting, they should be approached with caution. The
distributional decisions of participants is heavily dependent upon the experimental design
parameters, the particular choice of dividers/multipliers, budgets and incentives will have
differential effects on raw giving, depending on the preferences of participants. Indeed, this
is one reason why estimating preference parameters is important; if preferences are estimated
then behaviour in differing experimental designs can be predicted to identify differences not
purely based on experimental design. One difference between the designs is the difference
in average budgets as N increases; within our design the average budget remains the same,
while in Andreoni’s design it decreases. Similarly, the incentive structure leads to different
behaviour. In Andreoni’s set-up the participant knows they will receive the payoff they give
to themselves, plus the ‘Pass’ payoffs from each of the n other participants in their group.
Table 3.8: Comparing Average Proportional Payoffs
Andreoni (2007) Robson
N Players P1 PO P1 PO
2 0.622 0.378 0.712 0.288
3 0.710 0.145 0.626 0.187
4 0.688 0.104 0.604 0.132
5 0.695 0.076 . .
6 0.756 0.049 0.562 0.088
10 0.727 0.030 . .
12 . . 0.489 0.046
Results from Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007), do however, appear to be more in line
with our results. Comparing results to the multiple slider treatment, the equivalent mean
PP to P1 is 0.79 and 0.75, in the two and three person treatments, of their experiment.
Comparing this to our 0.71 and 0.62, we observe that ‘dictators’ take less for themselves as N
increases; however, both the absolute level of generosity and the change in giving are higher
in our experiment.
8.2 Comparing Preference Parameters
8.2.1 Self-Other and Between-Other Inequality Aversion
While Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007) (FKM) run both two and three-person dicta-
tor games, preference parameters are estimated separately for each treatment. We compare
classifications of r1 and r0 with those estimated in their three-person treatment, and the r
estimated in their two-person treatment. To make estimates comparable, we use their classi-
fications, and exclude those ‘selfish’ individuals with an average PP to P1 greater than 0.95
or who are not ’consistent’.9 Our total sample of participants with “consistent nonselfish
9In their paper they calculate Afriat’s Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI) and exclude those individuals
with CCEI < 0.8, as they behave in a manner ’inconsistent’ with utility maximisation. We do not calculate
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preferences” is 63, with 33 from the three-person and 45 from the two-person treatments in
FKM; the percentages shown below in Table 3.9 refer to these totals.
Results in Table 3.9 show the categorisation of inequality aversion parameters in FKM
and this study. We observe that for FKM the majority of the sample are either ‘utilitarian’
or ‘efficiency prioritarians’ for both r1 (66.7%) and r0 (66.7%), although there is a lower
proportion within this categorisation in the two-player experiment for r (53.3%). The opposite
is true from our results, with the majority of the sample being either ‘weighted prioritarians’
or ‘maximin’, for r1 (85.7%) and r0 (74.6%). This reversal shows a much higher weight on
efficiency concerns for the FKM sample, in contrast to a higher concern for equality in our
sample.
Table 3.9: Comparison of Inequality Aversion, r1 and r0
FKM Robson
r (2P) r1 (3P) r0 (3P) r1 r0
Utilitarian (r < −0.9) 4.4% 12.1% 15.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Efficiency Prioritarian (−0.9 < r < −0.1) 48.9% 54.6% 51.5% 6.4% 9.5%
Cobb-Douglas (−0.1 < r < 0.1) 11.1% 3.0% 9.2% 7.9% 15.9%
Weighted Prioritarian (0.1 < r < 0.9) 31.1% 21.2% 6.1% 22.2% 14.3%
Maximin (r > 0.9) 4.4% 9.0% 18.2% 63.5% 60.3%
There could be several reasons for these differences. The first, is the sample. Participants
in the UK are perhaps more averse to inequality than their US counterparts. The second, the
differences in experimental design alter individual behaviour. In our design participants had
to individually allocate to each individual, with a slider, while in their design a single point on
a budget line was clicked. The latter allows for quicker and easier decisions to be made, while
the former requires more effort. In itself, this could lead to different responses; on the one
hand the former method could lead to more ‘considered’ distributions, accounting for each of
the other participants, on the other the ease of clicking a single point could allow for more
time to consider the efficiency implications of the choices made. This, however, should then
appear in the distributional decisions between the single and multiple slider treatment, which
it does not.
A further difference in design, is the incentive structure. In our design one ‘dictators’
choice is picked at random to determine the payoffs of all in the group, while in FKM each
participant receives the payoffs they gave to themselves, plus the payoffs others gave them.
This may have an impact on average giving (as discussed in Chapter 2), but also on trade-offs
between equality and efficiency. On average, participants know that if everyone distributes
efficiently then payoffs will be greater, but in FKM this carries a much lower risk of particular
individuals receiving a low payoff. Other difference include: the explicit statement of the
‘Payoff Gap’ and ‘Total Payoffs’ (representing the trade-off between equality and efficiency)
in our design; the explicit statement of the ‘Dividers’ opposed to the difference in graphical
CCEI values, but instead use the likelihood-proportion value, ι to exclude those with ι < 0.5; which (while it
is a test dependent upon the utility function chosen) excludes individuals for whom random behaviour better
explains their behaviour.
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representation; and the difference in language between ‘allocations’ to each player (implying
the budget is a common good) compared to ‘hold’ and ‘pass’ (implying the budget belongs to
the ’dictator’, which they can choose to share).
Consistent between our findings is that there are strong within-subject correlation between
r1 and r0. With FKM there was 63.6% of the sample with r0, r1 ≤ 0, while r0, r1 < 0 for
24.2%. With only 6.1% with r0 ≥ 0 and r1 < 0 and 6.1% with r0 < 0 and r1 ≥ 0. In our
(similarly reduced) sample there are 81.0% of the sample with r0, r1 ≥ 0, while r0, r1 < 0 for
4.8%. With 4.8% with r0 ≥ 0 and r1 < 0 and 9.5% with r0 < 0 and r1 ≥ 0. This means that
there are 87.9% and 85.7% of the sample, for FKM and our study respectively, with both
self-other and between-other inequality aversion in the same direction.
8.2.2 Congestion
Andreoni (2007) estimates the congestion parameter, b, at both the sample and individual
level. At the sample level, the representative b estimated was 0.68, which is slightly lower than
our estimated value of 0.82, but not extensively so. At the individual level Andreoni (2007)
estimates preferences for 109 participants, with 11 participants identified as ‘perfectly selfish’.
Of those 109 participants b = 0 was estimated for 25%, while b = 1 for 17% and 0 < b < 1 for
the remaining 58%. From our estimates, there are 39.5% of the sample for whom b < 0.01,
13.2% with b > 0.99 and the remaining 47.4% with 0.01 ≤ b ≤ 0.99. The results are somewhat
similar, spikes at either extreme, where the modal group has b→ 0; but the majority exhibits
some degree of congestion.
8.2.3 Minimum Threshold Levels
Comparison with the τ preference parameter within the Stone-Geary function is limited. Its
use is more common in other literatures, such as the time and risk preferences. Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012) estimate Stone-Geary “consumption minima” (ω1), within a CRRA utility
function with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. While contextually different, the experimental
set-up is somewhat similar, with convex time budgets. Their aggregate estimate of ω1 = $1.35,
when ω1 = ω2 is assumed (the hypothesis of which is not rejected), which lies somewhere
between our median individual estimate of 62p and aggregate estimate of £2.45. Of interest,
however, is that they find the estimates of other preference parameters (especially curvature)
depend on the assumed ωi, a result we also find (with significantly lower estimates of r in the
stone-geary in comparison to the standard model, in Table 3.5). Andersen et al. (2008) also
use a similar functional form, but do not estimate a minimum threshold, instead utilising the
average value of daily consumption in Denmark as the threshold.
8.3 Charity Fundraising
While the main focus of this paper is somewhat technical and abstract, the methods used can
readily be applied to the domain of charity fundraising. This section provides an illustration
174
8. Discussion
of how the estimation of preferences could increase charitable giving, if projects rather than
people are assumed to be the others.
Imagine a charity. Within the charity there are four projects: Water, Education, Shelter
and Medication. The aim of the charity is to raise money to enable the projects to be funded.
In order to do so, there are alternative fundraising campaigns which can be undertaken, which
encourage people to donate. Each campaign advertises alternate bundles of the projects.
There are sixteen possible campaigns which can be delivered to potential donors:
Water1. Education2. Shelter3.
Medication4. Water, Educ5. Water, Shelter6.
Water, Medication7. Education, Shelter8. Education, Medication9.
Shelter, Medication10. Water, Education, Shelter11. Water, Education, Medication12.
Water, Shelter, Medication13. Education, Shelter, Medication14. All Projects15.
Do Nothing16.
In order to advertise a campaign there is a cost of £3 per person, with the exception of
(16) in which no campaign is run. Within each campaign information will be provided about
the respective projects. Each project has differential fixed costs which determine the ‘cost-
effectiveness’ of that project; stated as “for every pound given the amount of money going
directly to that project is X”, where X is 50p for Water, 33.3p for Education, 25p for Shelter
and 25p for Medication. The charity’s task is then to deliver the campaigns which raise the
most amount of money. The following analysis addressed this problem.
Donors are assumed to have a budget, m, which they can distribute between consumption
(which is entirely cost-effective) and donations to particular charity projects. Using estimated
preferences parameters for each of the 83 participants of the experiment (according to each
individual’s ‘type’) predictions of how they would optimally allocate between themselves (the
‘donors’) and each project, within a given campaign, can be made. The advertising costs of
the campaigns can be deducted and the average profit per person calculated.
The left panel of Figure 3.9 shows the calculation of average profit, for varying levels of
m, for three alternative methods of choosing the fundraising campaign. The random method
denotes the profits that would be made if the charity had no information about the preferences
of the donors. Here, as there is no information, charities would randomly choose a campaign to
send. The sample method uses the representative agent preferences (from the standard model
in Table 3.4) to identify the optimal campaign to advertise, for each m. The individual method
uses individual-level preference parameters to establish the optimal campaign to advertise to
each individual. The results show that the profits from the individual method dominates the
sample method, which in turn dominates to the random method. For low values of m the
random, and even sample, method give negative profits, as the low budget means that the
advertising costs are not exceeded by the donations. As m increases the random method
diverges from the sample and individual, making relatively lower profits.
The right panel shows the proportion of each campaign advertised, under the individual
method, for differing m. The four campaigns selected are: (1) Water; (10) Shelter, Medication;
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Figure 3.9: Fundraising Profit and Distribution of Campaigns
(15) All Projects; and (16) Do Nothing. At very low m the optimal campaign is to do nothing,
as the donations do not exceed advertising costs. As m increases campaigns (1), (10) and (15)
are sent to particular individuals, when m = 50, the campaign with the largest proportion is
(15), with 59.04%, next is (1) with 21.69%, followed by (16) with 15.66% with 3.61% being
selected for (10). The reasons for the differences lie in individuals preferences. Those for
whom (16) is optimal tend to be self-interested, the mean self-interest parameter of the group
is 0.976. Individuals who donate most in (1) are all efficiency prioritarians, with a mean
inequality aversion parameter of -0.112. The three individuals within (10) are all classed
as andreoni types, who are (slightly) weighted prioritarians with high values of b (0.965 on
average), meaning they consider total rather than average payoffs to others. Those within
(15) tend to be weighted prioritarians, with substantial regard for others; 26 of whom are
standard types with positive r, 8 are fisman types with positive r1, 7 are andreoni types with
low b, and 7 who are stone-geary types with a positive τ . Being able to account for individual
preferences allows for selection, which in turn allows for an increase in profit per person.
While this section is primarily illustrative, there are a number of extensions which could be
conducted to make it more applicable and realistic. The first relates to error. In the analysis
above the assumption is that donors act optimally and according to the preferences estimated,
however, there could be error in those predictions. By incorporating the error model proposed,
a monte-carlo simulation could be run, to establish the optimal campaigns to run, given
the error made. The second extension relates to the fundraising aim of the charity. Two
types of funding are commonly found in charitable giving, restricted and unrestricted funding.
The above assumes that donations are unrestricted, meaning that the charity can allocate
resources to any project they need. However, (especially with a move towards the tracking and
accountability of individual donations) donors may give restricted funding, meaning that only
those projects they give directly to can be allocated that funding. These considerations can be
incorporated into the analysis, selecting the optimal set of campaigns to increase the funding of
the ‘worst-off’ charity, rather than maximising the total profits (equality vs efficiency criteria).
Finally, the incorporation of the value of acquiring information is important. While it is clear
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that the individual method performs the best it may be more costly to acquire information
on individual level preferences. Collecting information at an aggregate level (perhaps one
decision problem, rather than 30) could prove to be less costly, but if this information cost
exceeds the gains made above the random method then it is counter productive to gather
such information. By accounting for the value of information the choice of method optimised
at different budget levels.
While experiments run in the laboratory may appear abstract, external parallels do
emerge. By utilising the methods proposed and accounting for individual preferences real
world charitable giving could perhaps be increased.
9 Conclusion
To conclude, through running a modified N-person dictator game both between-other and
self-other distributional trade-offs have been investigated as the number of players increases.
Results have found that, on average, the proportional payoffs given to the self decrease, as the
number of others increases, but not to the extent that the proportion of payoffs to each others
remains constant. The majority of the sample are shown to have other-regarding preferences
(91.6%), where the majority are classed as ‘Weighted Prioritarians’ (55.3%), with significant
proportion classed as either ‘Efficiency Prioritarians’ (22.4%) or ‘Maximin’ (18.42%).
The importance of estimating preferences within alternative utility functions has been
shown, with intuitive extended preference parameters of: self-other and between-other in-
equality aversion, congestion and minimum thresholds; better explaining the behaviour of
particular individuals. The importance of incorporating both goodness-of-fit and predictive
accuracy has been shown, alongside considerations of ‘information criteria’. The amalgamated
model (the most complex) provided the ‘best’ fit for the modal group of participants; how-
ever, when accounting for predictive accuracy and ‘information criteria’ it performed ‘best’
for no individuals in the sample. Splitting the sample into ‘types’, of the 83 participants, we
observe 33 individual’s behaviour is best explained by the standard model, 13 by the fisman,
21 by andreoni and 9 by stone-geary ; with 11 individuals being classed as egoists. Values from
the likelihood proportion reveal the ‘best’ utility functions, combined with the Dirichlet error
model, well fit and predict individual-level behaviour, with only 5 participants with ι < 0.5.
Prosocial behaviour and distributional preferences have been shown to be extremely het-
erogeneous. Not only do particular preferences within utility functions best explain their
certain individual’s behaviour, but alternative models best suit different individuals. Varying
the number of players to whom participants can give to may complicate modelling decision
making, but it is something we regularly do as humans and is, therefore, something worthy
of striving to explain.
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C Appendices
C.1 Instructions
Instructions
Welcome. Thank you for coming today.
Please Read These Carefully.
Everyone Will Receive the Same Instructions.
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General Instructions
In this experiment you will be making decisions about the distribution of payoffs
between yourself and other participants in this room. These payoffs are in
addition to your turn-up fee of £3.
There will be two different stages, each made up of multiple rounds. Your actual
payoff will be determined from one randomly selected round. It is from this
one round that all participants will receive their payoff. This means that every
round has an equal chance of determining your final payoff, so consider each
choice you make carefully. Everyone will finish at the same time, as you will
need to wait for every participant to finish each round before you can move onto
the next.
The individual choices you make will involve payoffs for multiple players. You
will make choices which concern the distribution of payoffs between those players.
In each round, you will be randomly grouped with some other players. Each
of you will make your choices independently of one another, but only one of the
player’s individual choices will be selected, randomly, to provide the payoffs for all
players within that group. You will not know whose decision has been chosen
and will receive your payoff, in private, at the end. This means that every decision
you (and the others) make is entirely anonymous. There are no right or wrong
answers, the decisions you make are entirely up to you and will determine the
potential payoffs for you and the others in that group.
The money you have to allocate amongst the group will come from a Budget. You
must decide how to allocate all of the money from the Budget. For each player
in your group, the Allocation that you make to them will then be divided by a
Divider to give their Payoff in that round. The Payoff can be thought of as the
final amount of money that each player gets in that round.
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To make your decisions you will be using a computer interface, a screenshot of
one of the rounds is shown on the next page. Importantly, you will always be
Player 1, and the other players are real other participants in the room.
The on-screen order of each player will vary. In the example shown here, Player
1 is in the middle.
You will be given a Budget to Allocate amongst the group. This is shown on the
left of the screen, and in this example is £50. You must spend the entire budget
in each round. This means the Remaining Budget must be zero. You will be
able to make the allocations in three ways. The first is with the sliders; you can
drag the sliders to any allocation that you want. The second is with the arrow
keys. They allow you to make increases and decreases of 10p and 1p, respectively.
The third is the written input; you can click in each of the blue boxes, type your
desired allocations and click update.
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Within each of the rounds there will be different Dividers for each player. The
actual Payoff that each player will get will be the Allocation you give, divided
by the Divider. For example, if you give an Allocation of £10, and the Divider
is 2, the Payoff will be £5. These Dividers are important as they change every
round, but are predetermined and not dependent upon your choices.
The Payoffs are the final amount of money which will be given to each partic-
ipant; they will be always be in pounds and will be shown by the height of the
orange bars, the orange numbers beside them and the numbers at the top of
the screen.
Throughout the rounds, two elements will change. The first is the Budget, so be
sure to consider exactly how much the Budget is before beginning each decision, as
it will vary by a considerable amount. The second is the number of players in
your group. This will change as you go through the experiment. You will see 2, 3,
4, 6 and 12 players in the groups, throughout various rounds. So remember that
each of these players is a real participant in the room, who will be anonymous
and randomly chosen for each round.
There are two stages in this experiment. The first is where you will have multiple
sliders, one for each Player. The second is where you will have a single slider
which determines the share of the Budget you choose to give to Player 1, where the
other players allocations are equalised.
Remember you are always Player 1. Take note especially in the first stage, as the
order of the players on-screen changes between rounds.
You will also see the Total Payoffs and the Payoff Gap. The Total Payoffs
is the Payoffs of all players added together. The Payoff Gap is the highest Payoff
minus the lowest Payoff. Notice how these change when making your decisions. You
must make a decision in every round, and then click Next or Finish to confirm
your decision.
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A minimum time will be displayed in the top right corner in every round, in
black. This time must have elapsed before you progress to the next round. There
will also be a maximum time, in red, which will be double the minimum time,
you must make a decision in this time and click Finish. If not, will receive a
Payoff of zero for that round and one of the other participants in your group will
be the individual whose decisions will count for that round.
After the experiment you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire. Your responses
from the questionnaire, and from the entire experiment, will be treated anony-
mously.
After reading these instructions you will go through an on-screen tutorial, which
will explain how to use the computer interface and the exact nature of the exper-
iment. You will then be allowed several practice rounds (which will not affect
your payoff) before making your decisions for real.
If you require help at any time, please raise your hand.
Please proceed to the On-Screen Tutorial.
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C.2 Design and Demographic Differences in Proportional Payoffs
C.2.1 Design
By running separate random effects models for each N , and focusing upon the multiple slider
treatment, further analysis can be conducted on more specific design effects. Table 3.10
models PP to Pj, for N = 2, 3 and 4, incorporating player specific multipliers, time taken,
screen position, the player name and the order of N, alongside the standardised budget. The
index j denotes a particular ‘other’ player, where j 6= 1,∈ N . Considering the multipliers
(pii), k and l are the ‘alternative others’, where k, l ∈ N , k is the lowest number that satisfies
k 6= 1, j, and l 6= 1, j, k.
Table 3.10: Random Effects Model: Proportional Payoff to Pj, Design Effects
(1) (2) (3)
2 Players 3 Players 4 Players
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Multiplier
- Player 1 -0.1569∗∗∗ (0.0354) -0.0908∗∗∗ (0.0180) -0.0557∗∗∗ (0.0123)
- Player j 0.0631∗∗∗ (0.0198) 0.1140∗∗∗ (0.0201) 0.1004∗∗∗ (0.0193)
- Player k -0.0526∗∗∗ (0.0184) -0.0368∗∗∗ (0.0124)
- Player l -0.0342∗∗∗ (0.0106)
Time Finished
- Average 0.3757∗∗∗ (0.1299) 0.3273∗∗∗ (0.0847) 0.1927∗∗∗ (0.0692)
- Mean Diff: Positive 0.1393∗∗∗ (0.0454) 0.0238 (0.0226) 0.0315 (0.0251)
- Mean Diff: Negative -0.0729 (0.0814) -0.0332 (0.0324) -0.0144 (0.0226)
Screen Position
- 2 -0.0000 (0.0124) 0.0083 (0.0075) 0.0024 (0.0063)
- 3 -0.0038 (0.0059) 0.0027 (0.0042)
- 4 -0.0014 (0.0056)
Player Name
- Player 3 0.0015 (0.0037) -0.0003 (0.0027)
- Player 4 -0.0023 (0.0023)
N Order
- Second 0.0598 (0.0419) -0.0404 (0.0306) -0.0214 (0.0253)
- Third -0.0224 (0.0478) -0.0156 (0.0314) 0.0035 (0.0221)
Standardised N Budget 0.0041 (0.0126) 0.0016 (0.0069) -0.0022 (0.0073)
Constant 0.2288∗∗∗ (0.0605) 0.1312∗∗∗ (0.0383) 0.1056∗∗∗ (0.0301)
N 83 83 83
Observations 818 1576 2379
R-squared 0.1452 0.1496 0.1228
Between-Subject Variance 0.1662 0.1057 0.0840
Within-Subject Variance 0.1588 0.1117 0.0880
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Results show that as pij increases the PP to Pj increases, and conversely as pii 6=j increases
the PP to Pj decreases. The average time participants took to finalise their decision is shown
to be strongly positively correlated with the PP to Pj. However, this correlation is perhaps one
of reverse causality. The time it takes to allocate all to the self, is much less than ensuring
payoffs are distributed equally. The mean difference variables, are constructed to identify
within-subject timing differences. For the decisions which participants took longer than their
individual average time (within each N) participants give more to others, while when they
take less than their average the give less. This relationship is, however, only significant for
183
Chapter 3. Giving to Varying Numbers of Others
positive differences in the two player treatment. The effect of the screen position, on giving,
is also tested. The base case, is where the screen position is on the left (1), while increasing
numbers denote a position further to the right. Results show that there are no significant
differences for screen position within either N , for any position. Similar results hold for the
name of the ‘other’ player. The order in which participants made decisions for each N was
also varied, the dummy variables show if the order of the N (of that model) was either second
or third, with the base case being first. Results show there are no significant order effects.
Within N , the budget (which is standardised within each N) has no effect of giving.
C.2.2 Demographics
Alongside the experiment a questionnaire was conducted to establish the demographic char-
acteristics of the participants, alongside questions regarding ‘oneness’, political persuasion,
altruism and beliefs of others giving. The demographic composition of the sample is shown
in Table 3.11. Further to this results from simple random effects models are shown in Table
3.12. The models include design control variables (number of players, single slider dummy,
relative multiplier for P1, standardised budget within each N and round number) and a ‘de-
mographic’ variable of interest, in order to determine if such variables explain the PP to P1
(over all 45 rounds). A separate model is ran for each, and the resulting coefficient for the
variable of interest, alongside standard errors, number of participants and R2. These are
run as separate models for two reasons. The first, missing data. For particular questions a
significant proportion of the sample did not answer (in particular parental income and degree
subject). The second, is multicollinearity between particular variables, in particular the final
four variables concerning altruism and beliefs of the payoffs others gave. As a result a simple
modelling approach has been taken, allowing for the comparison of coefficients, significance
and model fit; while being wary that these results are prone to omitted variable bias.
Results show that neither age, being an undergraduate, studying science, being of British
or Asian nationality, having parents with higher incomes or education, being more right
wing have a significant effect on giving to the self. Surprisingly, neither does hypothetical
donations, nor willingness to donate to good causes. Females are somewhat more generous,
as are art/humanities students, those who are religious, who come from a larger family or
are more liberal. While having more friends in the session does not increase giving, a greater
‘oneness’ (the closeness of connection to others) to the group does. The hypothetical slider
questions on “how do you believe the others in this session distributed payoffs” and “what
do you believe is a fair distribution of payoffs between yourself and one other” are highly
correlated with giving. Those regressors which give the most explanatory power are the fair
payoffs, beliefs of payoffs given by others and the ‘oneness’ to others in the group.
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Table 3.11: Sample Characteristics
No. %
Gender
Male 38 47.5%
Female 42 52.5%
Total 80 100.0%
Age
18-21 24 29.6%
22-25 30 37.0%
26-29 13 16.0%
30+ 14 17.3%
Total 81 100.0%
Nationality
Asian 37 46.3%
British 32 40.0%
European 8 10.0%
Other International 3 3.8%
Total 80 100.0%
No. %
Subject
Arts and Humanities 18 27.3%
Science 22 33.3%
Social Science 26 39.4%
Total 66 100.0%
Degree Level
Postgraduate 39 49.4%
Undergraduate 40 50.6%
Total 79 100.0%
Religion
Agnostic/Atheist 10 14.3%
Christian 10 14.3%
Muslim 12 17.1%
None 32 45.7%
Other 6 8.6%
Total 70 100.0%
Table 3.12: Random Effects Model: Proportional Payoff to P1, Demographic Effects
(1)
PP to P1
Coef. Std. err. N R2
Age 0.0022 (0.0045) 81 0.0757
Gender -0.1043∗∗ (0.0520) 80 0.1034
Undergraduate Dummy 0.0447 (0.0519) 79 0.0891
Arts/Humanities -0.1110∗ (0.0607) 66 0.0897
Science -0.0324 (0.0660) 66 0.0650
Social Science 0.1223∗∗ (0.0583) 66 0.1008
British 0.0786 (0.0540) 80 0.0920
Asian -0.0722 (0.0520) 80 0.0890
Religious -0.1149∗∗ (0.0562) 70 0.1034
Parental Income -0.0001 (0.0232) 49 0.0718
Parental Education 0.0533 (0.0782) 70 0.0874
Family Size -0.0236∗∗ (0.0116) 80 0.0923
Oneness - Group -0.0449∗∗∗ (0.0137) 83 0.1275
Friends in Session -0.0082 (0.0184) 80 0.0779
Authoritarian - Liberal -0.0369∗∗∗ (0.0130) 80 0.1128
Left - Right -0.0098 (0.0144) 80 0.0764
Donate -0.0001 (0.0001) 82 0.0855
Good Cause -0.0152 (0.0095) 83 0.0986
Fair Payoffs 0.8202∗∗∗ (0.0844) 82 0.3660
Belief Others Payoffs 0.5937∗∗∗ (0.1347) 82 0.1455
Controls YES
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.3 Graphical Intuition of Utility Functions
In addition to the formal notation in Section 3 the following surface plots illustrate the graph-
ical intuition behind the preference parameters. Each figure plots the optimal proportional
payoffs for each Player i (piix
∗
i ) for particular preference sets and numbers of recipients.
Figure 3.10 plots pi1x
∗
1 in the left panel and pi2x
∗
2 for different parameter values of self-
interest, α1, and inequality aversion, r. For simplicity the design parameters are set as: N = 2,
pi1 = 1 and pi2 = 0.5. In general as α1 increases the payoffs to Player 1 increase, while those
to Player 2 decrease. Indeed at the extremes, when α1 = 1 then pi1x
∗
1 = 1 and when α1 = 0
then pi1x
∗
1 = 0. The extent to which α1 changes behaviour depends on r. When r → −1
efficiency concerns are important and so optimal payoffs reflect the highest weighted payoffs
that can be obtained. As r → 0 preferences approach Cobb-Douglas, where allocations (x∗1)
are directly proportional to α1. As r → ∞ equality is the primary concern, and so payoffs
become more equal.
Figure 3.10: Inequality Aversion and Self-Interest: Standard Model
The fisman model allows for the distinction between self-other and between-other inequal-
ity aversion. As the experimental design allows N > 2 (and enables participants to distribute
between others) this allows for differential behaviour to be observed, and explained by the
model. To illustrate this Figure 3.11 shows the optimal PP to P1, P2 and P3 for varying
values of r1 and r0; where α1 = 0.5 and the design parameters are: N = 3, pi1 = 0.5,
pi2 = 1 and pi3 = 0.25. The variation in pi1 allows for differing behaviour to be predicted.
As r1 → ∞ the payoffs are equally distributed between the self and others, and as r0 → ∞
payoffs are equally distributed between others. When r1, r0 → 0 allocations are proportionate
to α, so pi1x
∗
1 = 0.25, pi2x
∗
2 = 0.25 and pi3x
∗
3 = 0.0625. If r0 → −1 the most efficient allocation
between-others is preferred, so the share between Player 2 and Player 3 goes entirely to Player
2. If r0 > −1 and r1 → −1 then all payoffs are allocated to Player 1. At the extreme when
r1 = r0 = −1 individuals are technically indifferent between payoffs to P1 and P2, as pi2 > pi3
and α1 = pi1/pi2 = 0.5. When r1 = r0 then behaviour follows that in the standard model.
To illustrate how the andreoni function models behaviour as n increases Figure 3.12 plots
pi1x
∗
1 for differing levels of congestion, b, and number of participants n. To simplify, we assume
that α1 = 0.5, pi1 = 1 and pij = 0.5 (∀j > 1) but vary r across the three panels, where r = −0.5
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Figure 3.11: Self-Other and Between-Other Inequality Aversion: Fisman Model
in the left, r → 0 in the middle and r = 2 in the right. If b = 1, participants consider the total
given to others, and so as n increases pi1x
∗
1 remains the same, and therefore pijx
∗
j decreases.
Indeed, the payoffs to Player 1 are the same for any n if b = 1 as when n = 1, for any value
of b. The different absolute levels between the three panels emerge, as pi1 > pi2; as those
prioritising efficiency give more to Player 1, Cobb-Douglas preferences mean that allocations
are proportionate to α1 = 0.5 and total payoffs are sacrificed in order to reduce inequality
when r > 0. As b increases changes in behaviour depend on n and r. If r < 0 payoffs to the
self increase, if r → 0 then pi1x∗1 remains the same, while if r > 0 payoffs to the self decrease.
Total payoffs to others actually decrease as n increases when r < 0 and b > 0 because the
weight to each other ((1−α1)/n) decreases, and so the more ‘efficient’ choice is to give more to
the self. Conversely, when r > 0 and b > 0, the total payoffs to others increases, as individuals
consider the weighted payoff to each other and prefer to weight higher the worst-off.
Figure 3.12: Congestion: Andreoni Model
The above CES models concern only relative payoffs, and so assume distributions are
proportionate to the budget. By incorporating an absolute minimum threshold, τ∗, the effects
of a change in the total and average budgets, on behaviour, can be modelled. Figure 3.13
illustrates how pi1x
∗
1 changes in relation to τ
∗ and n (note that the n axis is reversed). An
increase of n entails a reduction in the average budget available, and so the effects of differing
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τ∗ can be observed for each n. As above we assume α1 = 0.5, pi1 = 1 and pij = 0.5 (∀j > 1),
with r varying across the three panels (r ≈ −0.5, 0, 2). In each panel for high levels of τ∗ the
distribution of payoffs are equal between each participant, which ensures pi1x
∗
1 decreases as n
increases as m = 1 throughout. When τ∗ = 0 the predictions converge to the predictions of
the standard function. For values of τ∗ between the two points, r affects decisions made. The
minimum threshold level, in effect, allows for participants to distribute equally to a point,
and then distribute according to their other preferences. The scope for this latter distribution
depends on the available total and average budget.
Figure 3.13: Minimum Threshold Levels: Stone-Geary Model
The above illustrates the intuition behind the derivations of the optimal distributions
of payoffs, for each of the four models. The amalgamated model allows for these standard
and extended behavioural concerns to be combined. This flexibility in modelling enables
the extensive heterogeneity in behaviour to be accounted for; when the budget, number of
recipients and prices of giving change.
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C.4 Stone-Geary Non-Negativity Conditions
Due to the inclusion of τ some optimal allocations may lead to allocations where piixi − τi <
0,∀i, which is not feasible. To solve this issue in the main analysis the assumption that
τ = min(τ∗,m/
∑N
i
1
pii
) is used. An alternative solution is to make no such assumptions and
instead incorporate non-negativity conditions. This does not restrict τi ≤ xipii explicitly, but
provides a set of optimality conditions, within which a subset will ensure τi ≤ xipii. Through
this approach, the optimal allocations are as follows:
x∗i 6=k =
m+
N∑
j 6=i,k
((
τi
pij
(
αjpij
αipii
) 1
1+r
)
− τjpij
)
−
N∑
k 6=i,j
(
τk
pik
)
1 +
N∑
j 6=i,k
(
pii
pij
(
αjpij
αipii
) 1
1+r
) , x∗k = τkpik (3.18)
The set of optimality conditions can be concisely written by incorporating k. To solve, we
use a solution similar to Lagrange’s theorem with non-negative variables (see Dixit (1990) p.
28), which provides equations ∂L/∂xi ≤ 0, xi ≥ τi/pii,∀i, with complementary slackness, and
∂L/∂λ = 0, in order to solve for optimal allocations. In other words, ∀i either ∂L/∂xi = 0
or xi = τi/pii (or both). There are 2
N − 1 combinations of equations, which provide optimal
allocations (i.e. for N = 2: [∂L/∂x1 = 0, ∂L/∂x2 = 0], [∂L/∂x1 = 0, x2 = τ2/pi2], [x1 =
τ1/pi1, ∂L/∂x2 = 0]). Vector k, then, indexes all those instances where xk = τk/pik. In order
to find the optimal, a series of if conditions are formulated (from each 2N − 1 combinations of
Equation (3.18)) to enable the optimal to be found, while not violating the above conditions.
The ordering of the if statements is, however, crucial as often several optimality condition
ensure τi ≤ xipii,∀i. While this approach is feasible, the additional complexity, computing
time needed and issues of ordering meant that it was not used.
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C.5 Alternative Error Modelling
Within the specification of the error modelling two main assumptions are made. (1) E[Xi] =
x∗i , and (2) V ar(Xi) =
(x∗i (x
∗
0−x∗i ))
sˆ . While (1) is not particularly controversial, objections
could be made to (2) when considering the nature of the problem, with differing degrees of
complexity, κ. The variance of Xi could indeed depend on how many allocation decisions
need to be made, independent of x∗i . As a result three alternative error models, which define
s differently, have been used to estimate preference parameters:(A) sˆ = s, (B) sˆ = s.κ and (C)
sˆ = s.κγ . The three specifications allow for differing variance assumptions to enter into the
error modelling. (A) estimates s, with no consideration of the differing κ, while (B) assumes
a positive linear relationship between the precision parameter sˆ and κ. (C) parameterises this
relationship, including an additional parameter for estimation, γ, where γ ∈ [−1, 1], allowing
for flexibility which can be captured by γ. The choice of the error model has consequences
for the estimation of preference parameters, through its effect on the shape of the probability
density functions from which the log-likelihood is calculated.
Figure 3.14 shows individual-level goodness-of-fit results for the three error models, from
estimates within the standard model. The left panel shows the distribution of the likelihood
proportion, ι, for each error model. The higher ι the better the model is explaining individual
behaviour, relative to the uniform distribution, where ι < 0.5 implies that drawing randomly
(from a uniform distribution) better explains an individual’s behaviour. The distribution
shows that (A) performs worse that (B) and (C), while (B) and (C) are closely matched, with
the exception of the worst explained, for which (B) performs somewhat better. There are
10.53% of the sample for whom ι ≤ 0.5, in (A), 1.32% in (B) and 5.26% in (C).
Figure 3.14: Goodness-of-Fit for Alternative Error Models; Standard Model
While these distributions show only the aggregate distributions the middle panel shows
the distribution of the difference in ι between the models, for each individual. Take the solid
line for example, (A-B) shows the difference between ιA and ιB, the lower (and negative) the
value the better B performs, the higher (and positive) the better A performs. Both (A-B) and
(A-C) show that A tends to perform worse, with 61.84% and 63.16% higher ι values for B and
C, respectively. The third cdf (B-C) shows a similarity of performance between the two, with
C outperforming B for 52.63%. To identify for whom the error models perform better the
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right panel shows the aforementioned differences plotted against the mean PP to P1. Here
we observe that it is the more self-interested individuals for whom A tends to perform worse.
B outperforms A to a greater extent than C, for those individuals, however, it also tends to
perform worse than A for those who share more equally. C does not tend to have this latter
issue.
The reason for the differences in the right panel, can be explained by considering the
formula ai = x
∗
i (sˆ− 1). Model (A) has an issue when participants have a high degree of self-
interest. It models well behaviour for a particular N , as a1 > 1 and aj>1 < 1, meaning the
pdf asymptotes at x1 = 1. However, as x
∗
j>1 may be higher in rounds with lower N , aj>1 > 1,
meaning the pdf becomes uni-modal at an interior allocation, meaning at the bound (where
x1 = 1) the likelihood value is very low. Model (B) solves this issue, allowing ai to vary with
κ, however, it does so at the expense of those who are allocating more equally. For them
variance is perhaps not decreasing as κ increases, as indeed their decision problem becomes
more difficult to distribute equally. Model (C) then allows for the flexibility of estimation,
which ensures that the behaviour of the more self-interested is not modelled badly, but that
compensating for that does not lead to worse estimates for those who share more equally. An
additional parameter does need to be estimated in (C), but due to the above issues and the
additional information that γ carries (C) has been chosen for the main analysis.
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C.6 Clustering Amalgamated Preferences
Due to the high dimensionality of the preferences in the amalgamated utility function visu-
alising and describing the estimated parameters can be difficult. An alternative method of
understanding the distribution of preferences is through cluster analysis. A ‘mixture’ of indi-
vidual density functions which accurately fit the data can be estimated within a finite mixture
model (more details are found in Section 5.4 of Chapter 1). The multidimensional ellipses,
with specific mean and variance in each dimension, capture patterns in the distribution of
preferences. Below results are shown from finite mixture model results for r1, α, r0, b and τ .
10
Table 3.13 shows results where three clusters are optimal (allowing mclust to search between
0 and 5 clusters), while Table 3.14 shows results where eight clusters are optimal (allowing
mclust to search between 0 and 15 clusters).
In Table 3.13 we observe that the sample is split into three clusters, the largest is Cluster
C (49%), followed by Cluster A (30%), with Cluster B as the smallest (21%). Cluster A
consists of those who are slightly averse to inequality, with a high level of congestion and
some concern for a minimum threshold. This cluster are the most tightly packed, with the
lowest variance for all parameters, bar b, in particular with regard to the inequality aversion
parameters. Cluster B consists of weakly ‘weighted prioritarians’, who have zero congestion
and, again, and some concern for a minimum threshold. For b variance is very low, but for
each other parameter it lies between A and C. Cluster C captures those who are the most
averse to inequality and have the largest τ . There is a degree of congestion, more than B,
but less than A, while the variance is the largest for all preferences. The mean self-interest
remains similar across the clusters, but is the lowest in C. The mean levels and variance of r1
and r0 are similar within each cluster.
Table 3.13: Finite Mixture Model for Amalgamated Preference Parameters: Three Clusters
Cluster
A B C
Mean Mean Mean
(Var.) (Var.) (Var.)
Ineq. Aversion, r1 -0.17 1.77 7.03
(0.07) (2.76) (26.31)
Self-Interest, α 0.77 0.77 0.65
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08)
Ineq. Aversion, r0 -0.26 1.59 7.57
(0.11) (3.24) (28.50)
Congestion, b 0.69 0.00 0.33
(0.12) (0.00) (0.13)
Min. Threshold, τ 1.04 0.84 3.69
(1.02) (1.28) (33.24)
Proportions 0.30 0.21 0.49
In Table 3.14 an extended number of clusters accounts for a greater extent of the het-
erogeneity in preferences. As above the clusters are ordered in relation to r1, with Cluster
A capturing a efficiency prioritarian standpoint, while Cluster H encompassed an extreme
10To reduce issues of outliers the r1 and r0 estimates greater than 15, where capped at a value of 15.
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aversion to inequality. As before r0 and r1 appear similar within most clusters, with the
exception of Cluster E which captures those who have a higher self-other inequality aversion
and Cluster H within which between-other inequality aversion is higher. Self-interest varies
to a greater extent between clusters, with the lowest α in Cluster F, this is however, mainly
due to the large τ which we observe. Congestion is very low in Clusters D and G and high in
Cluster A, while the minimum threshold levels are highest in C and F. Interesting differences
between similar clusters can be observed. Clusters D and G have similarly low b and τ , but
G has higher inequality aversion and lower self-interest. Cluster C and D have similar levels
of inequality aversion, but C has much higher congestion, higher τ and lower α. Clusters G
and H have similar levels of r1, but H has much higher α and a higher r0, while congestion is
higher and τ is lower in H.
Table 3.14: Finite Mixture Model for Amalgamated Preference Parameters: Eight Clusters
Cluster
A B C D E F G H
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(Var.) (Var.) (Var.) (Var.) (Var.) (Var.) (Var.) (Var.)
Ineq. Aversion, r1 -0.29 0.04 1.29 2.10 6.18 8.25 10.01 10.35
(0.04) (0.11) (3.70) (2.77) (25.64) (19.16) (0.65) (22.83)
Self-Interest, α 0.68 0.88 0.50 0.72 0.89 0.27 0.45 0.99
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Ineq. Aversion, r0 -0.25 0.05 1.76 1.81 3.82 9.43 10.47 14.37
(0.11) (0.66) (6.69) (3.57) (8.51) (15.13) (6.98) (2.38)
Congestion, b 0.97 0.30 0.66 0.00 0.41 0.28 0.00 0.24
(0.00) (0.08) (0.05) (0.00) (0.11) (0.14) (0.00) (0.11)
Min. Threshold, τ 1.03 0.96 3.05 0.81 1.10 12.14 1.49 0.38
(0.32) (1.57) (6.72) (1.33) (4.10) (48.01) (1.02) (0.29)
Proportions 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.09
Through using finite mixture models the complexities of heterogeneous multidimensional
preferences can be more easily summarised, and through it interesting differences within the
sample observed.
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C.7 Mismatches Between Rankings
While the main analysis identifies ‘types’ of individuals by considering the information cri-
teria for a combined measure of goodness-of-fit and prediction, there are concerns related to
the mismatch in the ‘ranking’ of alternative utility functions. Here a deeper look into the
mismatches between rankings based on the differences between Residual Sum of Squares and
Log-Likeihood and amongst alternative error models.
C.7.1 Residual Sum of Squares or Log-Likelihood
The Residual Sum of Squares (RSS), identifies the difference between the optimal and observed
allocations. Likelihood, identifies the probability that the allocation is observed, given the
utility and error model assumed. The former asks how close, the second how probable.
Through this alternative criteria differences in which model is considered best will inevitably
emerge. In the main analysis the log-likelihood was the metric used, as indeed the estimation
procedure was based on maximising the log-likelihood. Here, the differences between the two
can be analysed.
Table 3.15 shows the rankings of utility functions, if the utility functions had been com-
pared using RSS, rather than the log-likelihood values (in Table 3.7). Comparing Table 3.15
with Table 3.7, we observe similar trends. The amalgamated model does better within raw
RSS fit, than prediction, and in RSS compared to IC, while the standard model does the
opposite. Final IC results for both are somewhat similar, the modal type is standard, with
the lowest being amalgamated. Standard, stone-geary and amalgamated are ‘best’ for more
individuals, while fisman and andreoni are best for fewer individuals (compared to the log-
likelihood IC). When comparing matching within-individuals we observe 51.31%, 59.21% and
59.21% of the sample have matched rankings for GOF, Pred and Both, respectively.
Table 3.15: Utility Types: Ranked by Residual Sum of Squares and Information Criterion
Residual Sum of Squares Information Criterion
GOF Predict Both GOF Predict Both
Standard 6 20 9 39 46 40
Fisman 21 18 19 5 10 10
Andreoni 12 14 13 16 12 13
Stone-Geary 12 12 14 11 5 11
Amalgamated 25 11 20 5 3 2
C.7.2 Alternative Error Modelling
In Appendix C.5 three alternatives error models, (A) sˆ = s, (B) sˆ = s.κ and (C) sˆ = s.κγ
are discussed. Using preference estimates from each of (A), (B) and (C), similar rankings to
those in Table 3.7 can be conducted. The result of assuming an alternative error model may,
lead to different compositions of ‘types’ in the sample. Table 3.16 shows the composition of
‘types’, by using the information criteria, for each alternative error model.
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Table 3.16: Mismatches in Error Models: Ranked by Information Criterion
(A) (B) (C)
Standard 49 42 33
Fisman 9 14 13
Andreoni 11 12 21
Stone-Geary 6 3 9
Amalgamated 1 5 0
Results show that, in comparison to (C) which is used in the main analysis, there is one
more amalgamated type in (A), five more in (B). There are lower numbers of andreoni types
in both alternatives, while the number fisman types is the lower in (A), and higher in (B).
The number of standard types is higher in both (A) and (B), while stone-geary types are both
lower. While these results are sample aggregates, of most interest is how many subjects are
classed as the same ‘type’ in the alternative models. Those of the same ‘types’ in (A) and (B)
are 65.8%, with 55.3% between (A) and (C) and 59.2% between (B) and (C). There are 69.7%
for whom two or more models designate the same ‘type’, with 44.7% who have the same type
in all three.
While it is clear that mismatches between rankings do occur, whether that be the metric used
to identify the ‘goodness’ of the model or from differing estimates according to alternate error
models, one main result remains. There is still heterogeneity in which models are ‘best’. In
none of the specifications does one particular utility function dominate and best explain all
individual’s behaviour.
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Conclusion
Preferences relating to inequality aversion and self-interest have been explored throughout
this thesis. Through running incentivised laboratory and lab-in-the-field experiments proso-
cial behaviour has been observed and preferences at the individual, cluster and sample level
have been estimated to account for such behaviour. The perspectives from which decisions are
made, alongside the particularities of the design of the experiment, are shown to have large
effects on the behaviour of individuals and the preference parameters subsequently estimated.
The effect of oneness, the closeness of connection to others, was investigated, modelled and
found to have a large and significant impact on giving behaviour; where distinctions between
self-other and between-others trade-offs emerged. Finally, the effects of increasing the num-
ber of recipients on giving behaviour has been investigated, with both the goodness-of-fit
and predictive accuracy of alternative utility functions compared. This conclusion will draw
out the contributions of this thesis, explore some limitations and possible extensions, before
discussing proposed future research.
***
In general, this thesis contributes to our understanding of prosocial behaviour and other-
regarding preferences. The incentivised experiments are run to provide novel datasets allowing
for the observation of prosocial behaviour for both student and general population samples.
Extensive individual-level observations are gathered within each experiment, across different
treatments and decision problems. In each instance the experimental data is complemented
by in-depth survey data. Throughout, structural models are formulated which build upon
existing models; either by providing generalisations, incorporating additional behavioural as-
sumptions or amalgamating functional forms. Within these models preference parameters are
estimated, to strive to explain the observed behaviour and providing insights into the value
judgements that participants have. The stochastic nature of behaviour is further modelled,
with the Beta and Dirichlet distributions proposed as random behavioural models. These
error models allow for a greater flexibility in the stochastic nature of decision making, are
generalisable to N dimensions and can be easily extended to other constrained allocation
problems.
In particular, the main contributions of the three chapters are as follows. The first chapter
contributes to existing research by identifying within-subject treatment effects between mul-
tiple designs and alternative perspectives. The three-person design of the experiment enables
the estimation (and elicitation) of preferences parameters when participants are both partial
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and impartial agents. The second chapter contributes to the literature by proposing a CES
utility function which incorporates oneness levels, to account for the explanatory power that
social distance can have on individual decision making. By estimating preferences relating to
inequality aversion, self-interest and oneness, the intricacies of their interactions are explored
and individual-level behaviour, observed in a lab-in-the-field experiment, is explained. The
third chapter contributes by adopting a within-subject design which allows for the complexi-
ties of both self-other and between-other trade-offs to be observed as the number of recipients
increase. Individual-level preference parameters are estimated within five alternative mod-
els, allowing for both the goodness-of-fit and predictive power of the respective models to be
analysed.
Methodologically this thesis has contributed in several ways. In terms of experimental
design, novel computer interfaces have been programmed for each of the experiments run;
with multiple designs being tested and compared within the first chapter. The precision and
complexities of the laboratory were extended to a lab-in-the-field setting, with the use of
touch-screen tablets. This removed barriers of computer literacy (due to the intuitive nature
of touch-screen technology) and social desirability bias (caused by a lack of anonymity, from
experimenters recording responses face-to-face) in the lab-in-the-field context. The program-
ming code produced throughout the thesis also provides a contribution. The code for the
experiments allows others to replicate and adapt the experiments ran, while the analytical
code enables others to perform similar descriptive, econometric and structural estimation
(particularly in relation to the error modelling). Finally, the range and differing intensity of
the analytical methods used is important. Behaviour and preferences have been analysed at
each the sample, cluster and individual level, using descriptive, econometric and structural
methods. Dependent on the context, one approach may be more appropriate for a particular
strand of research than another; it is, therefore, hoped that of the methods used here, some
can be appropriate for future researchers needs.
***
As in all research there are limitations to this thesis. The limitations discussed below
relate to the representativeness and size of the sample, the domain of the incentives and
computational burden. The first set of limitations are frequently observed in experimental
research. Within the laboratory experiments there is a lack of representativeness in the
sample, as the majority of participants are students. This means that generalisations of
behaviour and preferences cannot be made. To solve this issue the general population could
be recruited to the experiment, however, this is often impractical and costly (both in terms
of organisation and monetary payoffs). Within the second chapter, the general population
were recruited within the lab-in-the-field experiment, increasing the representativeness of the
sample. This was feasible as the issues of costs of monetary payoffs are minimised, due to
the lower average earnings in the developing context. The sample is, however, still far from
being representative, with the urban populace, more highly educated and wealthy being over
represented. In the case of the latter the sample could be weighted to ensure a more accurate
representation of the general population. However, this was not done. The sample size is
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still not particularly large, and so such methods are not very reliable, especially with such
a high degree of heterogeneity in behaviour. As a result the thesis does not claim that the
preference parameters estimated are population preference parameters. The aim is rather
to test economic theory and establish the models, and preference parameters within those
models, which best fit the observed behaviour.
The second limitation relates to the domain in which participants are incentivised. Through-
out each experiment monetary incentives are used. Therefore, the preference parameters es-
timated relate to money in particular. Participants could have alternative preferences over
different domains. For instance, the degree of self-interest and level of inequality aversion
could differ in the domains of health, education and income. Indeed, comparisons in Chap-
ter 1 show substantial differences between inequality aversion over income and health. It is,
however, difficult to incentivise other domains in an experimental setting, without breaking
ethical practices.11 If these domains cannot be incentivised, an alternative could be to use
surveys which ask participants for their stated preference. This alternative does, however,
raise concerns from experimentalists, as the potential for particular biases creep in when such
decisions are not incentivised; meaning that observed differences could be due to such biases
rather than an underlying difference. The point highlights another limitation of the thesis, as
the survey data, which accompanies the experimental data, is not incentivised. As a result
biases could lead to a misreporting of the demographics and opinions elicited in the survey.
Finally, a limitation which would perhaps not be apparent is that of computational burden.
Throughout the analysis of the experimental data, one particular issue was that of the compu-
tation time taken to estimate structural preference parameters. As the thesis progressed the
analysis became more sophisticated and due to work in the third chapter, the computational
time needed to re-estimate structural parameters in the first and second chapter was signif-
icantly reduced. In the third chapter, however, the high dimensionality of the optimisation
procedure led to a high computational burden. If higher dimensions were required, then this
could lead to further issues.
***
In addition to the limitations of the thesis, extensions of the thesis are also proposed.
Throughout the thesis, the theoretical framework considers one family of functional forms,
namely constant elasticity of substitution (CES). An extension could be to compare these
models to others in the literature; for example, E. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton (1991)
or Cappelen et al. (2007). Within other models alternative behavioural assumptions are
used, and therefore different preference parameters can be estimated. The goodness-of-fit
and predictive accuracy could be compared, identifying which of the functional forms best
models the data. Similarly, alternative error models could be compared. Within the random
behavioural framework, a standard (truncated) normal error model could be compared to the
Beta and Dirichlet distributions, or indeed the random behavioural models could be compared
to either random utility or random preference models. A broader approach, before estimating
11As voiced by John Hey, one cannot go around amputating limbs in experiments.
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structural preference parameters, would be to conduct tests of rationality. Measuring the
extent of GARP violations, using the Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI), is one example
of such a test. The scope for additional research adopting alternative models is extensive, but
with the experimental data gathered is entirely plausible.
The incorporation of preferences relating to risk into models of other regarding preferences
could be a further extension. Some of the distributional decision problems presented within
the experiments could have been interpreted within the context of risky decision making. In
the first chapter, decisions made under the veil of ignorance could have been considered as a
risky decision between the possible realised positions of either player. In the budget treatment
of the second chapter, participants knew the five others in the room, but did not know to
whom they were allocating. Therefore, behaviour could be modelled considering the expected
utility of a gamble between the possible realisation of the five other participants being either
Player 2 or Player 3, rather than assuming that participants weight the payoffs to the others
with the expected oneness levels. These extensions have been tentatively explored in the
respective chapters, but further more rigorous analysis could be conducted.
A methodological extension relates to cluster analysis. The cluster analysis within the
thesis relies either on splitting the sample into clusters based on average levels of giving
and then estimating representative preference parameters, or on estimating individual level
preference parameters and then clustering to characterise the estimates. An extension to this
would be to estimate the clusters and preferences simultaneously. This would provide a more
complete analysis than the former analysis used and require less extensive individual data,
than the latter. Mixtures of Dirichlet distributions could be formulated, rather than mixtures
of Gaussian densities, enabling greater flexibility and explanatory power.
While the work in the thesis is somewhat abstract, one possible extension would be into
real world charitable donations. The various elements which constitute giving behaviour ex-
plored in this thesis are important considerations of real world donations. The ‘abstract’
preferences explored underpin giving behaviour in general. So, through running representa-
tive, or donor specific, experiments which have concrete examples of charities programmes
and incorporate these ‘abstract’ elements, insights into real world charitable giving could be
gained. Fundraising packages could then be tailored to individuals, or clusters of individu-
als, to increase charitable donations, for example. A speculative analysis of this extension is
carried out in the third chapter, but this could be extended further to incorporate oneness,
perspective and concrete real world examples.
***
Building upon the research in the thesis I aim to extend the consideration of ‘distribu-
tional’ aspects of inequality to account for those aspects which are ‘dynamic’. The two are
inextricably interwoven and through incorporating both elements interesting behavioural in-
sights can be gained. Central to this research will be two papers. The first, “Giving to
Others and the Future Self”, focuses on the relation between other-regarding preferences and
time preferences. By incorporating closeness measures to others and the future-self, the ex-
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tent to which behaviour changes due to the strength of connection to either entity can be
explored. The trade-offs that individuals make between the self, future-self and others will
be modelled and these models tested using data from incentivised laboratory experiments.
To initialise investigations into this research I conducted a pilot study at the Choice Lab,
NHH. The results are promising, and this provides a platform from which to begin postdoc-
toral research. The second paper, “Intergenerational Allocations in an Uncertain World”,
delves into dynamic decision making. This work will consider how individuals make distribu-
tional decisions, both between and within ‘generations’. By nesting a modified dictator game
within a multi-period risky intergenerational problem, individual behaviour will be observed
and preferences, synonymous with ethical value judgements, will be estimated in incentivised
laboratory and lab-in-the-field experiments.
***
To conclude, humans are complex, varied and fallible. By utilising structural models which
incorporate behavioural constructs, accounting for heterogeneity in preferences and rational-
ising noise in decision making, economists can strive to better explain human behaviour. It
is clear that other-regarding preferences are an integral component of human nature, and
influence how we act in certain circumstances. This work aims to further this understanding,
allowing economists to move away from supposing that self-love is the only motivating factor
of humanity.
Economists are born free; and everywhere they are in chains (cf. Rousseau, 1651). Chained
to suppose that self-love alone defines humanity. But fools, “Wisedome is acquired, not by
reading of Books, but of Men” (Hobbes, 1651). Through relaxing the constricting assumption
of self-love economists have nothing to lose but their chains (cf. Marx and Engels, 1846).
They have the world to explain.
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